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The First Constitutional Tort:
The Remedial Revolution in
Nineteenth-Century State
Just Compensation Law
Robert Brauneis

52 Vand. L. Rev. 57 (1999)

This Article traces the change in the remedial framework of
nineteenth-century owner-initiated state constitutional just compensation
litigation, and explores the relationship between that change and substantive
changes in just compensation doctrine. Through the Civil War, owners
complaining of government-sanctioned seizure of their property brought
common-law tort actions against whomever might be held liable under
ordinary tort and agency law. Defendants in those suits claimed that some
piece of legislationaltered tort law to shield them from liabilityfor their acts.
Plaintiff owners responded that the legislation on which defendants relied
was void, because it purported to authorize acts that amounted to takings of
private property, but did not provide for just compensation. Within this
framework, just compensationprovisions in constitutions imposed disabilities
on the legislature but did not impose remedial duties or provide rights of
action. PartI of the Article reconstructs both the remedialframework and the
basic substantive doctrine that governed antebellum just compensation
litigation,and explains why that litigationtook the form it did.
In the 1870s and 1880s, state courts began to articulatea new framework for owner-initiatedjust compensation litigation,suggesting that a right
of action forjust compensation was either implied or explicit injust compensation provisions themselves. PartII of this Article traces the emergence of this
new framework, and explores both the possible causes of the change and its
practicalsignificance for owners. It concludes that the change in framework
had strong ties to the emergence of just compensation amendments that
expanded protection to cover not just "taking"ofprivate property, but "taking
or damage." Those amendments led courts to think of just compensation
provisions as positive enactments rather than as declarations, making
available a tradition of recognizing implied private rights of action under
statutes, and made it difficult for courts to continue to use the common-law
tort actionframework, because the protection afforded by the amendments was
arguablygreaterin some cases than common-law tort protection. In turn, the
change in framework seemed to result in at least one important substantive
change: owners became able to seek permanent damages injust compensation
suits. On the other hand, the new implied right of action framework had little
immediate impact on the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
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I. INTRODUCTON

A decade after First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles,' the idea that the federal and state just compensation clauses provide a private right of action for damages is a
familiar one. Indeed, it is tempting to think that just compensation
clauses have always been read to impose a judicially enforceable duty
to pay just compensation that is triggered when a government takes
or authorizes the taking of private property. Most legal commentators point to the 1971 case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics2 as the first instance in which the
Supreme Court suggested that individual rights provisions in the
Federal Constitution generally could give rise to damages actions.3
1.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of LA, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause, as incorporated against the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment, mandates a damages remedy for the period a confiscatory
land-use regulation has been in effect).
2.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 39597 (1971) (holding that petitioner was entitled to recover damages upon proof of injuries
suffered when federal agents entered and searched his apartment without a warrant and
arrested him on narcotics charges without probable cause, in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment).
3.

See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION

§

9.1.2, at 526 (2d ed. 1994)

("Prior to [Bivens], although courts protected constitutional rights through injunctive relief and
doctrines such as the exclusionary rule, plaintiffs were not allowed to sue federal officers for
monetary remedies in federal court."); KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.5, at 253 (3d ed. 1994) ("The Court created a whole new
category of torts in [Bivens]."); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1508 n.321 (1987) [hereinafter Amar, Of Sovereignty] (stating that Bivens extended the
notion that the Constitution provided a self-executing cause of action to suits for damages at
law; this had been previously acknowledged by the Supreme Court with regard to suits in equity
in Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
More recently, scholars such as Michael Collins and Ann Woolhandler have argued that
even in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court approved of actions for damages that may
be best described as actions implied under the Constitution, because the Court considered the
actions as raising a federal question even under the well-pleaded complaint rule, or because the
Court was not punctilious in respecting state rules of procedure even though the plaintiffs
cause of action was supposed to be a state common law action. See Michael G. Collins,
"Economic Rights," Implied ConstitutionalActions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J.
1493, 1517-25 (1989) (describing a line of Supreme Court cases recognizing damage claims that
the Court held raised a federal question on the face of a well-pleaded complaint); Ann
Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of ConstitutionallyCompelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J.
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Although the term "constitutional tort" was apparently coined six
years before Bivens,4 it has become closely associated with the Bivens
Court's recognition of a damages remedy springing directly from the
Constitution. 5 But the courts and litigants in Bivens, while
disagreeing about whether individual rights provisions generally (and
the Fourth Amendment in particular) could serve as swords rather
than as shields, 6 all agreed on one thing: the Just Compensation
Clause was a sword. The Second Circuit's opinion in Bivens generally
rejected a private damages action under the Constitution, but
specifically distinguished the Takings Clause as "a purer example of a
constitutional right with a necessarily implied remedy."7 Because
"[t]he right to just compensation [could] scarcely be vindicated other
than by securing just compensation," Chief Judge Lumbard wrote, the
Supreme Court had held the Takings Clause to "creat[e] a duty to pay
upon the government even in the absence of specific statutory
authorization for suits to enforce the right to just compensation." 8
Defending the Second Circuit's judgment in the Supreme Court, the
United States argued that "the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
was [solely] to insure that similar defenses would be disallowed in
state common law actions," 9 but conceded that the Just Compensation
Clause had been held to ground a right of action for damages against
the government, a holding that it attributed to the Clause's direct
mention of just compensation. 10 Sixteen years later, in FirstEnglish,

77, 102-11 (1997) (arguing that federal procedure was often more favorable than state procedure
to litigants raising federal constitutional claims). The phenomena Collins and Woolhandler
describe are interesting and important, but fall far short of a self-conscious, articulated decision
by the nineteenth-century Supreme Court that the Constitution provides a damages action
independent of the common law or the general law. As this Article will show, see infra text
accompanying notes 239-46, post-Civil War state courts did articulate such a decision with
regard to state just compensation clauses.
4.
Marshall S. Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pap, and the FrontiersBeyond, 60
Nw. U. L. REV. 277, 277 (1965) (coining this term in the article's title).
5.
See T. Hunter Jefferson, Note, Constitutional Wrongs and Common Law Principles:
The Case for the Recognition of State ConstitutionalTort Actions againstState Governments, 50
VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1528 (1997) ("The concept of a 'constitutional tort' first entered the
American legal landscape in Bivens ... in 1971.") (footnote omitted).
6.
The metaphor comes from Walter Dellinger's famous commentary on Bivens. See
Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1532 (1972).
7.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 723
(2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
8.
Id. (citing Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933)). The Supreme Court, reversing the Second Circuit, cited Jacobs as precedent for allowing an individual to redress his
injury by means of damages. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
9.
Brief for the Respondents at 4, Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (No. 301).
10. See id. at 15-16 (discussing Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16).
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the United States attempted to retract its concession, submitting an
amicus brief arguing that the Just Compensation Clause did not
mandate a damages remedy."
The Supreme Court, however,
brushed aside this volte-face and held that the Just Compensation
Clause required retrospective damages for the period a confiscatory
land-use regulation was in effect. Moreover, the Court hinted that
the Clause may abrogate sovereign immunity, allowing a property

owner to name a state or the United States in just compensation
litigation.12 That would give property owners an advantage that even
the Bivens Court, riding on the Warren-era wave of remedial
expansiveness, was unwilling to give constitutional rightholders
s
generally.1
The truth, however, is that for most of the nineteenth century,
just compensation clauses were generally understood not to create
remedial duties, but to impose legislative disabilities. 14 . An antebellum court did not ask whether a legislatively authorized act amounted
to a taking of private property, and enter a judgment for just compensation if it did. Rather, the court asked whether the act purportedly
authorized by the legislation amounted to a taking, and if so, whether
the legislation itself provided for just compensation. 5 If not, the legislation was void: the legislature had exceeded its competence, which
the Constitution limited to the authorization of "takings-with-just-

11. See Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 9-26, First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of L-A, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (No. 85-1199).
12. See FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 316 n.9 (rejecting the Solicitor General's argument "that
the prohibitory nature of the Fifth Amendment, combined with principles of sovereign immunity, establishes that the Amendment itself is only a limitation on the power of the Government
to act, not a remedial provision") (internal citation omitted); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COuRTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1002 (4th ed. 1996) (commenting
that footnote nine of First English suggests that "[slovereign immunity appears to play a more
limited role in %akings'cases"). I discuss FirstEnglish further, infra note 344.
13. For the Court's more recent confirmation of its unwillingness to go any further with
constitutional rights generally, see FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1994) (holding that a
Bivens action could not be brought against a federal agency). Although the preservation of
procedural sovereign immunity was not immediately at issue-the Court found that the agency
in question had waived its sovereign immunity, see id at 483-the refusal to recognize a
damages action against federal agencies for constitutional violations provides an even stronger
substantive immunity.
14. On the difference between legislative duties and disabilities, see H.LA. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 64-69 (1961). As Hart explains:
A constitution which effectively restricts the legislative powers of the supreme legislature in the system does not do so by imposing (or at any rate need not impose) duties on
the legislature not to attempt to legislate in certain ways; instead it provides that any
such purported legislation shall be void. It imposes not legal duties but legal disabilities. "Limits" here implies not the presence of duty but the absence of legal power.
I& at 68.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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compensation." Although the qualification in that limitation happened to involve the payment of money, the legal effect of exceeding
the limitation was, in theory, no different than exceeding a constitutional limitation incorporating a non-monetary qualification, such as
the Fourth Amendment's limitation of warrants to those that were
"issue[d] ... upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."16 The Constitution embodied a directive to
courts to treat nonconforming property legislation, like a
nonconforming warrant, as a nullity.
My goal in this Article is to trace the transition from that traditional understanding of just compensation provisions, as limitations
on legislative competence, to the modern notion that just compensation provisions provide owners a cause of action for damages when
their property is taken. My focus will be on the transition in state
constitutional law, for three principal reasons. First, the older understanding was much more fully developed in the states, because state
supreme courts decided hundreds of just compensation cases in the
nineteenth century, while the United States Supreme Court decided
only a handful. Second, a focus on state constitutions avoids the complicating factor of federalism; 17 though that factor is an important one,
it may be worthwhile to consider the evolution of just compenstion
doctrine in a simpler context. Third, the state constitutional transition occurred earlier, and to my knowledge provided the first examples of American courts explicitly reading constitutional provisions to
create private damage actions-hence my claim that the Article will
describe the creation of the "first constitutional tort."
One might assume that, under the traditional understanding,
property owners subject to uncompensated, state-authorized appropriations simply could not recover damages absent legislation establishing a procedure for doing so. If that were true, the story of the
16.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

17. Federalism-related reasons loomed very large, I suspect, in the creation of federal
constitutional torts generally. First, with the waxing of the principle that there is no federal
general common law, see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), federal courts lost
doctrinal control over the common law of torts, which was integral to the older 'justificationstripping" model of constitutional enforcement. (I describe the justification-stripping model
below at text accompanying notes 31-32.) To maintain control of federal constitutional
enforcement, federal courts needed a new model. Second, many federal judges became
concerned that federal rights would only be effectively enforced in federal courts; the
justification-stripping model, when combined with one version of the well-pleaded complaint
rule, left federal courts without jurisdiction over litigation initiated by rightsholders. On the
relationship of the justification-stripping model and the well-pleaded complaint rule, see
Woolhandler, supranote 3, at 100-05.
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transition from old to new understandings would be a story about how
property owners gained a damages remedy. That assumption, however, is not a valid one, and the truth makes the story of the transition much more complicated. Although just compensation provisions,
like many other constitutional provisions, were originally framed as
limitations on legislative competence, those limitations were designed
to operate within a vast, complicated, pre-existing common law context, including common law damage remedies. 18 A just compensation
provision's limitation on the competence of the legislature was, in
part, a limitation on its competence to abolish those pre-existing
damage remedies; it could do so only if it provided an alternative
remedy that a court found to be constitutionally adequate. 19
Thus, to figure out what kind of story to tell about the transition from a "legislative competence" understanding of just compensation provisions to a "remedial duty" understanding, we need to
broaden our perspective. We might define a useful horizon by considering, in legal realist fashion, that a property owner's just compensation rights are defined by the full set of rules specifying or accurately
predicting what a court will and will not do for him-rules that detail
when and from whom the owner can recover damages, what measure
of damages the owner can recover, and when and against whom the
owner can obtain injunctive relief. In the antebellum era, only a portion of those operative rules were expressed on the constitutional
plane. To recover the complete set, one must also look beyond the
Constitution, to common law forms of action such as trespass and
trespass on the case; to the common law of agency; to the common law
of sovereign immunity, governmental immunity, and individual officer
immunity; and to traditional principles of statutory interpretation.
Once we have recovered that set of rules, we are in a position
to inquire further into the meaning of the transition between old and
new understandings. In the body of this Article, I will attempt to
sketch the meaning that the transition actually had for state courts.
As an introductory matter, one might consider the range of possible
18. Even this statement fails to capture fully the integration of common law and constitution, because many constitutional provisions, including just compensation provisions, were
thought to express and preserve pre-existing common law principles. Thus, just compensation
provisions represent a principle that English judges, without a written constitution, enforced as
a strong canon of statutory construction, and occasionally as an absolute limit on legislative
power, see infra text accompanying notes 113, 118-26; many American state judges, faced with
state constitutions that did not contain just compensation provisions for most or all of the
antebellum period, did the same thing. See infra text accompanying notes 114-16. When
constitutional draftsmen penned just compensation provisions, they articulated this particular
principle, but left unarticulated its accompanying remedial framework
19. See infra note 34.
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meanings. It is possible that the transition would have no effect
whatsoever on the operative rules for property owners. One could
construct a constitutional cause of action that duplicated the rules
previously scattered throughout the common law, so that when a
taking occurred, the obligation to pay just compensation rested on
exactly those parties, and in exactly those amounts, as it did previously after working through the multiple layers of common law forms
of action, agency law, the law of immunities, and so on. Under this
option, the reconceptualization of just compensation provisions as
themselves providing a cause of action for damages could be seen as a
kind of "judicial codification": an effort on the part of courts to collect
existing rules and rationally order them, while clarifying their constitutional basis.
Alternatively, the shift to a "remedial duty" understanding of
just compensation provisions might be accompanied by some change
in operative rules. If it were, one could then inquire into the relationship between the shift in understanding and the change in operative
rules. One might first ask whether there was any logical link between the two, and if so, how tight it was. For example, one change in
the operative rules that appears to have actually accompanied the
shift in understanding in the state courts concerns the ability of a
property owner to obtain a judgment for permanent damages. Under
the old model, owners were subject to the common law rule that successful plaintiffs in trespass and case could recover only retrospective
damages, and could get prospective relief only in the form of an
injunction or judgment in ejectment. 2 About the same time that
courts began to understand just compensation provisions to provide
causes of action, however, they also began to allow suits for
permanent damages, and to refuse injunctive relief more often. Was
there a logical link between the two, or was it just coincidence? If
there was a link, in which direction did the line of causation run?
Were courts led to believe that an action for permanent damages was
appropriate, which then led them to reconceive just compensation
provisions as self-contained causes of action not subject to
Or, conversely, did courts
inappropriate common law rules?
reconceive just compensation provisions as remedial provisions for
other reasons, which reconception then led them to think more in
terms of presumptively permanent "takings for public use" for which
"just compensation" would naturally be permanent damages?

20.

See infra text accompanying notes 182-90.
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Yet another possibility is that courts were led to modify the
operative rules because of a change in the language of just compensation provisions themselves, and that this modification of operative
rules influenced courts to break out of the old understanding of just
compensation provisions as limits on legislative competence.
Although the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause has never
been amended, state just compensation provisions were frequently
amended in the nineteenth century, and some amendments moved
from state to state in waves of concern about some matter or another.
Popular amendments included provisions more precisely specifying
21
the measure of just compensation in partial condemnation cases;
provisions specifying that compensation needed to be paid or deposited before the taking;22 and provisions specifying a mode of assessing
compensation (often requiring a jury).2 The most popular amendment, however, was one that was intended to expand the scope of just
compensation protection, typically by providing that just compensation was required, not just when property was "taken," but when
property was "taken or damaged."2 Faced with this amendment,
courts did decide that it required them to extend the scope of just
compensation protection. Did that alteration of operative rules lead
to the demise of the legislative competence understanding? These are
the kind of questions I think are worth asking and attempting to answer.
The first section of Part II of this Article undertakes the task
of recovering the contours of antebellum owner-initiated just compensation litigation. It sketches the various doctrines that defined a
property owner's remedial options when he believed he had been
aggrieved by acts purportedly authorized by the legislature. At the
same time, it reveals the common law procedural framework in which
these doctrines were organized. Owner-initiated just compensation
litigation before the Civil War typically proceeded in three stages. An
owner who believed that his property had been taken by eminent
domain, like an owner who believed that his property had been sub-

21.

See, e.g., IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 18 (specifying that a jury assessing just

compensation "shall not take into consideration any advantages that may result to said owner
on account of the improvement for which [the private property] is taken).
22. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 14 ("Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made to, or paid into Court
for, the owner. ... ") (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 13 ("[Just] compensation, when not made by the
state, shall be ascertained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law.").
24. See infra text accompanying notes 265-72.
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ject to an unlawful search or seizure,2 brought an ordinary common
law action of trespass or trespass on the case against whomever might
be held liable at common law for the occupation or asportation of his
property.2 These defendants might include the individuals who actually committed the acts and the corporate or political bodies potentially liable for those acts under the common law of agency (so long as
the common law of sovereign immunity did not render those bodies
unreachable). 7 If the defendant's acts would otherwise give rise to
liability at common law, the defendant could proceed to the second
stage of litigation and seek to justify those acts by appealing to
legislation that authorized them and thus altered the common law.
It was then up to the plaintiff to introduce a third stage, by
appealing to a just compensation provision (or, if there was no specific
just compensation provision, the common law principle of just compensation, perhaps as implicitly encompassed in some other constitutional provision), and arguing that the legislation invoked by the
defendant violated that provision, because it authorized acts that
worked a taking of private property, but provided no just compensation to those whose property had been taken. Here, finally, the disabling character of just compensation provisions became evident. If
the plaintiffs argument prevailed, the court declared the legislation
void, and the defendant's justification failed. Once the defendant was
stripped of his justification, the plaintiff could recover the retrospective damages normally allowed under his common law action, and
could obtain prospective relief by means of an action of ejectment or a
suit in equity seeking an injunction.
The second section of Part II takes the project of developing
antebellum just compensation doctrine one step further by inquiring
into the reasons why just compensation litigation took this
"justification-stripping" form28-why plaintiffs initiated legal proceedings by bringing a common law action, to which defendants
typically responded by appealing to a legislative justification, which
plaintiffs in turn argued should be nullified.
One common
explanation is that this form was developed to circumvent sovereign
immunity, because it allowed plaintiffs to recover damages
from
individuals and entities that could not claim the absolute immunity
25. See infra text accompanying notes 201-06 (discussing the traditional remedial
structure under the Fourth Amendment).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 36-46.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 47-107.
28. I use the term "justification-stripping" instead of the commonly used term "immunitystripping." See infra note 32.
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from suit enjoyed by the state. While acknowledging that this
explanation has some appeal, I explore an alternative or
supplemental explanation, arguing that the structure was wellestablished as a device to discipline executive action, and that it was
adapted to the project of disciplining the legislature as that became of
greater concern to constitutional framers and courts.
The first section of Part III documents the transition in state
courts to the modern understanding of just compensation provisions
as directly imposing remedial duties. That transition, I argue, occurred largely between 1870 and 1890. Courts often began to use
language suggesting that the state constitution's just compensation
provision gave rise to a damages action without further explanation or
acknowledgment that they were doing something new. When they did
attempt some further explanation, they most often appealed to the
tradition of actions upon statutes-of implying private rights of action
in statutes that did not explicitly grant them.
In the remainder of Part III, I explore the relationship between
this transition and the operative rules defining a property owner's
just compensation rights, with the aim of determining more broadly
the meaning of the transition. My approach is selective; rather than
canvassing every possible relationship, I focus on what may be the
most important and interesting one: the relationship to the "taking or
29
damage" amendments eventually adopted by over half of the states.
The primary inspiration for these amendments was an Act of
Parliament that English courts had interpreted as granting property
owners a cause of action for damages; that fact alone made it natural
for courts to think that the amendment was similarly intended to
grant a damages action, and brought into play an existing tradition of
implying damages actions in statutes. Perhaps more importantly,
many courts also interpreted the "taking or damage" clauses to render
actionable some injuries that were not actionable at common law.
The expansion of constitutional liability beyond common law liability
may have made it difficult to continue use of the justificationstripping model, because under that model owners initiated litigation
under a common law form of action, and recovered according to
common law rules of liability when the defendant's attempt to justify
failed. Oddly enough, many courts concluded that the "taking or
damage" amendments expanded liability "beyond that known at
common law" because the courts considered the principal general rule
limiting takings liability-the rule deeming consequential injuries
29.

See infra text accompanying notes 247-72.
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that were privately actionable not to be takings30-to be a common
law rule. I argue that this was symptomatic of a realization by courts
that the rules defining the powers of public entities with regard to
private property could not be reduced to the rules governing
relationships between owners and other private parties.
The
realization that just compensation law was irreducibly public may
have contributed to the rejection of the old model, which through its
reliance on common law actions embodied the assumption that
constitutional liability was coterminous with, or a simple subset of,
private liability.
Having given full consideration to the relationship between the
transition to a remedial duty model of just compensation provisions
and courts' attempts to come to grips with the "taking or damage"
amendments, I close by briefly exploring the relationship between
that transition and two other sets of operative rules: the rules about
the availability of permanent damages and injunctive relief, and the
rules of agency and immunity law determining the parties against
whom just compensation judgments can be entered.
II. OWNER-INITIATED NON-STATUTORY JUST COMPENSATION
LITIGATION IN THE ANTEBELLUM ERA

Sometime before the Civil War, an owner comes to believe that
his property has been appropriated under state authorization without
just compensation. He wants to bring a lawsuit to vindicate his right
under the state constitution's just compensation clause. How will
litigation proceed? In this Part, I will first describe the typical form of
owner-initiated just compensation litigation in the first half of the
nineteenth century, and the legal rules and choices encountered at
each stage. I will then place just compensation litigation in the context of other litigation of that era to explain why it took the form it
did.
A. The Justification-StrippingForm and its Contents
Owner-initiated just compensation litigation before the Civil
War typically proceeded in three stages, with the constitutional issue
entering only at the third stage. First, a property owner would bring
a common law action of trespass or trespass on the case against a
30.

See infra text accompanying notes 301-03.
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government official or a corporation. Second, the defendant would
seek to justify acts otherwise remediable at common law by invoking
a statute that authorized him to do those acts. Third, the plaintiff
would argue that the statute, if it indeed purported to authorize the
defendant's acts, was unconstitutional, because the authorized acts
amounted to a taking and the statute did not provide for just compensation. If the court found the statute to be unconstitutional, it would
proclaim it void and without effect, thus depriving the defendant of
his justification and re-exposing him to common law liability. Chief
Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained
that, by 1836, courts took this remedial structure for granted:
[S]upposing that [an] act could be so construed, as to confer a power on [a]
corporation to take private property for public use, without providing for an
equitable assessment, and for the payment of an adequate indemnity, the act
would, in this respect, be in contravention of the constitution of this
Commonwealth, and in this respect void; and so would not afford the
justification relied on. The consequence would be, that the party damaged
would be remitted to his remedy at common law; the wrongful act would stand
unjustified by legislative grant. This has been so often decided in this
Commonwealth, that it must be taken as a settled principle. 31

Because, under this model of litigation, the just compensation provision operates to deny the defendant his statutory justification, I will
call it the "justification-stripping" model.3 2

31.

Thacher v. Dartmouth Bridge Co., 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 501, 502 (1836) (citing Stevens

v. Proprietors of the Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 466 (1815); Chadwick v. Proprietors of
Haverhill Bridge, 2 Dane's Abr. 686 (Mass. 1787)).
32. I am aware that this method of enforcing constitutional provisions often goes by the
name "immunity-stripping." I use the term 'justification-stripping" to avoid a particular type of
confusion that might be engendered by "immunity-stripping." Under the model I am describing,
just compensation clauses operated only to strip defendants of a statutory justification, and thus
only came into play if the defendant needed that statutory justification to avoid common law
liability. A defendant might avoid liability without statutory justification by invoking common
law sovereign immunity, defined broadly to include what now might be identified separately as
governmental immunity and official immunity. Because a just compensation clause did not
strip defendants of these common law immunities, the model I am describing is not, in this
sense, an "immunity-stripping" model. Cf Ann Woolhandler, Patternsof Official Immunity and
Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 396, 409 n.62 (1987) ("Legal justification protects only

an official who has acted legally, while an immunity may be defined as protection for illegal
acts.").

Other scholars have developed slightly different terminology to describe the aspects of

nineteenth-century constitutional litigation that they find important. Ann Woolhandler has
distinguished the "legality model" from the "discretion model." Id. at 410-11. The legality model
is justification-stripping without any official immunity doctrine, and flows from an emphasis on
"harms to the citizen's liberty or property interests .... " Id. at 410. The discretion model adds
an immunity doctrine protecting officials from liability for discretionary acts, and results from a
focus "upon the need to protect the governmental actor rather than the citizen...." I&L
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1. Forms of Action

A property owner who sought to vindicate his constitutional
right to just compensation in the courts faced two major initial issues:
what type of action to bring and whom to name as defendant.
Occasionally, the legislature provided a special statutory procedure
for claiming just compensation that could be initiated by owners who
believed their property to have been taken.m If a court found that
procedure to be adequate and exclusive, the owner would have to
follow it.34 Legislatures also sometimes provided procedures for asEric Grant calls the justification-stripping model the "equitable" remedy, to distinguish it
from the inverse condemnation model in which the Constitution directly provides an action for
damages, which he calls the "legal" remedy. Eric Grant, A Revolutionary View of the Seventh
Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 144, 202 (1996). Grant uses
this nomenclature because of his view of the difference between justification-stripping and
inverse condemnation: Under the legal remedy (inverse condemnation), the Just Compensation
Clause provides a property owner with an action at law against the government, whereas under
the equitable remedy (justification-stripping), the Just Compensation Clause allows an owner to
obtain a declaratory judgment voiding a statute that authorizes a taking without providing just
compensation.
See id.
This mapping of legal/equitable relief onto inverse
condemnation/justification-stripping has some truth, but may be more confusing than enlightening. Under the justification-stripping model, the effect of the Just Compensation Clause is to
void a statute, but that does not mean that the property owner is seeking declaratory relief; in
most cases, property owners using the justification-stripping model sought damages in an action
at law.
33. Such procedural provisions usually formed part of statutes authorizing particular
public works, or special charters of corporations formed to construct and operate canals,
turnpikes, railroads, and so on. See, e.g., Stevens v. Proprietors of the Middlesex Canal, 12
Mass. (11 Tyng) 466, 468 (1815) (discussing statutory procedures for claiming damages for
injuries caused by canal construction). I know of no antebellum statute that provided a general
owner-initiated procedure for obtaining just compensation for takings.
34. Courts varied widely in their willingness to hold that statutory remedies implicitly
displaced common law remedies. Compare Crittenden v. Wilson, 5 Cow. 165, 167 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1825) (holding that statutory procedures for appraising and paying damages caused by
construction of dam were merely cumulative as to common law action), with Stevens, 12 Mass.
(11 Tyng) at 468 (holding that statutory procedures for appraising and paying damages caused
by construction of canal displaced common law action). For a comprehensive review of cases
addressing the issue of remedial exclusivity, see 2 PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN § 468, at 1232-42 (2d ed. 1917).
An 1853 Indiana opinion reasoned that no common law action was available when a statute
provided a method of obtaining just compensation because any taking within the scope of that
statute was constitutional and therefore could be justified under the statute. See Null v. White
Water Valley Canal Co., 4 Ind. 431, 435 (1853). Philip Nichols made the same point in his
treatise, without citing Null. See 2 NICHOLS, supra, § 468, at 1236-38. This argument anticipated the logic of a recent line of Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1,
11 (1990) (holding that Just Compensation Clause claims against the federal government are
premature until the property owner has sought compensation through the procedures provided
by the Tucker Act); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194-95 (1985) (holding that a landowner's Just Compensation Clause claim was not ripe because
it had not sought compensation through the procedures that the state had made available). The
issue of ripeness is related to the issue of timing of compensation. The U.S. Supreme Court held
as early as 1890 that the Just Compensation Clause did not require compensation to be paid
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sessing and paying damages that only the condemnor could initiate;
courts sometimes held that, if a condemnor failed to initiate the procedure when it should have, owners could petition for a writ of mandamus to force it to do so. 35 Often, however, the aggrieved owner
could not find an applicable statutory procedure. In that circumstance, he had to pick an appropriate common law form of action and
find a defendant who was not shielded by a common law immunity
doctrine.
Two forms of action loomed largest: trespass-usually a particular type called trespass quare clausum fregit36-and trespass on
the case, sometimes abbreviated as "case. " 37 Courts drew the distinction between the two forms of action in a number of ways. 38 The most
before a taking, but it did require that, at the time of the taking, an owner have "reasonable,
certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation...." Cherokee Nation v. Southern
Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890).
35. See, e.g, People ex rel. Utley v. Hayden, 6 Hill 359, 360 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844) (holding
mandamus is the appropriate remedy when appraisers refuse to undertake their statutory duty
to assess damages when canal commissioners have appropriated land for public use); People ex
rel. Doyle v. Green, 10 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 755, 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 1875) (holding mandamus is the
appropriate remedy to require officials to perform statutory duties with respect to assessment
list, especially when relator's damages are damnum absque injuriaat common law); Gilligan v.
Board of Aldermen, 11 R.I. 258, 258 (1875) (granting writ of mandamus to force board of aldermen of Providence to make appointments required under statutory procedure for awarding
compensation for changes in grade); 2 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 614, at 1316-17 (2d ed. 1900) (discussing cases where plaintiffs
proceeded on mandamus writs to compel damage assessments). The writ of mandamus was
created by the King's Bench in England as one of the prerogative writs issuable against royal officers notwithstanding the sovereign immunity of the King. See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADmuiiSTRATvE ACTION 176-92 (1965). As a distinctively public law remedy,
mandamus stands outside the tradition of attempting to fit public law litigation into private law
molds like the justification-stripping model. It is irreducibly public in the same way that the
substantive law of highways came to be seen as irreducibly public. I discuss the phenomenon of
courts coming to view the law of highways as irreducibly public below at text accompanying
notes 304-12. In some alternative course of history, courts might have more explicitly drawn on
mandamus as a model for the distinctively public inverse condemnation action.
36. "Quare clausum fregit" literally translates as "by breaking his close" and refers to the
modern sense of intentional intrusion onto another's land. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
168 (1965).
37. The other common law form of action that is worth mentioning is assumpsit, an action
predicated on the defendant's express or implied promise. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *157-*165. I have found no case in which an antebellum state court allowed
owners to sue in assumpsit on the theory that a government that took property impliedly
promised to pay just compensation for it, and there are only a few postbellum cases. See Boise
Valley Constr. Co. v. Kroeger, 105 P. 1070, 1073-74 (Idaho 1909); 2 NICHOLS, supra note 34, §
478, at 1280.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, the implied promise theory became
orthodoxy for just compensation claims against the United States. See infra note 342
(discussing this development).
38. For detailed discussions of the development of the trespass/case distinction, see
generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort
Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1175-86 (1990); M.J. Prichard, Trespass, Case and the Rule in
Williams v. Holland, 1964 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 234. Kaczorowski contends that:
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common was to contrast immediate and indirect injuries. Thus, trespass was the appropriate form of action for an act that was "in itself
an immediate injury to another's person or property." 9 Trespass on
the case was appropriate "where the act [was] not immediately injurious, but only by consequence and collaterally....40 Another popular
formulation of the distinction involved the presence or absence of
force. Trespass was sometimes called "trespass vi et armis--"with
force and arms"41--to indicate that it was appropriate to remedy
injuries accompanied by force. Trespass on the case, by contrast, was
42
a remedy given for "wrongs or injuries unaccompanied by force."
Further, courts and commentators sometimes held trespass to be
appropriate to redress injuries caused by willful acts, whereas case
was appropriate "where there [was] no act done, but only a culpable
omission."43 Finally, the distinction was occasionally drawn in terms
of the lawfulness of the act. As Nathan Dane put it:
The true distinction seems to be this, if the act itself be lawful, as my putting
up a spout on my house, and is followed by an injury to another, the proper
action is case, especially if the injury happen at a time subsequent to the
putting up of the spout. But if the act itselfbe unlawful... then, trespass vi et
armis is the proper action.44

The distinction between trespass and case with respect to
injuries to land was always in some dispute. 45 Despite this, courts
Depending on the specific facts of a case, English courts decided whether trespass or
case was the appropriate action on four criteria: Whether the act was wilful, whether it
was lawful, whether the act was committed by the defendant or his servant, and
whether the injury was immediate or consequential.
Kaczorowski, supra, at 1177. My presentation of the distinction differs slightly because I have
not found the criterion of whether an act was committed by master or servant to be important in
just compensation cases (though it was used in other cases) and because I have added the
presence or absence offorce as another criterion, following Blackstone.
39. 3 BLACKSTONE, supranote 37, at *123.
40. Id. (emphasis in original); see also JOSEPH CHr=rv, A TREATISE ON PLEADING AND
PARTIES TO ACTIONS *126-*127 (9th American ed. 1840) ("An injury is considered as immediate
when the act complained of itself, and not merely a consequence of that act, occasions the
injury.").
41. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1504 (6th ed. 1990).
42. 3 BLACKSTONE, supranote 37, at *122.
43. I& at*123.
44. 2 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAw 487 (1823)
(discussing Reynolds v. Clark, 92 Eng. Rep. 822 (KB. 1725)). The trespass/ease distinction was
further muddied by the erratic use of a legal fiction designed to provide heightened protection
against unwarranted entry onto land: In Blackstone's words, "[tihe law always couples the idea
of force with that of intrusion onto the property of another." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at
*211.
45. For example, Nathan Dane noted that diversion of water onto another's land was
treated by one court as actionable in trespass, and by another as actionable only in case. See 2
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deciding just compensation cases in the first three-quarters of the
nineteenth century drew heavily on the trespass/case distinction to
limit the scope of just compensation clause protection, often holding
that "immediate injuries" were takings but "consequential injuries"
were not.46
2. Potential Defendants and Common-Law Immunities
Having decided upon a form of action, an owner would next
face the issue of whom to name as defendant or defendants. As a
legal matter, this choice would be shaped by common law doctrines of
sovereign immunity and of the liability of other public and private
organizations and their agents. During this era, different rules
emerged for states, "quasi-corporations," municipal and private
corporations proper, and individuals.
State courts in the nineteenth century generally accepted the
common law principle that a state could not be sued in its own courts
without its consent.47 Under this principle, an owner could not bring
an action seeking payment of damages from the state treasury, even if
the state legislature had directed a state official to commit acts oth48
erwise actionable in trespass or case.
Counties, townships, school districts, and similar organizations
were also generally immune from suit in tort.49 State courts consid-

DANE, supra note 44, at 492 (comparing Courtney v. Collett, 91 Eng. Rep. 1079 (KB. 1697) with

Haward v. Bankes, 97 Eng. Rep. 740 (KB. 1760)).
46. As I detail below, the eighteenth-century dispute over the proper form of action for
injury caused by diversion of water onto one's land was repeated in the nineteenth century as a
dispute.over whether such injury amounted to a taking. See infra text accompanying notes 14850.
47. See, e.g., 1 JAMEs KENT, COMMENTAPiES ON AMERICAN LAW 371 n.(e) (14th ed. 1851)
(citing Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, Walker's Ch. 9 (Mich. Ch. 1842)). An aggrieved property owner who sought to vindicate his state constitutional right to just compensation in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction, as owners sometimes did, would have to consider the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment, but I will not address that issue here.
48. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, a number of states constitutionalized this
common law immunity principle; I discuss the example of Illinois below at text accompanying
notes 338-41.
49. This fact might surprise students of federal jurisdiction familiar with the Supreme
Court doctrine that counties do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). Luning explicitly refused to draw a distinction between
corporations and quasi-corporations: A county "is a part of the State only in that remote sense
in which any city, town, or other municipal corporation may be said to be a part of the State."
Id. at 530. In an earlier case involving the liability of the District of Columbia for negligence in
the maintenance of its streets, the Court recognized in dictum the lack of liability in tort of
"involuntary quasi corporations," which, the Court stated, "are auxiliaries of the State merely,"
and corporations "of the very lowest grade, and invested with the smallest amount of power."
Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, 552 (1875).
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ered counties to be "quasi-corporations" that were not subject to
"private action for neglect of corporate duty, unless given by statute ...

"50

The English case to which this doctrine is traceable,

Russell v. Men of Devon,51 rested, from an American perspective, on
dubious grounds. The Russell court had held that a county could not
be sued because it had neither a corporate fund nor a means for
securing assets, 52 but many American counties had both corporate
funds and powers of taxation. 53 American courts, however, found two
other intertwined rationales for distinguishing quasi-corporations
from corporations proper (the latter encompassing both municipal and
private corporations). First, proper corporations were created by
solicitation or consent of the persons composing them, whereas quasicorporations were created by unilateral acts of the legislature. Thus,
a state legislature would charter a city as a municipal corporation
only upon petition of its inhabitants, and many areas of the state
remained unincorporated. In contrast, the legislature would divide
the state's entire territory into counties, regardless of the wishes of
the inhabitants. 54 Second, proper corporations, including municipal
corporations, were thought to act primarily for the interests and
convenience of their members, whereas quasi-corporations were
thought to act for the interests of all the state's citizens. 55 As Justice
Gray put it in the 1812 case of Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester:
"Corporations created for their own benefit stand on the same
ground.., as individuals. But quasi-corporations, created by the
legislature for purposes of public policy, are... not liable to an action
for [the neglect of duties enjoined on them], unless the action be given

50.
51.

See 2 KENT, supra note 47, at 420.
Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (KB. 1788).

52.

Id. at 362-63.

53.

For commentators noting the mismatch of English rationale and American fact, see 2
§ 962, at 1171-72
n.2 (4th ed. 1890); James D. Barnett, The Foundationsof the Distinction Between Public and
PrivateFunctions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16
OR. L. REV. 250, 259 (1936); Edwin Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4145(1924).
54. See Board of Comm'rs v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109, 119 (1857) ("The [municipal
corporation] is asked for, or at least assented to, by the people it embraces; the [county] is
superimposed by a sovereign and paramount authority."); 1 DILLON, supra note 53, § 23, at 42
(distinguishing corporations from quasi-corporations and quoting Mighels).
55. See Mighels, 7 Ohio St. at 119 ("A municipal corporation proper is created mainly for
the interest, advantage, and convenience of the locality and its people; a county organization is
created almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the State at large...."); 1 DILLON, supra
note 53, § 23, at 42.
JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
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by some statute." 6 In many states, counties, townships, school
districts, and even towns would be classified as quasi-corporations
57
and could not be sued.
Until about 1840, the law regarding tort liability reflected the
lack of distinction between private business corporations and public
municipal corporations. 58 Both corporations that we would now
recognize as private business corporations and corporations that we
would now recognize as municipalities, were in most courts suable in
tort.59 Thus, owners alleging appropriations of their property could
56. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 247, 249 (1812) (emphasis in
original); see 1 DILLON, supra note 53, §§ 26-27, at 45-46 (noting and approving ofthese grounds
for the distinction between municipal corporations proper and quasi-corporations in relation to
tort liability).
57. See Mower, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) at 249; Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks and Canals, 7
Mass. (6 Tyng) 169, 187 (1810); 2 DILLON, supra note 53, § 961, at 1169. As John Dillon noted,
the status of organizations such as school districts differed from state to state. In some states,
school districts were local corporations proper. In others, they were quasi-corporations created
unilaterally by the state. See 1 DILLON, supra note 53, § 24, at 43. Not until the mid-twentieth
century was there a broad movement in state courts towards abolishing the common law
immunity of these entities. See, e.g., Muskopfv. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961);
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (M1.1959); Spanel v. Mounds
View Sch. Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962); Holytz v. Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618
(Wis. 1962). For deviations from the majority rule in the early to mid-1800s in Ohio, New
Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, see Barnett, supra note 53, at 266 n.65; for the rejection of
Mower in Maryland, see County Commissionersv. Duckett, 20 Md. 468 (1864).
58. See, e.g., EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at
14-17 (1954); HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER 185-92 (1983); Barnett,
supra note 53, at 259; Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059,
1099-109 (1980).
59. Earlier eighteenth-century authority sometimes held that corporations could not be
sued in tort, particularly in trespass. See 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 223-25 (1793). By the early nineteenth century, however, American courts
routinely held corporations to be suable in tort. See, e.g., Riddle, 7 Mass. (6 Tyng) at 185-87;
Chesnut Hill & Spring House Turnpike Co. v. Rutter, 4 Serg. & Rawle 6, 17-18 (Pa. 1818);
JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AmEs, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE 457-67 (1858). There was generally no distinction drawn between municipal and
private corporations. See Thayer v. Boston, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 511, 516 (1837) ("That an action
sounding in tort, will lie against a corporation, though formerly doubted, seems now too well
settled to be questioned .... And there seems no sufficient ground for distinction in this respect
between cities and towns and other corporations."); Barnett, supra note 53, at 259 n.35 (citing
numerous cases).
The case of Fowle v. Alexandria, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 398 (1830), has sometimes been read to
hold that municipal corporations are not liable in tort. See Barnett, supra note 53, at 260.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, however, is written more narrowly. In Fowle, the plaintiff
argued that the city of Alexandria should be liable for losses incurred when an auctioneer with
whom he had placed property for sale became insolvent, because the city had licensed the
auctioneer without requiring him to post a bond, in contravention of its own licensing ordinance.
Fowle, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 405-06. The Court held that although private corporations were
generally liable in tort, a "legislative corporation" was not liable "for losses sustained by a
nonfeasance, by an omission of the corporate body to observe a law of its own, in which no
penalty is provided." Id. at 409. This statement hardly declares a municipality to be immune
from all suits sounding in tort, and could fit comfortably with a number of narrower spheres of
nonliability, such as nonliability for governmental functions, for discretionary functions, and for
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and did sue both turnpike, canal, and railroad companies on the one
hand, and cities on the other.60
Although private corporations remained generally liable, towards the middle of the nineteenth century, courts began to distinguish between the governmental and proprietary functions of municipalities, and to grant immunity in tort to municipalities for the performance of their governmental functions.6 ' Courts defined and justi-

fied this bifurcation of municipal functions by referring to the established rationale for the distinction between corporations and quasicorporations. Municipalities were said to be liable for wrongful acts
"from which they derive some special or immediate advantage or
emolument,"62 but not for wrongful acts done "in the discharge of duties imposed for the public or general (not corporate) benefit."63 By
use of this doctrine and a corollary, 64 courts justified their decisions
not to hold municipalities liable for the acts of police officers, 65 fire8
men,6 and health officers, 67 among others.6
Despite this new recognition that municipalities should benefit
from governmental immunity, courts continued to hold municipalities
liable in some circumstances. Perhaps most importantly to landowners, courts sometimes circumvented the entire doctrine of immunity
for governmental functions by holding that municipalities were liable
for the acts of their officers even when performing a governmental
function when those acts involved "a direct trespass to real estate, or
ultra vires acts. See infra text accompanying notes 61-77. At least one state court seems to
have taken the more extreme position that municipal corporations were never liable in tort. See
White v. Charleston, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 571, 574 (1835); Barnett, supra note 53, at 261 n.43
(collecting cases).
60. See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore (Baltimore County Ct. 1828), reprintedin 2 AM. JURIST
203 (1829) (involving a municipal corporation); Thacher v. Dartmouth Bridge Co., 35 Mass. (18
Pick.) 501 (1836) (involving a private corporation).
61. The landmark case for this governmental/proprietary split is generally acknowledged
to be Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842). See Barnett, supra note 53, at 267-68.
62. 2 DILLON, supranote 53, § 966, at 1180.
63.

Id.

64. The corollary was that individuals who exercised governmental functions were agents
of the state rather than the municipal corporation, even though the corporation had appointed
them. See id. § 974, at 1193; FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES &
OFFICERS § 850, at 572-73 (1890) [hereinafter MECHEm ON PUBLIC OFFICERS].
65. See Stedman v. San Francisco, 63 Cal. 193, 193 (1883) (holding municipality not liable
for wrongful taking and detention of property by police officers); 2 DILLON, supra note 53, § 975,
at 1196-98.
66. See 2 DILLON, supranote 53, § 976, at 1198-1200.
67. See id. § 977, at 1200-01.
68. Courts sometimes held that municipalities were not liable for acts of road surveyors,
see, e.g., Walcott v. Swampscott, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 101, 102 (1861), although the cases were not
uniform, and often imposed liability, see, e.g., Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N.Y.
463,466 (1850); see generally 2 DILLON, supranote 53, § 979, at 1202-03 (comparing cases).
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the creation or maintenance of a nuisance." 9 Similarly, although
courts developed a principle that municipal corporations were not
liable for their good faith exercise of discretionary powers, courts
often made an exception for those exercises of discretionary power
that caused "a positive and direct invasion" of an owner's private
property, 70 or created "a nuisance public or private."71
Courts used the ultra vires concept to limit municipal liability
in two ways. First, a municipality was not liable for the wholly unauthorized acts of its officers. 72 Courts sometimes used this principle
to deny relief to owners for the taking or destruction of their property:
a Pennsylvania court, for example, held that a person whose property
was wrongfully seized by an officer for the alleged violation of an
ordinance could not recover against the municipal corporation when
the corporation did not authorize or ratify the act.73 The lack of liability for ultra vires acts of officers, however, was substantially limited
by the development of a broad understanding of municipal grants of
authority, announced perhaps most prominently by Chief Justice
Shaw's opinion in Thayer v. City of Boston.74 Municipal corporations,
Shaw wrote, should be liable for acts "done by [its] officers having
competent authority.., to act upon the general subject matter, and
especially if the act was done with an honest view to obtain for the
public some lawful benefit or advantage," 75 even if the act turned out
later, upon judicial inquiry, to have been unlawful. Thus, in Thayer
itself, the court held that the city of Boston was potentially liable for
landowners' loss of access to a street when its officers removed the
pavement and rented the land out to others who built stalls, booths,
and fences on it. Even though the city had not empowered its officers
to close public highways, of which this street was one, it would be
liable if it had granted the officers general authority over city streets,
and the officers had professed to close the street by virtue of their
76
offices, for the benefit of the city.
69.

James Fleming, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Cm. L.

REV. 610, 629 (1955); see also 18 EUGENE McQuILiN, THE LAw OF MuNIciPAL CORPORATIONS §

53.11, at 217-18 (3d ed. 1993).
70. 2 DILLON, supra note 53, § 1047, at 1329 (emphasis in original); see also Ashley v. Port
Huron, 35 Mich. 296, 301 (1877).
71. 2 DILLON, supranote 53, § 1047, at 1330.
72. See id. § 972, at 1189-90.
73. See Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 Watts & Serg. 103, 105-06 (Pa. 1841); see also 2
DILLON, supranote 53, § 972, at 1190.
74. Thayer v. City of Boston, 36 Mass. (19 Pick) 511 (1837). See generally 2 DILLON,
supranote 53, § 972, at 1189 n.3 (citing sources).
75. Thayer, 36 Mass. (19 Pick) at 515.
76. 'See id. at 516-17.
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Secondly, courts developed the doctrine that municipal corporations would not be liable for acts wholly outside the powers that the
state had granted the corporation. Thus, for example, New York's
highest court decided that the village of Rochester would not be liable
when its officers appropriated land for a street in defiance of a provision in the village's charter expressly prohibiting it from laying out a
street on any parcel where building removal costs would exceed one
77
hundred dollars.
Suits against individuals7 typically raised issues of agency
law, issues of liability under trespass and case, and, when the individual was acting as an agent for a public body, issues of official immunity. Public officials were far more likely than individual agents of
private corporations 79 to be named as defendants in just compensation
77. See Cuyler v. Rochester, 12 Wend. 165, 168 (N.Y. 1834); see also 2 DILLON, supra note
53, § 970, at 1186.
78. The individual sued would usually be acting as an agent for a corporation or governmental body, since eminent domain power was rarely delegated directly to individuals. The
most prominent exception to the rule was the private road statute, which granted property
owners, individual or corporate, the power to condemn rights of way across neighboring land in
certain cases of necessity or convenience. For examples of such statutes existing in the nineteenth century (including a Pennsylvania statute in force since 1735 and a Kentucky statute in
force since 1820), see 1 LEWis, supra note 35, § 167, at 427.
79. Just compensation suits naming individual agents of private corporations were
relatively rare. For one such suit, see Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. (6 Tyng) 393, 395 (1811) (naming
one of the proprietors of a Massachussetts corporation chartered to maintain side-booms on the
Androscoggin river). This might have been due in some small part to the private agency law
principle of respondeatsuperior,which not only made the principal vicariously liable for injuries
caused by its agent in the course of employment, but also shielded the agent from liability for
his nonfeasance and omissions of duty. Thus, for example, an agent who managed a plantation
was not liable to a neighboring plantation owner for flooding caused by the agent's failure to
keep a drain open. The agent owed that duty only to his principal, who could seek indemnification from the agent were she found liable to her neighbor. See Feltus v. Swan, 62 Miss. 415, 417
(1884). For the general principle, see FLOYD R. MEOHEM, A TREYATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY §§
569-70, at 400-02 (1889) [hereinafter MECHEM ON AGENCY]; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF AGENCY § 308, at 402-03 (8th ed. 1874) [hereinafter STORY ON AGENCY]. For an
excellent explanation of the role of agency law in officer suits under federal law, see David E.
Engdahl, Immunity and Accountabilityfor Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV.
1, 15-19 (1972).
Just compensation litigation, however, typically involved allegations, not that an agent had
neglected to perform a duty, but that an agent had committed a positive wrong, such as
intentionally occupying the plaintiff's property, or interfering with the plaintiff's access to a
public street. An agent was still liable for misfeasances and positive wrongs, even when he was
following the directions of his principal, and even if he was ignorant of the wrongful nature of
his actions (because, for example, his principal had misrepresented the principal's ownership of
particular land). See MECHEM ON AGENCY, supra, § 571, at 402-03; STORY ON AGENCY, supra, §
308, at 402. The duped agent, of course, could seek indemnification from the mendacious
principal. See id § 339, at 433-34. Thus, the paucity of just compensation suits naming agents
of private corporations is probably due not to agency law's limitation of an agent's liability, but
rather to the amenability of private corporations to suit, and to the likelihood that corporations
were in a far better position than their individual agents to satisfy a judgment for damages.
The availability of corporate funds to pay judgments that a corporation's agents could not afford
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litigation, because the only potential organizational defendant-a
state, county, or public corporation-often enjoyed jurisdictional or
substantive immunity. When the public principal was not subject to
respondeat superior liability for the acts of its agents-a status enjoyed by the United States, 80 the states,8 ' and municipal corporations
with respect to agents exercising governmental functions 2---the individual agent was liable both for nonfeasance and for misfeasance or
positive wrongs. 83 For Justice Story, this was not merely a
coincidence; rather, the imperative of providing a remedy to an
injured party led to the expansion of the agent's liability as the
principal's liability waned:
[Tihe very consideration, that the public superiors are not responsible for the
acts and omissions of their subordinates in their official conduct, distinguishes
the case from that of mere private agencies, and lets in the doctrine, that,
under such circumstances, [the subordinates] shall be held personally
responsible therefor to third persons who are injured thereby.84

Thus, agency law was unlikely to give public officials a defense in just
compensation litigation.8

A public official, rebuffed by agency law, might seek protection
in the law of official immunities. For most of the nineteenth century,
however, officials likely to be named in a just compensation suit enjoyed far narrower immunities than they would under modern law.
to pay did not escape early nineteenth-century courts. In rejecting a corporation's argument
that it was immune from suit, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the argument was
"mischievous in its consequences, as it tends to introduce actual wrongs and ideal remedies; for
a turnpike company may do great injury, by means of labourers who have no property to answer
the damages recovered against them." Chesnut Hill & Spring House Turnpike Co. v. Rutter, 4
Serg. & Rawle 6, 17 (Pa. 1818).
80. See Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 274 (1868); see also MECHEM ON
PUBLIC OFFICERS, supra note 64, § 848, at 571-72.
81. See Lewis v. State, 96 N.Y. 71, 74-75 (1884); Clodfelter v. State, 86 N.C. 67, 68 (1882);
see also MECHEM ON PUBLIC OFFICERS, supra note 64, § 849, at 572; STORY ON AGENCY, supra
note 79, § 319, at 411-12.
82. See supratext accompanying notes 61-68.
83. See STORY ON AGENCY, supra note 79, §§ 319b, 320, at 414-15. The liability of the
public agent here, however, is subject to a very important limitation: If the agent does not act
in excess of his lawful authority, then he is not liable, even though his acts may injure a third
party. See id. § 320, at 415. This "lawful authority" is the "justification! in the justificationstripping model; to the extent the grant of authority violates a just compensation provision, it is
not "lawful," and the agent is liable.
84. Id. § 319b, at 414.
85. Presumably, because municipal corporations were vicariously liable for the torts their
agents committed while exercising corporate functions, see supra text accompanying notes 6268, municipal agents exercising those functions would have the same defense as private
corporations' agents to actions alleging nonfeasance. This would rarely be of moment to just
compensation litigation, however, because that litigation typically involved allegations of
positive wrong. See supranote 79.
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The general principle in the Anglo-American tradition was that executive officials enjoyed no immunity whatsoever for acts that they were
not authorized to perform by a valid statute.86 For example, in the
1804 case of Little v. Barreme, the Supreme Court ruled that the captain of a United States warship was personally liable for damages
when he seized a ship that was on a voyage from a French port while
the relevant Act of Congress authorized only the seizure of ships
sailing towards French ports, even though he was acting under orders
from the President. 87
In the 1840s, courts began to articulate a doctrine of "quasijudicial" immunity, under which an official granted discretionary
powers enjoyed exemption from civil liability at least for the good
faith, honest exercise of those powers, if not for acts with corrupt
motives.88 Many officials likely to be named in just compensation
86. For A.V. Dicey, this was one of the three principal meanings of the "rule of law" in
England: "With us every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of
taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other
citizen." AN. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 114 (8th
ed. reprint 1982).
87. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804). Chief Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, accepted the doctrine that non-military officials, acting within United
States territory, would be personally liable for all acts that turned out not to have been
authorized by law. See id. at 179. Marshall stated in the opinion that he initially believed
military officers acting on the high seas should enjoy some level of immunity. Subsequently, he
stated, he became convinced that his initial opinion was mistaken. See id. He did not say why
he became so convinced.
In a similar case heard by the Court the same term, the Court held another captain personally liable for having seized a ship owned by someone who the Court ruled was, although
American by birth, temporarily clothed with Danish nationality, and therefore not subject to the
Nonintercourse Act. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 67-69
(1804). The captains in Little and Murray both sought relief from Congress, which eventually
passed special acts arranging for payment of the judgments against them. See JEAN EDWARD
SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OFANATION 632 n.80 (1996).
88. See, e.g., Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87, 98 (1845); Wilson v. Mayor of New
York, 1 Denio 595, 600 (N.Y. 1845). As of the late nineteenth century, the scope of quasi-judicial
immunity was still in dispute. For a review of the cases on either side of the issue whether
quasi-judicial immunity was limited to acts performed in good faith, see MECHEM ON PUBLIC
OFFICERS, supra note 64, § 640, at 427. For contrasting views of treatise writers, compare id.
(asserting that even malicious quasi-judicial action should be protected so that officers are not
constantly forced to defend their motives), with JOEL PRENTISS BIsHoP, COMMENTARIES ON THE
NON-CONTRACT LAW § 789, at 367 (1st ed. 1889) (arguing that "[firom the ground on which this

doctrine rests, it follows that, if the quasi-judicial act is corrupt ... it will not be protected").
Morton Horwitz suggests that Sayre v. Northwestern Turnpike Road, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 454
(1839), was "[o]ne of the first cases openly to recognize an immunity limited to public officials."
MORTON J. HORwiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 294 n.86 (1977).

The two-sentence opinion in Sayre, however, is quite obscure, and nowhere suggests that the
officers of the Northwestern Turnpike Road were being sued as individuals. The one operative
sentence in the opinion is:
The court... are [sic] unanimously of opinion that the action does not lie in this case
against the northwestern turnpike company, composed as it is exclusively of officers of
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litigation-highway commissioners, for example89-exercised discretionary powers entitling them to quasi-judicial immunity. 9o
The actual workings of nineteenth-century quasi-judicial immunity as applied to a highway surveyor can be seen in the 1871 New
Hampshire case of Waldron v. Berry.91 Waldron, an owner of land
adjacent to a highway, sued Berry, a highway surveyor, for removing

a wall and sidewalk Berry had built within the highway boundaries. 92
The Waldron court examined the statutes defining the authority of
highway surveyors. It noted that the statutes generally empowered
highway surveyors to repair and alter highways, but specifically
withheld the power to make uncovered ditches on the side of highways adjacent to a dwelling house. 93 An earlier case had found a surveyor who had made such an uncovered ditch personally liable for the
injury to an adjacent owner.9 As the Waldron court explained, this
was "because [the surveyor] did what he had no authority to do; he

the government, having no personal interest in it, or in its concerns, and only acting as
the organ of the commonwealth in effecting a great public improvement.
Sayre, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) at 456. This sounds to me much more like an extension of quasi-corporation immunity, already well-established, to the turnpike company, rather than the creation of
an immunity protecting public officials sued personally.
89. See Sage v. Laurain, 19 Mich. 137, 141-42 (1869); Rowe v. Addison, 34 N.H. 306, 313
(1857); see also MECHEM ON PUBLIC OFFICERS, supranote 64, § 639, at 422.
90. Mid-nineteenth century quasi-judicial immunity, however, was little more than a
restatement of existing principles of agency law and statutory justification, and had little in
common with modern official immunity. Modem official immunity shields an official from personal liability precisely when he cannot justify his acts under a statute, either because no
statute authorized such acts, or because the statute that purported to authorize such acts was
unconstitutional and therefore void. The immunity always shields an officer from liability for
acts that are otherwise recognized to violate statutory or constitutional rights.
Although twentieth-century courts and commentators have found support for this modem
official immunity doctrine in mid-nineteenth century cases such as Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 87 (1845), such cases did not contemplate an immunity for unjustiflable acts. As David
Engdahl has argued:
The rule which all of these authorities endorsed was that certain wrongs may be done on
behalf of the state, and if authorized both in fact and in contemplation of law they are
not personal wrongs of the officer; but in each case not only must it be shown that the
act was one legally capable of being authorized, but also the act must be found within
the terms of authority actually given.
Engdahl, supra note 79, at 48 (emphasis in original).
91. Waldron v. Berry, 51 N.H. 136 (1871).
92. See id. at 137 ("The plaintiff had built a side-walk and bank wall on his land in the
highway; and the defendant, as highway surveyor, removed the wall, and used the earth of the
side-walk... in filling up and repairing the road."). To make sense of the statement that the
plaintiff had built "on his land in the highway,"-one must recall the traditional rule that the
public had only a right-of-way easement in highways, and the underlying fee simple remained in
the abutting owners. See, e.g., 3 KENT, supra note 47, at 666-71. Thus, Waldron built on that
portion of the highway to which he retained the fee simple, subject to the public's right of way.
93. See Waldron, 51 N.H. at 144.
94. See Adams v. Richardson, 43 N.H. 212,213 (1861).
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acted outside of and beyond his jurisdiction." 5 The court did not state
whether the surveyor reasonably believed that he had the power to
make uncovered ditches because that was irrelevant to its analysis;
the quasi-judicial immunity of this era did not protect an officer out-

side the bounds of statutory authority. Nor did it protect an officer
when the statute under which he sought to justify his actions was

unconstitutional.9
In Waldron, because the surveyor was acting within the scope

of his statutory authority, and the constitutionality of that statute,
which provided damages for any injury to adjacent private land, 7 was
not challenged, he could not be held liable for his judgment that the
removal of Berry's wall and sidewalk was necessary for road repairs
so long as he acted in good faith and "according to the best of his abilities." 8 The good faith doctrine avoids liability for negligence. In
general, courts developed a doctrine under which statutory authorization to perform some act did not shield the authorized party from
liability for negligent performance of that act.99 Waldron, however,
specifically rejected negligence liability for an officer protected by

quasi-judicial immunity:
The question of reasonable care and skill, or of ordinary care and skill, can
have no place here. If the surveyor acts in good faith and in the exercise of his
own best skill and judgment, that is all he is responsible for. His skill and

judgment may not amount to the ordinary degree among men in general, but
that is not his fault. All the law requires of him is to do the best he can with
such an amount of judgment, or of care and skill, as he possesses: beyond that
he is not responsible.10°

95. Waldron, 51 N.H. at 145.
96. Two of the cases Waldron discusses as exemplifying application of quasi-judicial
immunity, Callenderv. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 430-31 (1823) and Benden v. Nashua, 17
N.H. 477, 478 (1845), are careful to hold that the authorizing statute does not violate the state
just compensation clause because that clause does not reach consequential injuries. See
Waldron, 51 N.H. at 143 (discussing Callenderand Benden). The distinction between direct and
consequential injury was the most important distinction in early to mid-nineteenth century just
compensation law, and Callenderwas the leading American case. I discuss the distinction below
at text accompanying notes 118-47.
97. Waldron, 51 N.H. at 144.
98. Id. at 147.
99. See Engdahl, supra note 79, at 48 (noting that "under the doctrines judicially developed and consistently applied during the nineteenth century, an official was liable notwithstanding his superior's orders not only for any act that contravened the Constitution but also for
constitutionally permissible acts which were tortious because they violated standards of
reasonable necessity or due care .... .); infra text accompanying notes 159-67.
100. Waldron, 51 N.H. at 147 (emphasis in original).
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Not until the early twentieth century did quasi-judicial immunity
begin to be transformed into modern official immunity doctrine.1o1
If the general doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity left any
doubt about whether a property owner could recover from a public
officer for injury to his property, a more specific rule developed after
the Civil War by John Dillon and Thomas Cooley laid owners' worries
to rest. In a concurrence in the 1868 case of McCord v. High, Dillon,
then Chief Judge of the Iowa Supreme Court, concluded that whatever the scope of quasi-judicial immunity, it had to be limited so as to
allow vindication of property rights. 102 Like Justice Story before him,
Dillon formulated a rule that explicitly took into account the availability of other remedies. He noted that, in McCord, neither the road
district, nor the township, nor the county was subject to suit, "so that
although the injury done the plaintiff is a direct invasion of his rights
of property, and actionable in its nature, he is without remedy, unless
it be against the defendant." 03 Dillon then concluded "that where a
public officer other than a judicial one, does an act directly invasive of
the private rights of others, and there is otherwise no remedy for the
injury, such officer is personally liable without proof of malice and an
intent to injure."1°4 Fifteen years later, Thomas Cooley, as a Michigan
Supreme Court Justice, wrote an opinion in Cubit v. O'Dett o5 that was
paired with Dillon's concurrence in McCord in later cases and treatises, 1°6 but might be read to express the more traditional principle
that officers could not be authorized to commit acts amounting to an
unconstitutional taking, and would be liable for those acts without
regard to their good faith.107 Whether the expression of a traditional
principle, or the development of a particular rule to protect property,
101. See Engdahl, supra note 79, at 52; Max P. Rapacz, Protection of Officers Who Act
Under UnconstitutionalStatutes, 11 MINN. L. REV. 585, 585-86 (1927) (noting that as of 1927,

the "great weight of authority" was still that a public official could never justify action under a
statute subsequently declared unconstitutional; the first case to suggest otherwise was decided
in 1880).
102. McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336,350 (1868).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Cubit v. O'Dett, 51 Mich. 347 (1883).
106. See, e.g., Lowe v. Conroy, 97 N.W. 942, 945 (Wis. 1904); MECHEM ON PUBLIC OFFICERS,

supranote 64, § 642, at 428-29.
107. See Cubit, 51 Mich. at 351:
Highway authorities have no more right than private persons to cut drains the necessary result of which will be to flood the lands of individuals .... This rule sometimes,
when the agent has acted in good faith and without knowledge of the want of legal
authority, may seem to operate oppressively, but it is a necessary and very just rule
notwithstanding, and full protection of the citizen in his legal rights would be impossible
without it. Absence of bad faith can never excuse a trespass, though the existence of bad
faith may sometimes aggravate it.
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the doctrine of McCord and Cubit left most individual officials in just
compensation litigation vulnerable to liability in damages.
3. Justification: Statutory Interpretation and
Constitutional Limits
Assume that an aggrieved property owner has sued a party
who cannot claim common law immunity, and has proven that the
party's acts amount to trespass or trespass on the case at common
law. In typical just compensation litigation, the defendant would
answer that those acts were justified by a statute that altered common law liability; the plaintiff would reply that the statute was unconstitutional and therefore could not serve as a justification.
Although the issues raised by the defendant's answer and the plaintiff's reply-what the legislature meant to do and whether it had the
power to do it-are in theory analytically distinct, many nineteenthcentury American courts muddied that distinction, and variously
framed the doctrine they developed as canons of statutory interpretation, constitutional principles, or interpretive principles based on the
common law. Three reasons contributed to the blending and wavering
of the antebellum just compensation doctrine among statutory interpretation, constitutional limitation, and common law elaboration.
First, the statutes to which just compensation defendants appealed for justification almost never explicitly addressed the issue of
conferring immunity, leaving courts free to develop a doctrine of
implied justification that could draw on both common law traditions
and constitutional concerns. Most attempts at statutory justification
in just compensation litigation involved appeals, not to general legislation legalizing acts that would otherwise amount to trespasses or
nuisances, 108 but to acts granting authority to particular public officers, 109 authorizing particular public works,"1 0 or, most importantly,

108. For a fairly rare example of nineteenth-century litigation involving general legislation
legalizing nuisances, see Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239, 243-44 (1884) (upholding a law
empowering municipalities to license businesses to ring bells that would otherwise amount to
nuisances).
109. See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick-) 418, 426-30 (1823) (a surveyor of
highways named as a defendant in an action of trespass on the case successfully justifies his
acts by reference to a statute defining the authority of surveyors of highways).
110. See, e.g., Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. Ch. 735, 735 (N.Y. Ch. 1823) (defendants in a
trespass action "pleaded a justification, under the several acts relative to canals," that is, acts
authorizing the building of canals); Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 163 (N.Y.
Ch. 1816) (trustees of village unsuccessfully attempt to defend against action for injunction by
invoking statute authorizing them to obtain a water supply for the village).
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chartering particular corporations."' Through the mid-nineteenth
century, American state legislatures created virtually all corporations
by special charter or franchise, with particular powers and privileges
and for particular purposes." 2 Typically, then, a corporate defendant

would argue that its charter implicitly legalized all acts necessary to
further the purposes for which the charter was granted. A public
defendant would argue, similarly, that an act specifically authorizing
a public works project or creating an office responsible for public
works implicitly legalized acts reasonably in furtherance of that project or within the scope of that office.
A second reason for blending statutory, constitutional, and
common law analysis in considering the defendant's justification in
just compensation cases was that American courts considered the
most important precedent in the area to be English cases that acknowledged Parliament's plenary power to appropriate property and
leave owners without a remedy."m The English courts that had de111. See, e.g., Thacher v. Dartmouth Bridge Co., 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 501, 501 (1836) (bridge

company's appeal to its act of incorporation to justify its trespass unavailing, because grant of
eminent domain power must be explicit and grant of such power without provision for just
compensation would be void); Monongahela Navigation Corp. v. Coons, 6 Watts & Serg. 101,
114-15 (Pa. 1843) (holding company not liable for consequential damages caused by damming
the Monongahela River because legislature's incorporation of company was valid exercise of
authority).
112. See University of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 88 (1805) (noting that "[i]n every
institution of that kind, the ground of establishment is some public good or purpose intended to
be promoted .... ."); 1 KYD, supra note 59, at 320 ("Corporations having been established at
different periods, and with different views, the particular constitution of each depends on the
provisions of the charter, by which it was erected, or on the prescriptive usage which time has
imperceptibly introduced."). Specially-chartered corporations accounted for most of the activity
that would lead to complaints of appropriation of property: building roads, bridges, canals, and
railroads, and providing services such as water and sewage. Most early American "private"
corporations were chartered for the purpose of building infrastructure (and a banking system)
rather than manufacturing. See ADoLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 10 (1932) (stating that of the 335 profit-seeking corporations incorporated in the United States by 1800, 219 were turnpike, bridge, and canal companies; 36 furnished water and fire protection or dock facilities; 67 were banks and insurance
companies; and only six were manufacturers).
113. English courts had not always recognized parliamentary omnipotence. Edward Coke's
opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case is the most famous proof of this notion. See Dr. Bonham's case,
77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C.P. 1610) ("[The common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and
sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common
right and reason.., the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void .. ").
After the Revolution of 1688, however, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty became quite
solidly established, and was orthodoxy by the time the first relevant just compensation case was
decided in 1773. See Leader v. Moxon, 96 Eng. Rep. 546 (C.P. 1773), reported sub nom. Leader
v. Moxton, 95 Eng. Rep. 1157. Philip Hamburger argues persuasively that Chief Justice Holfs
opinion in City of London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 (KB. 1796), acknowledged parliamentary
sovereignty, in spite of earlier views that it asserted a power of judicial review. See Philip A.
Hamburger, Revolution and JudicialReview: Chief JusticeHolt's Opinion in City of London v.
Wood, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091,2095 (1994).
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cided those cases developed an alternative tradition of crafting canons
of statutory interpretation to reflect "constitutional" principles, including just compensation principles, and of applying these canons
quite obstinately when the occasion demanded.
A third reason for blending of analyses was the novelty of judicial review in the early nineteenth-century United States. Written
constitutions enforceable by courts were of recent vintage-many
state constitutions did not have just compensation provisions until
well into the nineteenth century." 4 As a result, even those courts
operating under written just compensation provisions often decided
cases on statutory grounds, 115 and courts relying on unwritten constitutional principles were usually even more circumspect about confronting the legislature with its limitations.116 For these reasons, the

most important distinctions that shaped antebellum just compensation doctrine had both interpretive and constitutional dimensions, and
I will therefore consider those dimensions together." 7
a. Directand ConsequentialInjuries
The most important distinction that shaped antebellum just
compensation doctrine, that between direct and consequential injuries, drew its support from a string of English cases decided between
1792 and 1824, and was eventually undermined by an influential
1871 case.
In 1773, the English Court of Common Pleas decided Leader v.
Moxon, which held a group of road commissioners liable for raising
the grade of a street in front of a group of houses by more than six

114. Of the first 14 states, only three had a just compensation provision in 1800, only seven
in 1850, and only nine even in 1868. See J.A.C. Grant, The 'Higher Law" Background of the
Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WIS. L. REV. 67, 70 (1931). On the development of extratextual just
compensation limitations on the legislature in the first half of the nineteenth century, see AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 140-42 (1998) [hereinafter

AMAR, TH BILL OF RIGHTS].
115. See, e.g., Thacher, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 502; Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. (6 Tyng) 393,
394-95 (1811).
116. For prominent just compensation cases in states without a constitutional provision
that were actually decided on statutory grounds, see Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 14546 (1839), and Gardnerv. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 168 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (I am persuaded
that the Legislature never intended, by the Act in question, to violate or interfere with this
great and sacred principle of private right.").
117. The distinctions between public and private agents and between public and private
nuisance liability also had this split character. Only the distinction between negligent and nonnegligent acts did not seem to have any developed constitutional dimension.
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feet, blocking passage, light, and air to the houses. 118 Sir William
Blackstone, who sat on the Leader court and reported the case, had
completed his Commentaries on the Law of Englandjust four years
earlier." 9 The Commentaries contained two statements that, read
literally and in isolation, seemed to contradict each other. On the one
hand, Blackstone acknowledged the absolute sovereignty of
Parliament:
It could "do every thing that is not naturally
impossible... what the parliament doth, no authority on earth can
undo." 20 On the other hand, Blackstone stated that when the
legislature took an individual's property, it did so "[n]ot by absolutely
stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by
giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury
thereby sustained." 2' Leader suggests how Blackstone, following and
reinforcing the English tradition, 2 2 reconciled parliamentary
sovereignty with the just compensation principle: through a strong
interpretive presumption. The Leader court, Blackstone reports,
reasoned that "had Parliament intended to demolish or render useless
some houses for the benefit or ornament of the rest, it would have
given express powers for that purpose, and given an equivalent for the
loss that individuals might have sustained thereby."123
Thus,
although Parliament had authorized the road commissioners "to pave,
repair, sink and alter the streets,"'2 it was not "consistent with
common sense that the plaintiff must pay [a street improvement
assessment] to have her houses buried, and the lights and free
passage of her houses obstructed and hindered."25
The
commissioners, therefore, acted outside of their statutory
authorization, and were liable in tort; Blackstone apparently even
thought that punitive damages were appropriate. 126
Although the tradition of enforcing unwritten constitutional
norms through interpretive presumptions survived into the nineteenth century, the specific presumption in Leader did not. Beginning

118. Leader v. Moxon, 96 Eng. Rep. 546, 547 (C.P. 1773), reported sub nom. Leader v.
Moxton, 95 Eng. Rep. 1156.

119. The four volumes of the Commentaries were published between 1765 and 1769. See
George

Sharswood, A Memoir of Sir William Blackstone, in WILLAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES v, xiv (George Sharswood ed., 1886).
120. 1 BLACKSTONE, supranote 37, at *161.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at *139.
See supratext accompanying note 113.
Moxon, 96 Eng. Rep. at 547.
Leader v. Moxton, 95 Eng. Rep. 1156, 1160 (C.P. 1773) (Blackstone, J.).
Id.
See id. ("I think the commissioners have acted arbitrarily and tyranically, and that the

damages are too small.").
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in 1792, English courts decided three influential cases drawing a
distinction between direct and consequential injuries, and holding
that public officials acting under turnpike and road improvement acts
were not liable for consequential injuries caused by road construction:
Governor v. Meredith,'17 Sutton v. Clarke,us and Boulton v.
2 9 In Boulton, Justice
Crowther.1
Littledale announced a broad interpretive presumption against holding road commissioners liable:
[Wihere an Act of Parliament vests a power in trustees or commissioners, to be
exercised by them, not for their own benefit, but for that of the public, and
gives no compensation for a damage resulting from an act done by them in the
execution of that power, the Legislature must be taken to have intended, that
an individual should not receive any compensation for the loss resulting to him
from an act so done for the public benefit 30

Significantly, however, Parliament had authorized compensation, in
all three cases, for those whose land was directly physically occupied
by the public work. 13 ' The allegation in Boulton,132 like the allegations
in the two earlier cases holding the commissioners not liable, 133
charged only that the commissioners had "ma[de] some alterations in
the road, from which a consequential injury ar[ose] to the plaintiff." 4
Thus, the cases came to stand for the somewhat narrower presumption that Parliament intended to offer no compensation for
"consequential injuries" when an Act did not explicitly provide for
127. Governor v. Meredith, 100 Eng. Rep. 1306, 1308 (K.B. 1792).
128. Sutton v. Clarke, 128 Eng. Rep. 943, 949 (C.P. 1815).
129. Boulton v. Crowther, 107 Eng. Rep. 544,546-47 (K.B. 1824).
130. Id at 547. Meredith, Boulton, and Sutton all had trouble distinguishing Leader. In
Meredith, Lord Kenyon said that he "doubt[ed] the accuracy of the report" of Leader. Meredith,
100 Eng. Rep. at 1307. In Boulton, Justices Bayley and Littledale stated rather conclusorily
that Leader was distinguishable because the Commissioners had there exceeded their authority.
Boulton, 107 Eng. Rep. at 546-47. Sutton made Leader into, essentially, a negligence case, as I
will discuss below. See infra text accompanying notes 159-67.
131. See Boulton, 107 Eng. Rep. at 545; Sutton, 128 Eng. Rep. at 944; Meredith, 100 Eng.
Rep. at 1307 n.(b).
132. The plaintiffs in Boulton alleged principally that the commissioners had changed the
grade of the road in front of the main entrance to the plaintiffs land, rendering access to the
land more difficult. Boulton, 107 Eng. Rep. at 545. The plaintiffs also alleged that "part of the
materials of the road had fallen into the plaintiffs premises, and damaged his hedge and
plantations." Id.
133. In Meredith, the plaintiffs alleged that commissioners appointed by a Paving Act had
raised the grade of the street in front of the gate leading to their plate glass warehouses,
reducing the clearance of the gate so that they could not drive wagons loaded with glass in and
out of it. Meredith, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1306. In Sutton, the plaintiff alleged that the trustees had,
in the course of improving a road, built a drainage ditch that discharged water onto the
plaintiffs land (although the ditch itself was not located on plaintiffs land). Sutton, 128 Eng.
Rep. at 943.
134. Boulton, 107 Eng. Rep. at 547.
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such compensation. In the antebellum United States, the cases became the leading precedent for limiting just compensation provisions,
which were widely interpreted to extend only to direct injuries.'3s
As I have suggested above, 13 6 the distinction between "direct"
and "consequential" injuries drew on the distinction between the
common law forms of action of trespass and trespass on the case.
Consequential injuries were those for which one could not maintain a
trespass action, but had to use case. Thus, if certain acts could uncontroversially support an action of trespass or trespass quare clausum fregit, purported statutory authorization of those acts without
provision of just compensation would be void, often leading courts to
construe statutes not to attempt such authorization. In the 1811 case
of Perry v. Wilson, for example, Perry brought an action of trespass
quare clausum fregit alleging that Wilson had entered Perry's land
and stored logs there, injuring the land. 8 7 Perry alleged neither that
Wilson had taken any logs or other property belonging to Perry, nor
that he had excluded Perry from possession, but only that he had
invaded Perry's land and damaged it.138 Wilson attempted to justify
his acts under a Massachusetts special charter creating a corporation,
of which he was a proprietor, to transport logs down the Androscoggin
River. The court, however, held that the charter, if construed to
authorize such an invasion of Perry's land, would be void, because it
135. For leading American just compensation cases citing these English cases, see
TransportationCorp. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 641 (1878); Hollister v. Union Co., 9 Conn. 435,
445-46 (1833); Callenderv. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 434-35 (1823); Stevens v. Proprietors
of the Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 466, 468 (1815); City of St. Louis v. Gurno, 12 Mo.
414, 424 (1849); Radcliffs Executors v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 195, 204 (1850); Wilson v.
Mayor of New York, 1 Denio 595, 597-98 (N.Y. 1845); Green v. Borough ofReading, 9 Watts 382,
385 (Pa. 1840); Hatch v. Vermont Central RailroadCo., 25 Vt. 49, 64 (1852). For prominent
treatment of the English cases in an American treatise, see JOSEPH K ANGELL & THOMAS
DURFEE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS §§ 208-10, at 181-85 (1857).
Seemingly alone among American courts, those of Ohio rejected the distinction between
direct and consequential injuries, and held that municipal corporations were liable for consequential injuries occasioned by legislatively authorized, non-negligent acts. See Town Council v.
McComb, 18 Ohio 229, 231-32 (1849); McCombs v. Town Council, 15 Ohio 474, 479 (1846);
Rhodes v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio 159, 161 (1840).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 36-46.
137. Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. (6 Tyng) 393, 394 (1811).
138. William Michael Treanor describes Perry as involving the taking of logs belonging to
Perry. See William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the FifthAmendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 706-07 n.71 (1985) (citing Perry
for the proposition that the Massachusetts Constitution's just compensation clause was held to
require compensation for the taking of personal property, and describing the case as involving
"logs taken for use in canal construction"). In fact, although Wilson "carr[ied] away.., logs,"
Perry, 7 Mass. (6 Tyng) at 393, Wilson, not Perry, was the "owner of the logs carried away," id.
at 394; Perry alleged only that Wilson had "placed them [on Perry's land] ...and... carried
them away, without paying [Perry] any compensation for the damage done him by their being
placed upon, or their removal from his [land]." Id.
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provided no compensation for the invasion. 1 9 Therefore, Perry prevailed in his trespass action. 140 On the other hand, courts generally
agreed that if certain acts could not support a trespass action, uncompensated statutory authorization of those acts did not run afoul of the
constitution.' 4 '
The term "consequential" was also used, often in compound
phrases like "remote and consequential," to indicate the lack of
proximate causation, barring recovery under any common law form of
action, independent of statutory justification. 4 2 Thus, for example, a
New Jersey court held that a turnpike company could not recover
damages for loss of tolls from a railroad company even though the
railroad company had no statutory justification under New Jersey
doctrine. The damage, held the court, was only "a consequence which
results from the fears, prejudices, passions or caprices of the public'--fear and discomfort from having steam engines run adjacent to

the turnpike-and hence not "the direct and natural result of the act

itself."4 3 Courts bolstered acceptance of the notion that a legislature
could eliminate recovery for injuries actionable in case by conflating
or mixing the two meanings of "consequential." Many of the cases
holding that legislatures could shield corporations from liability for
consequential damage used language suggesting that the damage was
likely to be trivial, unforeseeable, or otherwise undeserving of sympathy. In Hollister v. Union Co., for example, the Connecticut Supreme
Court denied recovery for erosion of riparian land caused by changes
in the river flow made by a corporation charged with improving river
navigation.'" "The defendants," reasoned the court, "have, under the
139. See id at 394-95.
140. See id.
141. Perhaps the most common type of case of that kind in the first half of the nineteenth
century was the street grading case, in which the plaintiff alleged that a change in grade of a
street on which his property abutted diminished the value of that property. See, e.g., Smith v.
Corporation of Wash., 61 U.S. 135 (1857); Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823);
City of St. Louis v. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414 (1849); Wilson v. Mayor of New York, 1 Denio 595 (N.Y.
1845); O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187 (1851); Green v. Borough of Reading, 9 Watts 382 (Pa.
1840). Ohio courts, the sole dissenters from this early to mid-nineteenth-century consensus,
held that cities were liable for changes in street grade if (1) they had previously established the
grade of a street and (2) an abutting owner had built in reliance on that established grade. See,
e.g., Crawford v. Village of Del., 7 Ohio St. 459 (1857). I further consider street grading and the
judicial recognition of "easements of access" below at text accompanying notes 306-11.
142. See, e.g., THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 112 (2d ed.
1852) (concluding that in assessing damages for torts, "[t]he general rule ... is, to adhere as
closely as posible to the maxim, that the natural and proximate consequences of the act are
alone to be taken into consideration.").
143. Bordentown & S. Amboy Turnpike Rd. v. Camden & Amboy R.R. & Transp. Co., 17
N.J.L. 314, 320-21 (1839).
144. Hollister v. Union Co., 9 Conn. 430,446 (1833).
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sanction of the authority of the legislature... operated upon this
river so as to produce an inconvenience-a remote and consequential
injury to the plaintiffs land."145
Although there was some conflation of lack of actionability in
trespass and lack of proximate causation, in the end most courts drew
a distinction between the two; while the latter defined the limits of
private liability in tort, the former defined the narrower limits of the
constitutional just compensation obligation. As a result, the eminent
domain power was understood to be not merely the power to take
property with just compensation, as we now think of it, 1 but also the
power to inflict certain privately actionable injuries without
compensation. When a defendant claimed statutory authorization as
a defense to a tort action, he was understood to be claiming that the
state had delegated its power of eminent domain to him, and that any
injuries caused by his exercise of that power did not give rise to a just
compensation claim, although they might otherwise have been
actionable as torts.
As Chief Justice Gibson explained in
MonongahelaNavigation Corp. v. Coon, incorporating a discussion of
the limitation added by a just compensation clause:
The state itself is answerable for private damage no further than it is
expressly made so by the provision of the constitution which forbids private
property to be taken for public use, without compensation made for it. A grant
of this eminent domain, so far as it is not specially restricted, passes the
immunity from responsibility which pertained to it while it was in the hands of
the state; and a corporation invested with it, being the locum tenens of the
state, is liable to consequential damage to private property no further than it
is declared to be so in the act of its incorporation. 147

145. Id.; see also Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146, 149, 151 (N.Y. 1828) ("[Wlhere the injury
sustained is remote and consequential, it is damnum absque injuria";it is a matter of "partial
individual convenience"; when inconveniences are "consequential, slight and temporary, it is
damnum absque injuria, for which no action can be sustained."). On the development of
"consequential damages" as a limiting principle, see HORWiTZ, supranote 88, at 71-74.
146. By the early years of the twentieth century, eminent domain had come to be understood more narrowly as the power to take with compensation, often opposed to the police power,
considered as the power to modify property rights without compensation. See, e.g., Block v.
Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (Holmes, J.) ("For just as there comes a point at which the
police power ceases and leaves only the power of eminent domain, regulations of the letting of
building may be pressed to a point where they amount to a taking of property without due
process of law."); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132, 150
(1909) (McKenna, J., dissenting) ("By the exercise ofthe ... [eminent domain] power property is
taken and compensation for it is a necessary condition; by the exercise of the ... [police] power
property is subjected to regulation and a provision for compensation is not necessary.")
147. Monongahela Navigation Corp. v. Coon, 6 Pa. 379, 382 (1847). For similar discussions,
see TransportationCo. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 641 (1878); O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187,
189 (1851) (Gibson, C.J.); ANGELL & DURFEE, supra note 135, § 207, at 181 ("The public acts,
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The preeminence of the direct/consequential injury distinction
in limiting just compensation liability lasted until 1871, when two
influential cases called the distinction into question and signaled its
demise. Both cases addressed the issue whether acts causing flooding
of neighboring land amounted to takings. Just as flooding cases had
led mid-eighteenth century courts to disagree whether trespass or
case actions were appropriate, 148 they had led mid-nineteenth century
courts to disagree whether just compensation was required. 4 9 Faced
with cases in this persistently-disputed area, both the New
Hampshire Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
discarded the direct/consequential distinction altogether, and
formulated new takings tests. The opinion in Eaton v. Boston,

and is amenable, only through its officers, whose powers are commonly defined by statutes, and
who, so long as they do not exceed those powers, cannot be held to answer for the consequences
of their acts, unless the statutes themselves are void."); SEDGWICK, supra note 142, at 111 (The
proper light in which to regard the matter is to consider the grantee of the franchise, or the
public agent, so long as he does not transcend the authority conferred on him, as representing
the government, and the government as acting under its right of eminent domain, subject, of
course, to its liability to make compensation, and to that liability only."); On the Liability of the
Granteeof a Franchiseto an Action at Law for ConsequentialDamages,from its Exercise, 1 AM.
L. MAG. 52, 60 (1843) ("The proper light in which to regard the subject, is to consider the
grantee of a franchise as representing the government. Then, whatever are the rights of the
government, belong to the grantee, and the same liabilities which affect the government, attend
the exercise of the franchise.").
148. See generally 2 DANE, supra note 44, at 492 (comparing Courtney v. Collett, 91 Eng.
Rep. 1079 (KB. 1697) with Haward v. Banks, 97 Eng. Rep. 740 (KB. 1760)).
149. Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania cases held that flooding of land caused by
public works was merely consequential injury that could be statutorily authorized without just
compensation. See City of St. Louis v. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414, 418 (1849); Wilson v. Mayor of New
York, 1 Denio 595, 600 (N.Y. 1845); West Branch & Sesquehanna Canal Co. v. Mulliner, 68 Pa.
357, 360 (1871); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & Serg. 101, 113 (Pa. 1843); cf
Mayor v. Randolph, 4 Watts & Serg. 514, 516-17 (Pa. 1842) (holding that a municipal
corporation is not liable for statutorily authorized acts causing flooding, but not explicitly
considering whether such authorization would violate a just compensation clause). Connecticut
and Vermont cases held that flooding required compensation. See Hooker v. New-Haven &
Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146, 157 (1841) (holding that charter of canal could not immunize
canal company from liability for flooding without providing just compensation); Hatch v.
Vermont Cent. R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 49, 68-70 (1852). The law in Connecticut was somewhat
complicated. Hooker purported to distinguish, rather than overrule, an earlier case, Hollisterv.
Union Co., 9 Conn. 435 (1833), which had held that a canal company authorized by the
legislature was not liable for flooding damages. Hooker later returned to the Connecticut
Supreme Court and was decided on different grounds, namely, that immunity would not be
implied in the charter of a private corporation, as opposed to legislation creating a public
agency. See Hooker v. New-Haven & Northampton Co., 15 Conn. 312 (1843); infra text
accompanying notes 168-76 (discussing the private/public agent distinction). For treatises
noting the split in authority between states about protection from liability for damages from
flooding, see ANGELL & DURFEE, supra note 135, §§ 217-218, at 192-94; 1 LEWIS, supra note 35,
§ 103, at 224.
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Concord & MontrealRailroad,150 the New Hampshire case, contained
the more explicit assault on the direct/consequential distinction.
The Eaton court noted that the distinction gathered much of
its intuitive appeal from a conflation of the boundary between trespass and case with the issue of proximate causation; once that conflation was exposed, contended the court, the intuitive appeal faded, and
the rule that injury actionable in case could not amount to a taking
seemed "arbitrary."151 The Eaton court's sense that the trespass/case
distinction was arbitrary, however, was a result of much more than
the exposure of that particular conflation. For several decades before
Eaton was decided, law reformers had attacked common law pleading
as unjustifiably convoluted, and had succeeded in many states in procuring the passage of legislation abolishing the forms of action, beginning with the famous 1848 New York Code of Civil Procedure, masterminded by David Dudley Field. 52 Acceptance of those procedural
reforms, in turn, reinforced the sense that any legal doctrine depending on a distinction between two forms of action was arbitrary and
outmoded. Eaton explicitly discussed these developments and noted
their effect:
"We are not to suppose that the framers of the constitution meant to entangle
their meaning in the mazes" of the refined technical distinctions by which the
common-law system of forms of action is "perplexed and incumbered." Such a
test would be inapplicable in a large proportion of the States, where the
distinction between trespass and case has been annihilated by the abolition of
the old forms of action. 1'

150. Eaton v. Boston, Concord &Montreal R.R., 51 N.H. 504 (1872).
151. The Eaton court went on to note that:
When... it is said that a land-owner is not entitled to compensation for "consequential
damage," it is impossible either to affirm or deny the correctness of the statement until
we know in what sense the phrase "consequential damage" is used. If it is to be taken to
mean damage which would have not been actionable at common law if done by a private
individual, the proposition is correct .... If, upon the other hand, the phrase is used to
describe damage, which, though not following immediately in point of time upon the doing of the act complained of, is nevertheless actionable, there seems no good reason for
establishing an arbitary rule that such damage can in no event amount to a "taking of
property."
Id. at 520.
152. See 1848 N.Y. Laws ch. 379, pt. 2, tit. VI.
153. Eaton, 51 N.H. at 520 (citations omitted). Eaton does not cite the source of its

quotations, but the first one is from Chief Justice Gibson's opinion in Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & Serg. 101, 114 (Pa. 1843). The intended effect is one of irony. Gibson's
opinion in Monongahela Navigation Co. is one of the landmark cases adopting the
direct/consequential distinction and classifying damages from flooding as consequential; in the
quoted excerpt, Gibson is rejecting the pleading categories predating the forms of action of
trespass and case, under which a victim of flooding apparently had the election of proceeding
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Despite some language that suggested that public liability for takings
should be equivalent to common law private liability for torts, Eaton
did not strongly advocate making all torts takings.1M The principle
suggested by Eaton's discussion is that a tort will be a taking when it
is defined and permanent enough that it is as if the tortfeasor subjected the owner's property to an easement, removing a strand from

the owner's bundle of rights.155 The United States Supreme Court
used a similar approach in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.156 Applying the
Wisconsin Constitution in a diversity action, the Court held that
"where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of
water, earth, sand, or other material.., so as to effectively destroy its
usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution."67
Descendants of these tests continue to determine whether
governmentally-sanctioned activities amount to takings.'5
b. Negligent and Non-NegligentActs
A second distinction that found a place in the antebellum just
compensation law was that between negligent and non-negligent acts.
Recall that the 1773 case of Leader v. Moxon held road commissioners
liable for blocking passage, light, and air of abutting houses, a holding
that later English cases had difficulty distinguishing.159 In 1815, in
Sutton v. Clarke, Chief Justice Gibbs argued that the commissioners
in Leader did not exceed their jurisdiction, but acted "wantonly and

either under the action that was the predecessor to trespass, or under the action that was the
predecessor to case:
It is true, that a nuisance by flooding a man's land was originally considered so far a
species of ouster, that he might have had remedy for it by assize of novel disseisin, or
assize of nuisance, at his election; but we are not to suppose that the framers of the
Constitution meant to entangle their meaning in the mazes of thejus antiquum.
Id Thus, the passage in Eaton advocating the end of the trespass/case distinction in just
compensation law invokes language from an opinion advocating the adoption of that distinction.
154. I discuss this aspect ofEaton in more detail below. See infra note 286.
155. See Eaton, 51 N.H. at 514-15. I discuss Eaton's legal positivism and its language
limiting takings liability infra at text accompanying notes 283-89.
156. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
157. Id. at 181.
158. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) ("Flights over private land are
not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference
with the enjoyment and use of the land .... We agree with the Court of Claims that a servitude
has been imposed upon the land."); see also Portsmouth Land & Harbor Hotel Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327, 330 (1922) (noting that "the specific facts set forth [about regular firing of
coastal defense guns over resort hotel grounds] would warrant a finding that a servitude has
been imposed.").
159. Leader v. Moxon, 96 Eng. Rep. 546 (1773), reported sub nor. Leader v. Moxton, 95
Eng. Rep. 1156.
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oppressively," because "the injury might have been avoided by doing
the act in a different way." 6 0 By contrast, Gibbs contended, in Sutton
itself, "the commissioners, at the time of doing the act, took every
precaution to prevent injury to the surrounding land."161

Further,

Gibbs noted that "[n]o imputation of negligence rests on them, and
they did the act in the manner, which, according to the best information they could obtain, was the best mode." 162 Out of this effort to

distinguish Leader eventually arose the doctrine that legislative
authorization would not immunize agents from liability for negligence. 63 The courts understood this doctrine to distinguish between
the work authorized-say, building a road-and the way that work
was accomplished: "The act done being itself lawful, can only become
unlawful in consequence of the mode in which it is carried into execution."'6 As the concept of "negligence" more broadly gained its modem cast of objectivity,165 the implied qualification to legislative
authorization followed. 66 By 1847, the North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld a judgment against the commissioners of the town of
Wilmington for failing to exercise "ordinary skill and caution" in reducing the grade of a street, because it concluded that legislative
authorization of work always implied "a condition.., that the work
shall be done properly."167

160. Sutton v. Clarke, 128 Eng. Rep. 943, 948 (C.P. 1815).
161. Id.
162. Id.

163. Seven years after Sutton, the Court of King's Bench put the negligence exception to
work, upholding an award against sewer commissioners for damage caused by failing to shore
up a sewer during repairs. The court concluded that the jury had found that the commissioners
were negligent, and that Sutton was for that reason distinguishable. See Jones v. Bird, 106
Eng. Rep. 1397, 1399-400 (K.B. 1822). For an example of a treatise tracing to Leader the
doctrine that statutory authorization does not eliminate liability for negligence, see ANGELL &
DUM, supra note 135, § 219, at 194-95.

164. Boulton v. Crowther, 107 Eng. Rep. 544, 547 (K.B. 1824).
165. The case of Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493-94 (C.P. 1837), is a suggested

turning point. It is generally recognized as the first to establish that the test of negligence in
tort law is objective. See A.W. Brian Simpson, The Elusive Truth About Holmes, 95 MICH. L.
REV.2027,2028 (1997).

166. For a later notorious English case holding that a landowner could not recover for
injury caused by fire set by sparks from a passing locomotive when its operation was sanctioned

by the legislature and not negligent, see Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry., 157 Eng. Rep. 1352 (Ex.
1858).
167. Meares v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 73, 76, 81-82 (1848). The
court reasoned, somewhat weakly, that whereas a legislature could predict the amount of
compensation required for injuries that were a necessary consequence of the project authorized,
it could not know in advance the degree to which ordinary skill and care would be lacking in
carrying out the project, and therefore could not provide for compensation for the lack of that
ordinary skill and care. See id. at 81-82.
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c. Public and PrivateAgents

Two of the prominent English cases holding that parliamentary authorization of public works shielded public agents from liability for consequential injuries caused by those works mentioned that
the agents were granted powers to exercise, not for their own benefit,
but for the benefit of the public. 168 This discussion raised the issue
whether courts should apply the same rules of construction about
implied grants of immunity to charters of private corporations as they
did to charters of municipal corporations, and the issue whether the
same rules should apply to municipal corporations whether acting in
their governmental or proprietary functions. Courts and commentators split on these issues. On the one hand, Joseph Angell argued
that the grant of immunity did not depend on the lack of private benefit and should be extended to a city even when acting in its proprietary capacity. 16 9 Many courts took Angell's argument one step further,
and read the charters of corporations operated for private profit to
grant immunity implicitly from liability for consequential injuries. 170
On the other hand, a number of courts decided that private corporations should not enjoy the same implied immunity as public agents
and entities, reflecting and contributing to the developing distinction
between private and public corporations.' 7 ' In Ten Eyck v. Delaware
& Raritan Canal Co., for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that the charter of a private canal company should not be read to
grant the immunity from liability for consequential injuries that a
public agent would receive. 72 The canal company, the court concluded, acted in its own private interest, and only incidentally in the
public interest. 73 The company's charter permitted it to construct a
168. See Boulton, 107 Eng. Rep. at 547 (Littledale, J.); Sutton v. Clarke, 128 Eng. Rep. 943,
949 (C.P. 1815).
169. See ANGELL & DURFEE, supra note 135, § 210, at 185 (citing Mayor v. Randolph, 4
Watts & Serg. 514 (Pa. 1842)).
170. See, ag., Spring v. Russell, 7 Me. 273, 291 (1831); Monongahela Navigation Co. V.
Coon, 6 Pa. 379,382 (1847).
171. On this development in the context of common law liability, see supra text
accompanying notes 61-77.
172. Ten Eyck v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 18 N.J.L. 200,204-05 (1841).
173. See id. at 204. In Meares v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 73, 80-81,
86 (1848), the court rejected the argument that a municipal corporation should be immune from
liability for negligence. Both business and municipal public corporations, argued the court,
solicited and accepted grants of legislative power because of the benefit they would derive from
them. See id. at 80. According to the Meares court:
(A grant of power to a municipal corporation] is accepted because of the benefit which
the corporation expects to derive, not by making money directly, but by making it more
convenient for the individuals composing the corporation or town, to pass and repass in
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canal, but did not compel construction, and allowed the company to
abandon the project at any time. 7 4 Thus, there was no reason to believe that the legislature intended "to interfere with private and
vested rights, without providing a recompense to be paid by the company ... ."175 Later in the century, several courts hardened the public/private distinction from a rule of construction to a constitutional
limitation on legislative power: legislatures could not confer upon
private individuals and corporations the same immunity they con176
ferred upon public agents without paying just compensation.
d. Public and PrivateNuisanceLiability
Finally, courts sometimes held that the effect of a legislative
authorization was to exempt the authorized party from liability for
violation of public rights, but not for violation of private rights. 177 For
the transaction of business, and to benefit them by holding out greater inducements for
others to frequent the town and thereby add to its business.
Id.
174. See Ten Eyck, 18 N.J.L. at 204. One writer who argued that corporate charters should
be read to grant immunity described charters that did place affirmative duties on corporations.
See On the Liability of the Grantee of a Franchise to an Action at Law for Consequential
Damages, from its Exercise, 1 AM. L. MAG. 52, 64 (1843) ("It is th[e] duty [of a company
established by the legislature] (and a duty which they may be compelled to perform) to enter
upon the land of individuals, and to exercise the right granted, notwithstanding it may be
attended with injurious consequences to private rights."). Thus, a difference or change in
attitude towards private corporate immunity might be due in part to differences or changes in
the form of charters themselves.
175. Ten Eyck, 18 N.J.L. at 204; see Hooker v. New-Haven & Northampton Co., 15 Conn.
312, 320 (1843) (holding that the charter of a private corporation does not impliedly grant
immunity from liability for consequential damages); Bordentown & S. Amboy Turnpike Rd. v.
Camden & Amboy R.R. & Transp. Co., 17 N.J.L. 314, 320-21 (1839) (holding that a railroad was
not liable for damage to a turnpike franchise even though, as a private corporation, it could not
justify its acts under its charter, because the damage was too remote and speculative);
Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 147 (1839) (Dayton, J.); id. at 150-51 (Nevius, J.) (also
developing the distinction between implied grants of immunity to public agents and private
individuals or corporations). A later New Jersey court commented that the legislature did not
have a good track record in making owners whole for injuries caused by private individuals and
corporations under legislative authorization: "As applied to the acts of the legislature obtained
in the interest of individuals or corporations, the hypothesis that the paternal care of the
government will shield the citizen from injustice, is not confirmed by practice." Trenton Water
Power Co. v. Raff, 36 N.J.L. 335,340 (1873).
176. See Evansville & Crawfordsville R.R. Co. v. Dick, 9 Ind. 433, 435-36 (1857);
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Angel, 41 N.J. Eq. 316, 329-30 (1886) (noting that "an act of the
legislature cannot confer upon individuals or private corporations, acting primarily for their
own profit.., any right to deprive persons of the ordinary enjoyment of their property, except
upon condition that just compensation be first made to the owners."); Alexander v. City of
Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 264, 271-72 (1862) (noting that liability of municipal corporation working
for the public good is more restricted than liability of corporation or individual working for
private benefit).
177. See, e.g., Sinnichson, 17 N.J.L. at 147, 151-52 (Nevius, J.); Crittenden v. Wilson, 5
Cow. 165, 167 (N.Y. 1825).
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example, a party authorized by statute to undertake some project,
such as building a dam on a navigable stream, could "plead the act, to
any indictment for a nuisance, or against any complaint for an infringement of a public right, but [could not] plead it as a justification
for a private injury, which [might] result from the execution of the
The
statute " 178 Such a distinction appeared as early as 1789.
argugristmill
owner's
to
a
Court,
responding
Connecticut Supreme
ment that he could not be liable to his neighbor for injury caused by a
dam erected in connection with the mill, held that "the license, however it may estop the town from proceeding against the dam as a
common nuisance, it can be no excuse or justification for an injury
done to private property." 179 Courts limited the legal effect of legislative authorization in this way virtually exclusively in cases in which
the defendant was a private individual or corporation. Thus, it often
appeared in tandem with the doctrine that general immunity from
consequential damages was not implied in grants of power to private
entities. 180 Just as some courts hardened the rule of construction
about immunizing private corporations into a constitutional rule,
others, including the Supreme Court, hinted that the private/public
nuisance distinction might be of constitutional dimensions. 181
4. Remedial Matters: Retrospective Damages,
Prospective Uncertainties
Suppose a property owner prevails in his trespass or case
action, having proven acts sufficient to make out trespass or case at
common law, and having defeated the defendant's attempt to justify
under a statute. What damages can the owner now collect? The tra-

178. Sinnickson, 17 N.J.L. at 152 (Nevius, J.).
179. Nichols v. Pixly, 1 Root 129, 129 (Conn. 1789).
180. See Sinnickson, 17 N.J.L. at 147 (Dayton, J.); id. at 150-52 (Nevius, J.).
181. See, e.g., Baltimore & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1883):
It admits indeed of grave doubt whether Congress could authorize the [railroad] company to occupy and use any premises within the city limits, in a way which would subject others to physical discomfort and annoyance in the quiet use and enjoyment of their
property, and at the same time exempt the company from the liability to suit for damages or compensation, to which individuals acting without such authority would be subject under like circumstances.
The acts that a legislature may authorize, which, without such authorization,
would constitute nuisances, are those which affect public highways or public streams, or
matters in which the public have an interest and over which the public have control.
The legislative authorization.., does not affect any claim of a private citizen for damages for any special inconvenience and discomfort not experienced by the public at large.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:57

ditional rule was that the owner could only recover retrospective
damages, for injury up until the time the owner brought suit. 182 If the
injury was continuing, the owner could bring successive actions, but
could not bring a single action for permanent damages. 18 As one treatise writer put it:
[Ihf the injured party should receive in one action prospective as well as past
damages for a continuing trespass, there would be an assumption of
persistence in wrong-doing, an assumption repugnant to the common law, and
also a result equally repugnant,-the acquisition of a right by being mulcted in
damages for a wrong.'84

For Chief Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the
inability of property owners to sue for permanent damages at common
law was one reason, real or rhetorical, that courts should not read just
compensation clauses to encompass nonpossessory injury to property,
but should await legislative action:
[It must be admitted that, while it is inequitable to injure the property of an
individual for the benefit of the many, it would be impossible for a corporation
to bear the pressure of successive common law actions for the continuance of a
nuisance, each verdict being more severe than the preceding one. The
modification of the remedy would be for the legislature, which can turn
compensation for a permanent detriment into the price of a prospective
license. 18

The inability to bring suits for permanent damages did not
pose a problem for property owners as long as they could sue for
ejectment or for an injunction to prevent prospective injury. Indeed,
ejectment and injunctive relief were arguably more favorable, because
they allowed the owner to demand his asking price, potentially higher
than a just compensation award, until condemnation proceedings
were brought. And as a general rule, injunctive relief was available to
prevent permanent construction on land or changes of a permanent

Id. at 331-32 (Field, J.).
182. See 2 NICHOLS, supranote 34, § 478, at 1276-77.
183. See id. As a corollary, one recovery in trespass would not bar a subsequent action.
See, e.g., Holmes v. Wilson, 113 Eng. Rep. 190, 193 (KB. 1839).
184. CARMA F. RANDOLPH, THE LAw OF EsINENT DOMAiN IN THE UNITED STATES § 308, at
282(1894).
185. O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187, 189-90 (1851). Chief Justice Gibson's comment
that "each [nuisance] verdict [would be] more severe than the preceding one" suggests that he
would expect the damages assessed to have a punitive component; without a valid exercise of
eminent domain, one could not just maintain a nuisance and pay the price of compensatory
damages.
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In two circumstances, however, some courts found that

property owners did not have a right to an injunction. First, many
courts held that owners could lose their right to ejectment or an injunction if they acquiesced in entry onto and construction on their
land. This exception appears to have been applied rather liberally to
prevent interference with projects thought to be of public importance.
Thus, in denying a landowner's action for ejectment against a railroad
that had not paid for the land on which it had constructed rails, Chief
Judge Redfield of the Vermont Supreme Court commented:
In these great public works the shortest period of clear acquiesence, so as fairly
to lead the company to infer that the party intends to waive his claim for
present payment, will be held to include the right to assert the claim in any
such form as to stop the company in the progress of their works, and especially
operation, whereby
to stop the running of the road after it has been put into
87
the public acquire important interests in its continuance.

186. See, e.g., Rowe v. Granite Bridge Corp., 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 344, 34647 (1839);
Scudder v. Trenton DeL Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694, 717 (1832); Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns.
Ch. 162, 164-65 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). In Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 (N.Y. Ch. 1823),
Chancellor Kent denied an injunction against removing rock from the plaintiffs land as
authorized by the legislature for the purpose of constructing a lock and dam. The opinion
expresses two radically different grounds for the denial. On the one hand, Kent contended that
the plaintiff did not show that the rock was of any particular value to him, so that the removal
of the rock "was susceptible of a perfect pecuniary compensation." Id. at 331. In that case,
there was no good reason for the intervention of a court of equity, because "the injury [did] not
appear to be irremediable and destructive to the estate, and... the ordinary legal remedy in the
courts of law [could] afford adequate satisfaction." Id. This is an application of traditional rules
of equity, but it seems to be quite a stretch; rock had already been removed on several separate
occasions, and the plaintiff had pending several actions for damages relating to those separate
occasions, see id; ordinarily, equity would intervene to prevent such repeated misconduct. After
disposing of the case on these grounds, however, Kent proceeded to hold that the legislative
authorization justified the defendants' acts, so that they were not trespassers, even though the
law did not provide expressly for compensation, see id at 337-45. He suggests that the legislature probably considered the commissioners to have sufficient discretionary authority to pay for
damage such as that caused by removal of the rock, but he seems to think that the validity of
the defendants' justification does not depend upon that authority: "The question of compensation is distinct from the right of entry to take and use the land necessary for the purpose of the
improvements; and that right I hold to be unquestionable, provided it not be abused in the
exercise, through the want of good faith or due discretion." Id. at 345. If Kent's position was
that the availability of a post-deprivation common law suit for damages satisfied the just
compensation requirement, then he was considerably ahead of his time.
187. McAulay v. Western Vt. R.R. Co., 33 Vt. 311, 321-22 (1860); see also Goodin v.
Cincinnati & Whitewater Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. 169, 180 (1868); 2 NICHOLS, supra note 34, §
474, at 1264-67. Nichols speculated that the probable explanation of the cases that found
sufficient acquiescence to deny injunctive relief even when no elements of estoppel were present
"is that public sentiment does not support the rigid enforcement of the requirement that
compensation be paid in advance of the taking with the necessary delay incident to the ascertainment of the sum to be paid." Id. at 1267. For later cases, see, for example, Southern
Railway Co. v. Hood, 28 So. 662 (Ala. 1899); Evansville & Terre Haute Railroad Co. v. Nye, 15

N.E. 261 (Ind. 1888).
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Second, some courts denied injunctions when the injuries alleged,
though possibly actionable, were not direct, but consequential. 188
When prospective relief in the form of ejectment or injunction was
unavailable, the traditional rule that permanent damages were unavailable in a trespass or case action had more dire consequences for
the property owner. Although by 1860 a few courts had relaxed this
rule and allowed an owner to waive ejectment and sue for permanent
damages, many courts stuck to the rule that permanent damages
were unavailable. 189 This problem would become acute once constitutional amendments made consequential damages recoverable in a
much wider variety of situations.lee
B. Why Justification-Stripping?Antebellum Just
CompensationLitigation in Context
In modern Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and commentary, the "officer suit" is routinely characterized as a fiction invented
to circumvent Eleventh Amendment immunity.191 The fiction is often
traced to the 1908 Supreme Court case of Ex parte Young, 192 but hundreds of state court cases, as well as many Supreme Court cases,
confirm David Engdabl's assessment that Young was not "a great
breakthrough and the origin of a novel principle," but "the last surviving (although enfeebled) vestige of the vigorous traditional scheme for
enforcing legal restraints against government." 193 As early as 1823,
the use of the justification-stripping model in just compensation litigation was explained as a device to provide some remedy to owners

188. In Bruce v. President of the Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 19 Barb. Ch. 371 (N.Y.
1853), the court noted that:
The plaintiffs property has not been occupied; all that he complains of is, that it has

been injured by means of an act done by the defendants elsewhere. For this injury, he
may or may not have a right to recover damages; but, if the act itself was authorized by
law, the defendants could not be restrained from doing it because it would result in an

injury to the plaintiff.

Id. at 375.
189. For an early case allowing waiver of ejectment and suits for the value of the land, i.e.,
permanent damages, see Mayor and Council ofRome v. Perkins, 30 Ga. 154 (1860).

190. See infra text accompanying notes 324-36.
191. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 621, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (1997)
("Application of the [exception in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)] must reflect a proper
understanding of its role in our federal system and respect for state courts instead of a reflexive
reliance on an obvious fiction."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105
(1984) ("[We declined to extend the fiction of Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so

would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States.").
192. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
193. Engdahl, supranote 79, at 55 n.255.
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who could not sue the state directly. In Callender v. Marsh, Chief
Justice Parker of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrote:
[If by virtue of any legislative act the land of any citizen should be occupied by
the public... without any means provided to indemnify the owner of the
property, the title of the owner could not be devested thereby, and he might
maintain his action for possession, or of trespass, against those who were
instrumental in the act; because such a statute would be directly contrary to
the [Massachusetts Constitution takings clause]; and as no action can be
in
maintainedagainstthe public for damages, the only way to secure the party
194
his constitutional rights would be to declare void the public appropriation.

If the "remedial imperative" 195 of providing compensation to those
whose property had been confiscated meant that courts were likely to
find some device to circumvent sovereign immunity, the question
remains: why justification-stripping? The answer is likely that
courts were already familiar with the model of justification-stripping
in a truncated form, and had already successfully adapted it from
private law to serve public law ends. For centuries, English courts
had recognized legislative power to change rules of private conduct;
statutes might sanction private conduct otherwise actionable at
common law.19 Those courts began to use their authority to construe
those statutes to discipline the executive branch of government,
thought in the eighteenth century to be a far greater threat to liberty
and property than the legislature. 197 If an executive official committed
acts that were actionable at common law and that did not fall within
the scope of a legislative grant of authority, a court could hold that
official personally liable for damages. 198 When using this model to
discipline executives, courts could claim that they were doing no more
than consistently applying the rules that they already applied to
private litigants. A.V. Dicey's boast, in other words, may have begun
life in the defensive form that "[w]ith us, every official.., is under [no
more] responsibility for every act done without legal justification
[than] any other citizen."' 99 As the civil action model was applied to
194. Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418,430-31 (1823) (emphasis added).

195. See Amar, OfSovereignty, supra note 3, at 1484.
196. On the development of legislation in England, see, e.g., CHARLES H. McILwAIN, THE
T AND ITS SUPREMACY 42 (1910).
HGH COURT OF PARMN

197. I use the abstract term "executive branch" to cover both the King or Queen of England
and the President ofthe United States. Obviously, these are two very different institutions.
198. See, e.g., Wayne v. Varley, 6 Term. R. 443 (KB. 1795) (holding a public official authorized to seize undried leather liable in trespass when he mistakenly seized what turned out to be
dried leather); supratext accompanying notes 86-87 (discussing similar American cases).
199. DICEY, supranote 86, at 114. For parallel American rhetoric, see, for example, United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (No man in this country is so high that he is above the
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litigation against public officials, the jury gained new importance in
public litigation as a representative of the citizenry in times when
judges lacked any significant independence from the other branches of
20o
government.
With the tradition of disciplining another branch of government by means of common law actions in place, it was easy to adapt
the model to enforce constitutional discipline on the legislature. If an
official was exposed to a common law damages action when he strayed
from the limited protective scope of a valid statute, he was similarly
vulnerable when the statute was declared void, or void in applicable
part, as unconstitutional, and could provide no shield at all. In this
manner, courts could present judicial review, still in its controversial
infancy, as an extension of an already-existing practice of interbranch
discipline in the courts. For this reason, perhaps, justificationstripping became a dominant model of constitutional enforcement, not
only with regard to just compensation clauses, but also with regard to
other constitutional provisions. As Akhil Amar has shown, for
example, the Framers of the Fourth Amendment and of similar state
constitutional search-and-seizure provisions presupposed that they
would be enforced by means of common law damages actions against
government officials. 201 In many circumstances, the common law
permitted searches and arrests; 2 2 government officials could often
defend themselves against damages actions without presenting some
special justification. When they needed to justify acts that would
otherwise be actionable at common law, however, they turned to the
warrant, which was understood to confer immunity on a government
official for the acts it authorized, much as a special charter was
thought to confer immunity on a corporation for authorized acts.m
Just as the Fifth Amendment (or its state counterparts) limited
legislative power to immunize by special charter, 2 4 the Fourth
law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the
government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.");
Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 87, 92 (1845) (McLean, J., dissenting) ("It is a fundamental principle
in our government, that no individual, whether in office or out of office, is above the law. In this
our safety consists.").
200. See AKmL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
'PRINCIPLES 13-14 (1997) [hereinafter AMAR, FIRST PRINCIPLES].
201. See id. at 20-21.
202. See id. at 5-8; 4 BLACKSTONE,,supra note 37, at *292-94 (enumerating the circumstances under which arrests without warrants may be executed).
203. See Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817-18 (KB. 1765) (holding royal agents
liable in action for trespass because warrant was invalid); AmAR, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note
200, at 15-16, 187 nn.80, 84-85; supra text accompanying notes 108-12 (discussing the implied
grant of immunity associated with special charters).
204. See supratext accompanying notes 31-32.
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Amendment limited the government's power to immunize its officials
by means of warrants. Unless the warrant was issued "upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,"2 5 the
official was stripped of his justification and made liable in damages.
The Seventh Amendment reinforced the Fourth by constitutionalizing
the use of the jury in such damage actions, following the exhortation
of the Maryland Farmer that "no remedy has yet been found equal to
the tack of detering and curbing the insolence of office, but a
jury... [whereas] an American judge, who will be judge and jury
too... [would probably] spare the public purse, if not favour a brother
officer."m
Although the Fourth Amendment's framers undoubtedly intended it to prevent Congress from passing a law purporting to
authorize the issuance of warrants that did not meet the
Amendment's requirements, their primary concern was probably to
discipline the officials who issued and executed the warrants, rather
than the legislature. In that context, the stick of personal liability
made perfect sense, just as it did in the older statutory scope-ofauthority cases. An award of damages against the government, to be
satisfied from funds collected by means of legislatively-authorized
taxes, would have been a less direct method of disciplining errant
officials in the executive branch; personal liability struck a direct blow
at the executive official, and left him to seek indemnification at the
mercy of the legislature.
The property protection clauses in early state constitutions
were undoubtedly also intended to curb oppressive executive practices. Late eighteenth-century jurists were thoroughly familiar with
traditions of distrust of the executive (in England, of the Crown) and
of trust in representative legislatures. In his 1689 Second Treatise on
Government, John Locke argued that "[t]he Supream Power cannot
take from any Man any part of his Property without his own con-

205. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

206. Essays by a Farmer[1], in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 5, 14 (Herbert J. Storing
ed., 1981); see also AMAR, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 200, at 14-15. In his article contending
that the Seventh Amendment requires the use of a jury in all Just Compensation Clause cases,
Eric Grant constructs a complex argument that the jury requirement should apply to inverse
condemnation cases brought by property owners as well as direct condemnation proceedings
instituted by the government. See Grant, supra note 32, at 192-94. Under the justificationstripping model, however, the Seventh Amendment connection to owner-initiated just compensation litigation is much more direct: owners bring common law tort damage actions, which are
the quintessential "actions at law."
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sent,"207 but he considered that requirement of consent satisfied by
"the Consent of the Majority, giving it either by themselves, or their
Representatives chosen by them."2°8 Locke's concern was to wrest the
power to take property from the Crown and place it in the hands of a
representative legislature; he was not terribly worried about the
potential for oppression by such a legislature. As he put it-naively,
many of us would now say-the power to take property "is not much
to be fear'd in Governments where the Legislative consists, wholly or
in part, in Assemblies which are variable, whose Members upon the
dissolution of the Assembly, are Subjects under the common Laws of
their Country, equally with the rest."209 The only direct protection for

property in the first constitutions of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia were provisions modeled on Locke's language; in Delaware's
formulation, the provision declared that "no Part of a Man's Property
can be justly taken from him, or applied to public Uses without his
own Consent or that of his legal Representatives." 210 Delaware's constitution also made the faith in representative government explicit,
declaring that "the Right in the People to participate in the
Legislature, is the Foundation of Liberty and of all free
21
Government." 1
John Jay's 1778 plea to the New York legislature to pass laws
governing the appropriation of property for military use pursues the
same Lockean theme. Jay complained of the "Practice of impressing
Horses, Teems, and Carriages by the military, without the
207. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOvERNMENT § 138, at 360 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
208. Id.§ 140, at 362.
209. Id. § 138, at 361.
210. A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE DELAWARE STATE § 10

(1776), reprintedin 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONS 197-98 (William F.
Swindler ed., 1973) [hereinafter SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS]; see also PA. CONST. of 1776, art.
VIII, reprintedin 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 278 ("[No part of a man's property can
be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal
representatives ... ."); VA. CONST. of 1776 § 6, reprintedin 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra,
at 48-49 ("[All men... cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses, without
their own consent, or that of their representatives.., elected [in free elections].. . ."). For the

connection between Locke and the early constitutions, see William B. Stoebuck, A General
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 566-68, 585-86 (1972). For the opinion that
the form of consent provision used in Delaware, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and elsewhere was
"very clearly a limitation upon the administrative branch, being an attempt to secure 'a
government of laws not of men,'" see Grant, supra note 114, at 76 n.48.
211.

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE DELAWARE STATE § 6

(1776), reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 210, at 197-98. Maryland's 1776
Declaration of Rights contained a nearly identical provision:

"[Tjhe right in the people to

participate in the Legislature, is the best security of liberty, and the foundation of all free
government...." MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. V (1776), reprinted in 4 SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 210, at 372-73.
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Intervention of a civil Magistrate, and without any Authority from the
Law of the Land."21 That practice, he contended, violated "the undoubted Right and unalienable Priviledge of a Freeman not to be
divested... of ... Property, but by Laws to which he has assented,

either personally or by his Representatives213-the Lockean
formulation. By way of issuing a warning, Jay then adverted to the
practice of disciplining errant officials through common law actions:
It may not be improper to observe that it is no less the Interest of the Quarter
Master and their agents than of the People at large that such Laws should
take Place. The Time may come when Law and Justice will again pervade the

feel this kind of oppression, may then bring
State, and many who now severely
214

Actions and recover Damages.

There is some evidence that the Fifth Amendment Just
Compensation Clause, and similar state just compensation clauses,
were directed towards the military impressment practices that incensed Jay. In 1803, Henry St. George Tucker wrote that the Clause
"was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode
of obtaining supplies for the army, and other public uses, by impressment, as was too frequently practiced during the revolutionary war,
without any compensation whatsoever."215 To that extent, the justification-stripping model would have seemed a perfect fit: within that
model, the Just Compensation Clause would function to guarantee the
availability of the very private damage actions that Jay portended.
The just compensation clauses, however, seem to hint at a
distrust of the legislature not reflected in the "consent" provisions. 216
212. John Jay, A Hint to the Legislatureof the State ofNew York (1778), reprintedin 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 312 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
213. Id.

214. Id. at 313. Jay's plea for legislative regulation of military appropriation practices also
has direct ties to the second half of the Third Amendment, which prohibits soldiers from being
quartered in houses "in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST.
amend. HI.
215. 1 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 305-06 (1803). Jed
Rubinfeld and Akhil Amar, citing Jay and St. George Tucker, have both suggested that military

impressment was one of the principal concerns motivating the Just Compensation Clause. See
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGTS, supra note 114, at 79; Jed Rubinfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077,
1122-23 (1993).
216. Differing views about trust and distrust of representative government also shaped the
debate over interpretation of the "law of the land" provisions that were the most popular
protections ofproperty in colonial charters and early state constitutions. These provisions were
all variations on Magna Carta's declaration that "[nlo freeman shall be taken or (andi imprisoned or disseised ... except by the lawful judgment of his peers or {andl by the law of the land."
MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215), reprintedin SAMUEL E. THORNE ETAL., THE GREAT CHARTER: FOUR
ESSAYS ON MAGNA CARTA AND THE HISTORY OF OUR LIBERTY 111, 132 (1965) ("Nullus liber homo

capiaturvel imprisonetur,aut disseisiatur... nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per
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A consent provision would, after all, subject military officials to legislative control, on pain of retroactive damage awards. To one who
thought a representative legislature to be sufficiently protective of
property rights, any other provision would have been superfluous.
Yet states began to add just compensation clauses just the same, and
a just compensation clause became part of the 1791 Federal Bill of
Rights. 217 The first ratified state constitution to contain a just compensation clause, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, was submitted to the convention by the drafting committee with a consent
provision just like those in Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.2 18

legem terre."); see, e.g., MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XXI (1776), reprinted in 4
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 210, at 372-73; A COPPIE OF THE LBERTIES OF THE
MASSACHUSErrs COLONY IN NEW ENGLAND § 1, reprintedin 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra

note 210, at 46 ("[N]o man's goods or estaite shall be taken away from him... unless it be by
vertue or equitie of some expresse law of the Country waranting the same, established by a
generall Court and sufficiently published...."); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII, reprinted in
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 210, at 175; NEW YORK CHARTER OF LIBERTIES AND
PRIVILEGES § 13 (1683), reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 210, at 164-65
("But by the Lawfull Judgment of his peers and by the law of this province.... ."); N.C. CONST.
of 1776, art. XII, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 210, at 402-03; S.C.
CONST. OF 1778, art. XLI, reprintedin 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supranote 210, at 475.
In State v. , 2 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 38, 43 (1794), for example, Attorney General Haywood
argued that "law of the land" meant "a law for the people of North Carolina, made or adopted by
themselves by the intervention of their own Legislature," and was intended to exclude 'the idea
of foreign legislation, of royal or executive prerogative, and of usurped power...." Such an
interpretation would have given the law of the land clauses a function quite similar to the
function of the "consent" clauses modeled on Lockean political philosophy. The court, however,
read "by the law of the land" to mean "according to the course of the common law," that is,
according to certain procedures that the legislature could not constitutionally alter. Id. at 39; cf.
University of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 88 (1805) ("[L]aw of the land" means "by a trial by
Jury in a court ofJustice, according to the known and established rules of decision, derived from
the common law, and such acts ofthe Legislature as are consistent with the constition ... ").
The position that the "law of the land" included a substantive just compensation principle
also found judicial support before the end of the eighteenth century. In Lindsay v.
Commissioners, 1 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 16, 23-24 (1796), the court held that the use of eminent domain
to acquire land for highways was part of the common law of the state, and hence part of the "law
of the land." In dissent, however, Judge Waties argued that the common law "authorize[d] the
power of taking private property for public uses [only] 'by providing... a full indemnification for
it.'" Id. at 24 (Waties, J., dissenting) (quoting William Blackstone). As a common law restriction, Waties argued, the just compensation requirement was part of the law of the land, and an
attempt to take property without paying just compensation would violate the South Carolina
constitution's "law of the land" provision. See id. at 24-25 (Waties, J., dissenting).
Later in the century, Justice Miller, rejecting Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877), interpreted Magna Carta's "law of the
land" provision to encompass the common law plus parliamentary legislation. According to
Miller, the barons who forced King John to sign Magna Carta interpreted "law of the land" as
"the ancient and customary laws of the English people, or laws enacted by the Parliament of
which those barons were a controlling element. It was not in their minds, therefore, to protect
themselves against the enactments of the laws by the Parliament of England." Id. at 102.
217. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
218. See JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION FOR FRAMING A CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FOR
THE STATE OF MASSACHUSErTS BAY 38 (1832) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION];
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The just compensation requirement was added by amendment from
the floor; the convention journal does not indicate who was responsible for it.219 As William Stoebuck puts it:
[oi the extent [the just compensation amendment] betrays its author's state of
mind, it shows a distrust of the legislative process that was no part of Lockeian
theory .... [Locke] reposed great confidence in the legislature, and many
American rebels, whom we take to be good enough libertarians, were content
with that. But somewhere out there in the hustings ... people sent
a delegate
20
who did not trust even representative government all that much.

Perhaps from the very beginning, just compensation clauses did not
mesh perfectly with the justification-stripping model. For those worried about legislative power, the executive officials who carried out
the legislature's directives were second-best defendants, called into
court only because the state itself could not be, as Chief Justice
Parker's comment in Callender v. Marsh acknowledged. 221
Importantly, this "second-best defendant" phenomenon does
not affect that large portion of nineteenth-century just compensation
litigation that involved corporate defendants. Everyone expected that
turnpike, canal, and railroad corporations, and usually municipal
corporations as well, would bear the costs of property acquired for
their benefit. In these cases, the justification-stripping model placed
liability on the party all thought should be ultimately responsible for
the dispossession or injury.
That still leaves public officials. Louis Jaffe scoffed at the
notion that courts should be concerned about the plight of officials
Stoebuck, supra note 210, at 592-93. The Vermont Constitution of 1777, which also contained a
just compenation clause (as well as a consent clause) was never ratified. See VT. CONST. of
1777, ch. I, § I1, reprintedin 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 210, at 489. ('MThat private
property ought to be subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it; nevertheless,
whenever any particular man's property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to
receive an equivalent in money."); id. ch. I, § IX, reprintedin SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 210, at 490 ("[No part of a man's property can be justly taken from him, or applied to
public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal representatives.").
219. See JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supranote 218, at 194.
220. Stoebuck, supra note 210, at 593. William Michael Treanor argues that the addition
of just compensation clauses in the 1780s and 1790s is evidence of a shift from republicanism to
liberalism as the reigning American political ideology. See Treanor, supra note 138, at 704-05.
There may well have been some such shift; but in light of the fact that Locke, the quintessential
liberal, placed a faith in legislatures that was likely reflected in the early state constitution
"consent" provisions, see supra text accompanying notes 207-11, the proliferation of just
compensation clauses may have been due to a more general loss of faith in legislatures. The
mounting criticism of legislatures in the 1780s is well described in GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERcAN REPuBLic 1776-1787, at 403-09 (1969).
221. Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 430-31 (1823); supra text accompanying
note 194 (discussing Callender).
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faced with damages liability because their legislatively-authorized
action amounted to a taking: "What unrealism in the name of realism! If this is so, the legislature can easily solve the problem by providing indemnity or a direct charge on the treasury."222 Whether nineteenth-century legislatures actually did regularly agree to indemnify
officials in advance, or provide private-bill relief in retrospect, is a
matter that needs further study.2 2 Only with that study would we
know the degree to which there was a factual basis for the concern for
public officials that was supposed to have motivated the expansion of
official immunity doctrine. What seems undeniable, however, is that
there were expressions of such a concern even relatively early in the
nineteenth century. Chancellor Kent, for example, supported a very
broad view of just compensation clause protection, 224 and speculated
that a court might restrain unconstitutional interference with property "until an opportunity was given to the party injured to seek and
obtain the compensation."225 However, Kent did not support the prevailing justification-stripping model, apparently out of concern for
government officials:
rInt would deserve a very grave consideration, before we undertook to lay down
the proposition, that notwithstanding a statute clearly and expressly directed
the assumption of private property for a necessary public object, it would still
lbe a nullity, and the officer who undertook to execute it a trespasser, if a

222. Louis L. Jaffe, SuitsAgainst Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 209,227 (1963).
223. Akhil Amar suggests that the government "would typically be forced to indemnify
officials who were merely carrying out government policy[,]" because "[w]ithout indemnification,
who would agree to work for the government?" AMAR, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 200, at 40.
Amar, however, cites only one English case, one American dissent, and one federal statute. See
id. at 198 nn.197, 199, 204. David Engdahl, who Amar also cites, see id. at 198 n.199, is in fact
somewhat more hesitant. Engdahl says that [tihe officer's plight was improved somewhat by
the recognition that, in some of the most difficult cases, he would enjoy a right of indemnity
against the state." See Engdahl, supra note 79, at 18. The right of indemnity to which Engdahl
refers, however, is only the ordinary right that an agent has against a principal who directs him
to perform a tortious act that he does not know to be tortious. See id. at 18 n.77. As Engdahl
acknowledges, this right is still subject to the state's defense of sovereign immunity; the official
would get nowhere if the state "was unwilling to honor its obligation and refused to consent to
being sued for indemnity." Id. at 18. Engdahl does not address the issue of states' actual
indemnification practices.
224. Kent decided one of the most prominent early cases finding a taking when there was
no physical invasion of the plaintiffs land, but only a diversion of water to which the plaintiff
had rights as a riparian owner. See Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). In
his Commentaries,Kent also criticized Callender, 18 Mass. at 418, the landmark case holding
that injury caused to neighboring land by street grading was consequential and hence
noncompensable, for adopting too narrow a view of takings of property. See 2 KENT, supra note
47, at 338-40.
225. Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. Ch. 735, 745 (N.Y. Ch. 1823).
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provision
for compensation did not constitute part and parcel of the act
itself. 2 6

Thus, as he wrote later in his Commentaries, "I think the more reasonable and practicable construction to be, that the statute would be
primafacie good and binding, and sufficient to justify acts done under
it, until a party was restrained by judicial process, founded on the
paramount authority of the constitution."27

Kent's view, however,

was clearly a minority one; virtually all American courts chose with
Chief Justice Parker to leave public officers vulnerable in order "to
secure [a property owner] in his constitutional rights."228
lI. THE REMEDIAL TURN: TAKING (OR DAMAGE) AS
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT

In 1870 the justification-stripping model of just compensation
was still dominant. Property owners seeking damages for stateauthorized action allegedly amounting to a taking brought common
law actions, and the constitutional issue entered as a challenge to the
validity of the defendant's statutory justification. By 1890, the scene
looked quite different. Many state courts had begun to hold that just
compensation provisions were themselves the source of property
owners' rights of action for damages. In this Part, I first describe that
change in understanding. I then consider the relationship of that
change to several selected changes in just compensation doctrine.
First, and in greatest detail, I consider the relationship between this
change and "taking or damage" amendments that many states
adopted after 1870. Second, I consider the relationship of the change
226. Id. Kent noted:
I should doubt exceedingly, whether the general principle, that private property is not to
be taken for public use without just compensation, is to be carried so far as to make a
public officer who enters upon private property by virtue of legislative authority, specially given for a public purpose, a trespasser, if he enters before the property is paid for.
Id. at 744. Kent took this view again in Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 (N.Y. Ch. 1823). For
another early expression of concern for officers, see Barron v. Baltimore (Baltimore Cty. Ct.
1828), reprintedin 2 AM. JURIST 203 (1829):
[Tihe policy of every nation might demand, in order to secure the utmost possible exertion of all her agents and officers, that for damages... occasioned [by public officials responding to a military invasion or disaster], in seasons of public danger, there should
not be a remedy furnished personally against such agents, because if courts of justice
are open to every complainant under such circumstances, the ruin of such agents would
be the necessary consequence.

Id. at 209.
227. 2 KENT, supranote 47, at 526 n.(f).
228. Callender,18 Mass. (1 Pick.) at 430-31.
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in understanding to two other areas of doctrine: the availability of
permanent damages and injunctive relief and the rules of agency and
immunity that determine the parties that can be named in just
compensation litigation.
A. The Change in UnderstandingDescribed
Some courts that suggested just compensation provisions were
the source of property owners' rights of action did so without much
elaboration, and seemingly without being conscious that their holding
was novel. In the 1876 case of City of Elgin v. Eaton, for example, the
Illinois Supreme Court used language that could be read as consistent
with the justification-stripping model, under which the city would
become liable in trespass for its agents' acts if it did not do what was
constitutionally necessary to gain title to the property: "[F]ailing to
provide compensation for the damages, the city became liable to an
action." 229 At the same time, however, the court stated that once the

city began improvement of the street that was the subject of the
litigation, "the right to recover damages was given by the constitution;
and inasmuch as the city failed to have them assessed as they might
have been under the Eminent Domain Law, then in force, the action
will lie for their recovery."2o
Courts that attempted to provide fuller accounts of what they
were doing most often drew on a vision of the common law, not simply
as a set of judge-made rules of conduct, but as a source of remedies to
protect rights whatever their source.2 1 Thus, in the 1880 case of

229. City of Elgin v. Eaton, 83 Ill. 535, 537 (1876) (citing Clayburgh v. City of Chicago, 25
IM. 535 (1861)).

230. Id. at 536-37 (emphasis added) (citing People v. McRoberts, 62 M1.38 (1871)).
231. The statement echoing this vision that is known to every law student is Chief Justice
Marshall's in Marbury v. Madison:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties
of government is to afford that protection.... "[lit is a settled and invariable principle
in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every
injury its proper redress." The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37,

at *109). The canonical English formulation is perhaps Chief Justice Holt's dissent in Ashby v.
White:

If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain
it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is a vain
thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal.
Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (KB. 1703) (Holt, C.J., dissenting).
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Johnson v. City of Parkerburg,the West Virginia Supreme Court reasoned:
Where the constitution forbids a damage to the private property of an
individual, and points out no remedy, and no statute gives a remedy, for the
invasion of his right of property thus secured, the common law, which gives a
wrong, will furnish the appropriate action for the redress of
remedy for every
s2

his grievance.

The particular established common law practice that these
courts had in mind was the recognition of implied damages actions in
statutes. Professor Al Katz has argued that, at early English common
law, the recognition of damages actions based on statutes was hardly
distinguishable from the broader practice of providing remedies for
Only in the seventeenth century, with the ascendance of
rights.2
parliamentary supremacy, did the courts begin to consider legislative
intent as a "factor of primary significance" in determining whether or
not a damages action should be implied in a statute.m Even then,
Katz contends, a review of English cases from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries leads to the conclusion that deference
to legislative intent "was a significant barrier [to a recognition of
damages actions] only where the statute specified a mode of proceeding or a fixed sum penalty payable to the plaintiff." 2 5 Thus, the tradition of the action on the statute was alive and serviceable in the midnineteenth century, 6 and state courts hearing just compensation
232. Johnson v. City of Parkerburg, 16 W. Va. 402, 426 (1880) (emphasis on "damage" in
original; other emphasis added). Some courts read state constitutional provisions as embracing
and supporting this common law view of courts as remedial fronts. The Illinois Constitution of
1870, for example, contained a section providingEvery person ought to find a certain remedy in the law for all injuries and wrongs which
he may receive in his person, property, or reputation; he ought to obtain, by law, right
and justice freely and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly, and without delay.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 19. In one of the first cases approving an owner's cause of action
for damages under the 1870 constitution's "taking or damage" clause, the Illinois Supreme
Court quoted this section. See Stone v. Fairbury, Pontiac & Nw. R.R., 68 l. 394, 395-96 (1873).
233. See Al Katz, The Jurisprudenceof Remedies: ConstitutionalLegality and the Law of
Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1968).
234. Id. at 21.
235. Id. at 29.
236. Thomas Cooley's 1879 treatise on torts suggests that the mid-nineteenth-century
American attitude toward implied actions under statutes was similar to the attitude Professor
Katz found in England. On the one hand, legislative intent was in theory central: When a
statute had no explicit provision about private actions, "the question of civil liability to parties
who may be damnified by the neglect [of statutory duty] can only be determined upon careful
consideration of the statute and of the end it was manifestly intended to accomplish." THOMAS
M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF
CON rRACT 651 (1879). On the other hand:
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litigation were not afraid to draw on it. The Eaton court discussed the
tradition at great length, and traced it back through American and
English precedent to Coke and Bacon.2 7 By 1880, the West Virginia
Supreme Court asserted in Johnson that it was "'understood to be
well settled, that when a statute gives a right, or forbids the doing of
an injury to another, and no action be given therefor in express terms,
3
still the party shall have an action therefor' 28

The next step was to extend this practice to constitutions. In
Householder v. City of Kansas, the Missouri Supreme Court accomplished the extension in a single sentence, without acknowledging its
innovation: The court held that "[w]hbrever a statute or organic law
creates a right, but is silent to the remedy, the party entitled to the
right 'may resort to any common law action which will afford him
adequate and appropriate means of redress.'"2 9 Yet the cases and
treatise passages the court cited to support this proposition concerned
statutes; none concerned "organic laws."2O By contrast, the West
Virginia Supreme Court in Johnson slyly recognized its innovation:
after tracing the history of providing remedies to vindicate statutory
rights, the court made a brief argument to support extension of the
remedial principle from statutes to constitutions. "A constitutional
prohibition forbidding an injury to the property of a citizen," the court
asserted, "is certainly as effective as a statute framed for the same
purpose... ." 1 That is as close as any court came, however, to acknowledging that recognition of damage actions under a constitutional provision was something new.
Recognizing a damage action directly under a constitutional
provision, however, was something new, even in the case of just compensation clauses, which seem to make direct reference to a remedy.
The justification-stripping model was based on the premise that the
just compensation clause, like other constitutional provisions, was a
[Tihe authorities ...recognize the rule as a general one, that when the duty imposed by
the statute is manifestly intended for the protection and benefit of individuals, the
common law, when an individual is injured by a breach of the duty, will supply a remedy, if the statute gives none.
Id. at 658.
237. See Eaton v. Boston, Concord, & Montreal R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 512 (1872); see also
Johnson v. City of Parkersburg, 16 W. Va. 402, 423-24 (1880).
238. Johnson, 16 W.Va. at 425 (quoting Stearns v. Atlantic & St. Lawrence R.R., 46 Me. 95,
115 (1858)).
239. Householder v. City of Kansas, 83 Mo. 488, 495 (1884) (quoting Tapley v. Forbes, 84
Mass. (2 Allen) 20, 24 (1861)).

240. See Stearns, 46 Me. at 114; Tapley, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) at 23; Knowlton v.Ackley, 62
Mass. (8 Cush.) 93, 94 (1851); see also 1 C.G. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON TE LAW OF TORTS 65-66
(1881).

241. Johnson, 16 W. Va. at 425.
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limitation on legislative power. "Just compensation" described not a
remedy that the constitution required courts to provide if a plaintiff
demonstrated that the government had taken certain actions, but a
remedy that the constitution required legislators to provide in certain
legislation lest the courts declare the legislation void. The innovation
was to treat a just compensation clause as a kind of legislation providing a right and remedy to property owners, rather than merely as a
limitation on legislative power. The Householder court tellingly responded to Kansas City's argument that the just compensation provision was so general that it required legislation to determine the exact
injuries that fell within its scope: "The making of a constitution is but
legislation; legislation, however, of the most solemn character, and if
the general assembly can place a construction upon it, binding upon
the courts, then it can make and unmake constitutions at its pleasure."242 The interesting component of this assertion is not the proviso,
but the initial statement: The constitution, the court suggests, is just
like legislation, and thus can be brought within the tradition of recognizing implied private actions for damages.
The fact that the just compensation clause itself referred to
payment for the appropriation of property made the clause a special
case even within the tradition of recognizing implied damages actions,
for it could be read as the express grant of a damages action. Just
compensation clauses were framed as limitations---"private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation"-rather
than as remedial grants-"whenever the state takes property, it will
have an obligation to pay just compensation." Yet for many courts,
the limitation, turning as it did on compensation, obviously and
necessarily encompassed the remedial grant-more obviously and
necessarily than if the limitation had been unqualified, even though
the violation of an unqualified limitation, like the flat prohibition on
takings for private use, should arguably be seen as more serious than
the mere failure to pay compensation for what could be forcibly taken
so long as it was paid for. Thus, in many of the statements courts
made about just compensation clauses in the 1870s and 1880s, there
is an interesting ambiguity about whether the common law is
supplying the damages remedy or is merely supplying the procedural
vehicle for collecting the damages that were more or less expressly
provided by the constitution itself. This ambiguity is reflected in
Justice Miller's statement that "since the positive declaration of the

242. Householder,83 Mo. at 496.
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constitution is that private property shall not be taken or damaged
without just compensation, [the city] is bound in some way to make
that just compensation, and... the law shall compel it to do it."243 It
is also reflected in the courts' widespread use of the term "selfexecuting" to describe just compensation provisions. In one sense,
just compensation provisions were always "self-executing." They were
not merely hortatory directives to the legislature, but were judicially
enforceable limitations on legislative competence. In the terms
commonly used in nineteenth-century discussions, they were not
"directory," but "mandatory."
Thus, when courts used the terms
"self-executing" or "ex proprio vigore" to describe the operation of just
compensation provisions, they might not have been saying anything
new. And yet the use of these terms at least hints at the possibility
that just compensation provisions themselves imposed remedial
duties. So, for example, when the West Virginia Supreme Court
proclaimed that "[t]he first clause of section nine of our bill of rights,
ex proprio vigore protects the private property of an individual from
damage for public use without just compensation,"24 5 it was poised
midway between the old understanding that just compensation
provisions merely limited legislative competence and the modern
understanding, exemplified by the Supreme Court's statement in
United States v. Clarke that property owners are entitled to bring
inverse condemnation actions because of "'the self-executing

243. Blanchard v. City of Kansas, 16 F. 444, 446 (W.D. Mo. 1883); see also Householder, 83
Mo. at 494 (explaining that if a city takes private property, absent a law authorizing it to do so,
the city is liable to the owner).
244. For a discussion of this terminology, see THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE

AMERICAN UNION 74-84 (1868). The Supreme Court case most often cited for the proposition
that constitutional provisions might be merely directory is Groves v. Slaughter,40 U.S. (15 Pet.)
449, 495 (1841) (holding that a provision in the Mississippi Constitution of 1832 prohibiting the
introduction of slaves into the state for purposes of selling them was merely directory to the
legislature, and not a prohibition per se).
245. Johnson v. City of Parkersburg, 16 W. Va. 402, 423 (1880). A punctuation error in the
opinion makes it appear that the Johnson court is quoting an Illinois case for this language, but
the language is not contained in the Illinois case, and the reference to "the first clause of section
nine of our Bill of Rights" is a reference to the West Virginia Constitution. For similar language, see Swift & Co. v. City ofNewport News:
[W]hen the provision of a Constitution, as does ours.., forbids damage to private property, and points out no remedy, and no statute affords one, for the invasion selfexecuting, and the common law, which provides a remedy for every wrong, will furnish
the appropriate action for the redress of such grievance.
Swift & Co. v. City of Newport News, 52 S.E. 821, 825 (Va. 1906).
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character of the constitutional
compensatin .... ' "246

provision

with

respect

to

B. The "Taking or Damage"Amendments
How did courts come to see just compensation clauses in this
new way? One strong influence seems to have been a constitutional
amendment that over half of the states adopted between 1870 and
1910. That amendment expanded the scope of just compensation
protection from the "taking" of property to the "taking or damaging"
of property. In the course of interpreting and applying this amendment, courts began to see just compensation clauses as supporting a
right of action against governmentally authorized invasions of property rights.
1. Legislative Background
The first state to consider and adopt a "taking or damage"
amendment was Illinois, which looked to English law to protect landowners from the effects of railroad development and other public
works projects. In December of 1869, an assembly convened in
Illinois to consider adopting a new state constitution, which would
replace the Illinois Constitution of 1848. The Constitution of 1848
had directed the Illinois legislature to "encourage internal improve24 7
ments by passing liberal laws of incorporation for that purpose,"
and had granted the legislature discretion to grant special charters
when it determined that general incorporation statutes were insufficient.24 8 The legislature understood that railroads were the chief
"internal improvement" the framers had in mind and was happy to
promote railroads, but used the special charter as the rule rather
than the exception.2 49 In the thirteen years between 1848 and 1861,
the legislature granted 176 special charters to railroads; in the five
246. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (emphasis added) (quoting Nichols);
see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315
(1987) (quoting this language from Clarke).
247. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. X, § 6 (amended 1870).
248. See id. art. X, § 1 (empowering the general assembly to create corporations by special
act "in cases where, in the judgment of the general assembly, the objects of the corporation
cannot be attained under general laws").
249. For general background on railroad construction in Illinois and associated legal
developments, see GEORGE HALL MILLER, RAIuROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS 59-96 (1971);
Alan Jones, Republicanism, Railroads, and Nineteenth-CenturyMidwestern Constitutionalism,
in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW
DEAL 239-65 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989).
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years from 1865 through 1869, it granted 147 such charters.20 Illinois
railroad track mileage exploded-from 110 miles in 1850 to 2,790
miles in 186025---but with that development came the dirt and danger
of the machines, the economic and social upheaval of radically new
infrastructure, and massive pressure on legislators to play favorites.
By the end of the 1860s, the costs of rapid, indiscriminate railroad
development had become apparent, 252 and criticism of legislative favoritism to railroads was widespread, in Illinois and throughout the
25s
nation.
It was thus no surprise that many delegates to the 1869-1870
Constitutional Convention were interested in reining in railroad
corporations. One delegate remarked that "if there is anything like
unanimity in this State upon any one thing, it is upon restricting
these railroads, these immense corporations."M On a number of important points, the delegates looked to English legislative prece5 Before 1845, there was no general law in England about comdent.M
pensation for expropriation of property. Rather, compensation requirements were included in individual private bills creating companies as one qualification of a specific grant of expropriation powers, 2N
or in individual acts authorizing the construction of particular public
works.257 The boom in railroad construction led Parliament to pass
250. See John W. Eilert, Illinois Business Incorporations,1816-1869, 37 BuS. HIST. REV.
169, 174-75 (1963).
251. See JOHN F. STOVER, IRON ROAD TO THE WEST: AmERiCAN RA OADS IN THE 1850S, at
119(1978).
252. A nice early judicial recognition that the costs of railroads were greater than initially
thought is found in Hatch v. Vermont Central Railroad Co., 25 Vt. 49 (1852). As to the
motivation of the legislature in shielding the defendant railroad from liability for consequential
injuries, the court commented: "The extent of such [consequential] injuries had not been much
considered, perhaps, at that time, and almost all our citizens then esteemed it a desideratum, to
bring a railroad as near them as possible, the nearer the better." Id. at 60.
253. For criticism in Illinois, see MILLER, supra note 249, at 75. The most prominent
critique of railroad interests published shortly before the Illinois convention convened was
Charles Francis Adams, Jr.'s A Chapterof Erie. See Charles Francis Adams, Jr., A Chapterof
Erie,in CHARLES FRANcIs ADAMS, JR. & HENRYADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND OTHER ESSAYS 1
(1886) (originally published in the July 1869 issue of NorthAmerican Review).
254. 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTTIMONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS, CONVENED AT THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1869, at 1710 (1870)

[hereinafter DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS].

255. In addition to English domain legislation, the Illinois delegates looked to English rate
regulation legislation as the basis for constitutional provisions directing the General Assembly
to establish maximum rates for railroads and grain elevators. See ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XI, §
12; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135-36 (1877) (upholding Illinois grain elevator rate regulation
against due process challenge); 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 254, at 1641-43.
256. See Eric C.E. Todd, The Mystique of Injurious Affection in the Law of Expropriation,
1967 B.C. L. REV. 127, 131-32.
257. See id. (citing cases about public works authorizations that had their own individual
provisions concerning compensation for expropriated property).
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three "clauses consolidation acts," providing standard clauses for
insertion into each relevant private bill.28

Section 68 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act provided
compensation "in respect of any lands, or of any interest therein,
which shall have been taken for or injuriously affected by the
Execution of the Works,"2 9 "Works" meaning the undertaking, "of
whatever nature," which the private bill was authorizing to be executed.wo The act did not further specify the circumstances under
which land was "injuriously affected," 261 but by 1870, English courts
had decided a number of cases interpreting that phrase, suggesting
that it reached injuries that were compensable at common law but
had been rendered noncompensable by special charters and public

258. The Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict., ch. 20 (1845) (Eng.), furnished
standard provisions for railway bills. The Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Viet., ch.
16 (1845) (Eng.), furnished provisions for companies generally. Most important for present purposes, the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict., ch. 18 (1845) (Eng.), furnished
provisions concerning compulsory purchases of land.

259. 8 & 9 Vict., ch. 18, § 68 (1845).
260. Id. § 2. The Act also provided arbitration, rather than a jury trial, at the election of
the owner; interestingly, it was believed by some that a jury would likely favor railway
companies because they were likely to be "mixed up with these railway speculations" in one way
or another. Todd, supranote 256, at 135 (citing 79 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 228 (1845)). Illinois and
many other states were moving in the opposite direction, adding requirements for jury trials to
protect owners. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 13 ("Such compensation, when not made
by the State, shall be ascertained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law."); 2 DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 254, at 1575 (statement of Mr. Springer) ("[P]eople should be entitled
to a jury in assessing damages to property taken for public use .... The General Assembly has
virtually deprived the people of this only sure guarantee against the frauds and oppressions
practiced by private corporations.").
261. At least two commentators, one contemporary to the Act and one modem, have argued
that section 68 was meant to apply only to "partial takings": situations in which one part of an
owner's land was actually appropriated, and another part retained by the owner was adversely
impacted, or "injuriously affected," by the appropriation. See Keith Davies, 'InjuriousAffection"
and the Land CompensationAct of 1973, 90 L.Q. REv. 361, 366-67 (1974); Lands 'Injuriously
Affected-, 41 L. TIMES 148, 149 (1865); see also Todd, supra note 256, at 136 (quoting statement
by Lord Campbell on the day the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act became law, complaining
that a landowner has no remedy when his land is injuriously affected but none of his land is
actually occupied, which suggests that Campbell did not believe that the Act provided such a
remedy). Keith Davies argues that section 68 was interpreted more broadly to mitigate the
unjust effects of an earlier doctrinal mistake: the doctrine that statutory authority to undertake
a certain project (for example, to build and operate a railroad) contains an implied grant of
immunity from nuisance liability. See Davies, supra, at 362-65. This may well be true but is
subject to a qualification. Statutory authority was never construed to grant absolute immunity,
but only immunity for non-negligent acts. See Jones v. Bird, 106 Eng. Rep. 1397, 1399-400 (K.B.
1822); supra text accompanying notes 159-67 (discussing the doctrine that statutory authority
does not grant immunity for negligent acts). In interpreting section 68, English courts
preserved that immunity in regard to operation (as opposed to construction) of a project;
"injurious affection" did not include damages from the non-negligent operation of a railroad. See
Hammersmith Ry. v. Brand, 4 L.R. 171 (H.L. 1868). To that extent, section 68 was not read to
correct for prior overgenerosity of the courts in implying grants of immunity.
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works authorizations that courts interpreted to shield corporations
262
from liability for consequential injuries.
The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act became the principal
inspiration for the Just Compensation Clause that became part of the
Illinois Constitution of 1870,263 although delegates must also have
been aware of existing American compensation statutes that provided
for compensation in particular circumstances that state constitutional
takings clauses would not have covered. 26 That expanded clause
provided that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compenation."265 "Damaged," like "injuriously
affected" in the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, was supposed to
indicate that some injuries short of "takings" would be covered by the
Just Compensation Clause. The principal kinds of injuries on the
minds of the delegates during the convention were twofold: those
caused by railroads 26 6 and those caused by street grading.267 The con262. See, e.g., Glover v. North Staffordshire Ry. Co., 117 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Q.B. 1851)
(holding that an owner's land had been injuriously affected" when it was diminished in value
because the defendant's railroad tracks made a right of way leading to the land more difficult to
use); cf Ricket v. Metropolitan Ry., 2 L.R. 175 (H.L. 1867) (denying recovery for injuries,
reasoning that they would not be actionable at common law); Caledonian Ry. v. Ogilvy, 2 Macq.
229, 235 (H.L. Scot. 1856) (same). For my discussion of statutory justification of consequential
injuries, see supra text accompanying notes 118-47. The Clauses Consolidation Acts were part
of the legislative tradition that led Theodore Sedgwick to proclaim that 'the protection afforded
by the English government to property, is much more complete in this respect than under our
system; although Parliament claims to be despotically supreme, and although we boast our
submission to constitutional restrictions .... " THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES
WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 524 n. * (1857).
263. See, e.g., 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 254, at 1578 (statement of Mr.

Wall) ("While I am on the floor, I wish to refer to another provision in this section, that private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation .... I understand that by an act of parliament a similar provision exists in England."); id (statement ofMr.
Allen, of Alexander) (noting that an act was passed "looking to this very question in which the
term 'damage' was used. For years thereafter the courts of England were called upon to give
constructions to this act, until now, the law with reference to such damage has been well
settled.").
264. Many nineteenth-century state statutes provided for compensation for changes in
street grade, for damage caused to neighboring landowners by running railroads in streets, and
in other particular cases. See, e.g., 1 LEWIS, supra note 35, §§ 206b-220, at 496-518; 2 NICHOLS,
supra note 34, § 309, at 833-35. Quite a few of them predated the Illinois Constitution of 1870.
See, e.g., 1 LEWIS, supra note 35, § 213, at 503 (describing an 1852 statute granting damages for
grade changes on streets in New York City); id. § 214, at 504 (describing an 1854 statute granting damages for grade changes on streets in Philadelphia); 2 NICHOLS, supra note 34, § 309, at
824 (describing an 1824 Massachusetts statute granting damages for injuries to property not
taken by road construction); id- (describing an 1833 Massachusetts statute interpreted to grant
damages for railroad construction even when no land was taken). All of these statutes, however, were limited in scope to particular acts such as street grading or railroad construction; the
generality of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act was distinctive.
265. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. H, § 13 (emphasis added).
266. See 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 254, at 1578 (statement of Mr. Allen, of

Alexander) ("Take a railroad, for illustration, which runs within three feet of a residence, and
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cern with the dirty and dangerous operation of railroads fit the overall
anti-railroad theme of the convention. The concern about street grading, a much older problem on which the leading courts of the country
had long deliberated, 68 was especially widespread in Chicago, which
was built on a swamp. Street raising projects in Chicago in the midnineteenth century, covering the entire downtown area and many
nearby neighborhoods, had buried the first floors of many existing
buildings.29
These concerns caught the imagination of constitutional conventions in many other states as well. By 1880, a mere ten years
after Illinois pioneered the "taking or damage" clause, eleven other
the smoke from which fills the house and prevents its occupation, that property is naturally
'damaged'-destroyed-for residence purposes, and yet is not 'taken.' "); id. at 1579 (statement
ofMr. Church):
If the term "damage" is not satisfactory, use "injury," or whatever will prevent a man's
property from being destroyed without compensation ... because there may be such a
construction of a railroad as will expose [a man's] property for all time to come as absolute destruction, by means of fire being brought into almost immediate contact with it,
whereby destruction will follow almost as a necessity, and where the moment it is thus
exposed, his expenses of insurance, aside from all other damages and dangers to which
he is exposed, may be increased five-fold.
267. See id at 1577 (statement of Mr. Underwood):
The courts have decided that cities, in their grading, may cut down lots so as to almost
ruin men and subject them to enormous expense, or they may raise the grade of streets
so as to cause water to run upon lots, and make property comparatively worthless, but
that is a damage for which landowners are entitled to no compensation .... As I understand this article, it will require compensation to be made for those damages which necessarily and naturally arise to a party in consequence of these public improvements.
See also id at 1578 (statement of Mr. Wall) (The "taken or damaged" provision "is for the
purpose ... of protecting persons whose property is not immediately taken by the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, but by reason of... a street being leveled or graded up so that their
property is injured.").
268. See supra note 141 (listing leading street grading cases).
269. Donald Miller describes the enormous scope of the street raising project in Chicago:
Construction of ... new sewers and streets forced the city council to raise the
grade of the city by as much as tan feet in places. This meant that buildings, too, had to
be elevated. Reporters from all over the world went to Chicago to see almost an entire
city uprooted and raised to a new height by an engineering "miracle" of enormous cost
and difficulty.
Owners of buildings were expected to pay for elevating them, but some refused to
cooperate, leaving their houses and stores in "holes" beside rows of structures that had
been hoisted to the new grade.
The raising of Chicago went on for two decades ....
DONALD L. MILLER, CrrY OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC OF CHICAGO AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA

125 (1996); see also 2 NICHOLS, supranote 34, § 311, at 844:
It was in the rapidly growing city of Chicago that the most serious injuries to property
by the construction of public improvements occurred and the attention of the people of
that city was focussed upon the hardship of [the rule that there was no liability for the
consequential damages of public improvements] by a number of especially striking examples.
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states had adopted similar constitutional provisions. 270 By 1912,
twenty-five of the forty-eight states had a "taking or damage" provision,271 and of the thirteen states admitted to the Union after 1870,

twelve adopted a "taking or damage" provision in their first constitutions. 272
2. Judicial Interpretation of the Amendments and the
Remedial Turn
Soon after the "taking or damage" amendments became law,
property owners began to bring lawsuits relying on them. Even if the
legislature had provided a statutory procedure for owners to obtain
just compensation, it was often restricted by its terms to cases in
which property had been taken. 73 As a result, owners seeking compensation for damage to their property could not use the statutory
procedure, and were forced to bring non-statutory actions; this forced
many courts to consider the basis of such actions for the first time.
270. The eleven other states were, in chronological order, West Virginia, Pennsylvania,
Arkansas, Alabama, Missouri, Nebraska, Colorado, Texas, Georgia, California, and Louisiana.
See W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 9 (1872); PA. CONST. art. XVI, § 8 (1874) ("taken, injured, or destroyed") (applied only to "Im]unicipal and other corporations and individuals invested with the
privilege of taking private property for public use"); ARK. CONST. art. H, § 22 (1874) ("taken,
appropriated, or damaged"); ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. XIV, § 7 ("taken, injured, or destroyed")
(applied only to "[m]unicipal and other corporations and individuals invested with the privilege
of taking private property for public use"); Mo. CONST. OF 1875, art. II, § 21; NEB. CoNST. art. I,
§ 21 (1875); COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 15 (1876); T=x CONST. art. I, § 17 (1876) ("taken, damaged,
or destroyed for or applied to public use"); GA. CONST. OF 1877, art. I, § HI, para. I; CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 14 (1879); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 156.
271. See sources cited supra note 270; ILL. CONST. OF 1870, art. HI, § 13; MONT. CONST. of
1889, art. III, § 14; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1889); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13 (1889) ("taken for
public use, or damaged"); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (1889); WYO. CONST. art. I, § 33 (1889);
MISS. CONST. art. HI, § 17 (1890); KY. CONST. § 242 (1891) ("taken, injured, or destroyed")
(applies only to "[m]unicipal and other corporations, and individuals invested with the privilege
of taking private property for public use"); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22 (1895); MINN. CONST. art. I,
§ 13 (1857) (amended 1896) (amendment changed "taken" to "taken, destroyed or damaged");
VA. CONST. OF 1902, art. IV, § 58; OKLA. CONST. art. H, § 24 (1907); N.M. CONST. art. H, § 20
(1912); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17 (1912).
272. The only state admitted after 1870 not to include a "taking or damage" clause in its
first constitution was Idaho, admitted in 1890. See 1 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 210,
at vi (Idaho admitted on July 3, 1890). The other twelve states admitted after 1870 were
Colorado (1876), Montana (1889), North Dakota (1889), South Dakota (1889), Washington
(1889), Wyoming (1890), Utah (1896), Oklahoma (1907), Arizona (1912), New Mexico (1912),
Alaska (1959), and Hawaii (1959). See id.; sources cited supra notes 270-71; see also ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 18 (1959), reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL AND
STATE 8 (Shirley S. Abramson ed., 1969); HAw. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1959), reprinted in 1
CoNsITrIoNS OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL AND STATE, supra, at 4.
273. For cases holding that statutory procedures did not cover claims that property was
damaged, see Indiana Central Railway Co. v. Boden, 10 Ind. 96, 98 (1858); Burlington & M.
Railroad Co. v. Reinhackle, 18 N.W. 69, 70-71 (Neb. 1883); New Mexican Railroad Co. v.
Hendricks, 30 P. 901, 901 (N.M. 1892).
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From the beginning, courts recognized that the amendments had been
modeled on an Act of Parliament and looked for guidance to English
cases interpreting that Act,274 as well as to American cases interpreting state statutes providing compensation for injuries that were not
"takings." 75 Thus, from the very beginning, courts thought of the
"taking or damage" amendments as being like statutes, making it easier for them to bring the amendments within the common law tradi276
tion of implying private damage actions under statutes.
More important, however, was the debate about the substantive scope of the "taking or damage" amendments. To what extent did
they broaden liability? One possibility was that the amendments
simply removed the justification that courts had implied under special
charters, leaving corporations in the position that they would have
been in had no statute authorized their activities: subject to common
law tort liability. This "common law equivalence" interpretation had
strong appeal for a number of reasons, not the least of which was that
it was perfectly compatible with the justification-stripping model of
just compensation litigation. Many states, however, rejected the idea
of common law equivalence in favor of an interpretation under which
the "taking or damage" amendment imposed liability that even exceeded common law liability in some cases. This substantive interpretation made it difficult to continue with the traditional justification-stripping model, because that model started with a common law
action and could not accommodate additional liability. One cannot
274. See, e.g., Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64, 81 (1882) (citing numerous English
cases).
275. One of the first cases to interpret a "taking or damage" amendment, an 1873 Illinois
Supreme Court decision, looked to a Massachusetts case interpreting legislation requiring
railroad companies to pay for all damages caused by the construction and maintenance of their
roads. See Stone v. Fairbury, Pontiac & N.W. R.R. Co., 68 l. 394,397-98 (1873) (discussing and
quoting Proprietors of Locks & Canals v. Nashua & Lowell R.R. Co., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 385
(1852)).
The Massachusetts legislative tradition was particularly important because
Massachusetts courts, unlike English courts, had held that their statutes allowed recovery in
some situations that would not have been actionable at common law. See Parker v. Boston &
Me. R.R., 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 107 (1849):
The claim for damages... does not depend on the relative rights of owners of land, each
of whom has a right to make a proper use of his own estate .... [because] the [railroad]
did not own land; they only acquired a special right to and usufruct in it, upon the condition of paying all damages which might be thereby occasioned to others.
Id. at 114; see also 2 NICHOLS, supra note 34, § 310, at 842 n.17. For my discussion of how this
recognition of broader-than-common law liability contributed to the breakdown of the
justification-stripping model, see infra text accompanying note 300.
276. In addition, state constitutions were amended much more frequently and often
contained more detailed provisions than the United States Constitution, making state constitutional provisions look less like general declarations of timeless truths, and more like ordinary
legislation.
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say that it made it "impossible" to continue with the justificationstripping model, because constitutional liability in excess of common
law liability coexists with the justification-stripping model in the
seminal Supreme Court case of Ex parte Young. 277 Yet the tension
between common law liability and the justification-stripping model
may be one of the reasons why Young persists in being enigmatic; and
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, the Supreme Court rejected the justification-stripping
model, in part, precisely because it thought that model would no
longer work once it rejected "the notion that the Fourth Amendment
proscribes only such conduct as would, if engaged in by private persons, be condemned by state law.278

The common law equivalence interpretation found early favor
in an 1851 Queen's Bench case interpreting the Lands Clauses
Consolidation Act,279 and had strong appeal throughout the remainder
of the nineteenth century as an interpretation of "taking or damage"
amendments.2 0 The appeal was at least threefold. First, common
law equivalence meant that everyone-individuals, private and public
corporations, and the state itself-was subject to the same rule of law,
a powerful attraction for many who cherished the ideal of neutral,
generally applicable laws affording equality of opportunity.281 Some
277. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). As Henry Hart put it in his classic article:
By almost imperceptible steps [the Supreme Court] appears to have come to treat the
remedy of injunction as conferred directly by federal law for any abuse of state authority
which in the view of federal law ought to be remediable.
The crucial advance, seemingly, was in Ex parte Young, where the personal wrong
complained of consisted of threats of a multiplicity of prosecutions, a very dubious tort
under state law.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 524
n.124 (1954) (citation omitted). For a stronger statement that Ex parte Young did not involve a
common law tort, see Amar, Of Sovereignty, supra note 3, at 1479 n.218 ("Young itself, for
example, involved no individual private law tort by the defendant; the sole basis for the suit was
the claim that defendant, as a state official, was about to execute an unconstitutional state law
that offended the due process clause's restrictions on state action.") (emphasis in original).
278. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971).
279. See Glover v. North Staffordshire Ry. Co., 117 Eng. Rep. 1132, 1136 (Q.B. 1851) (Lord
Campbell, C.J.) ("The jury find that the land is depreciated in value; and the depreciation is
caused by that being done which, but for the powers contained in the Act of Parliament, would
have been actionable. That criterion is very fairly suggested by the counsel for the
defendants."); id. (Wightman, J.) ("A very fair criterion is suggested: suppose no Act of
Parliament had passed, and that had been done which has been done, would an action have
been maintainable?").
280. See, e.g., 1 LEWIS, supra note 35, § 236b, at 555 n.83 (citing cases taking this view).
281. For a later expression of the value of equal rules, see Joseph M. Cormack, Legal
Concepts in Casesof EminentDomain, 41 YALE L.J. 221,240 (1931):
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constitutional convention delegates and courts focused particularly on
equivalence between individuals and private corporations, reflecting
the reaction to industrial concentration and oligopoly generally, and
railroads in particular, in the post-Civil War era. Thus, in the state
constitutional convention that adopted a "taking or damage" clause
for Kentucky's constitution, one delegate supporting the amendment
remarked:
If it is necessary to protect equal rights to the citizen with the railroad to put
railroads on the same footing with individuals, I do not care if it blots out every
railroad in the State. I am opposed to the injustice of inequality. I think this
Convention was called to produce equality, and if it requires inequality to
2
foster railroads, let them go .... 28

Second, common law equivalence fit the idea, which was gaining in prominence in the 1870s, that the "property" protected by just
compensation clauses was not land or physical objects themselves, but

the owner's "bundle of rights" in those things.m

Two years after

Illinois adopted its Constitution of 1870, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court's opinion in Eaton v. Boston, Concord & Montreal
Railroad forcefully expressed the view that "[t]he term
'property,'... in its legal signification 'means only the rights of the
owner in relation to it,' "
and cited, among other things, John
Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence to indicate the court's affinity for

The assumption of the New Hampshire justices [in Eaton v. Boston, Concord & Montreal
R.R., 51 N.H. 504 (1872)], that the property rights of an individual against the public are
the same as his rights against other individuals, seems to be entirely justified, as applied to the awarding of compensation in eminent domain proceedings. It is implicit in
the nature of such proceedings that society desires to purchase from an individual the
property rights recognized in him under a legal system designed to adjust his relations
with other individuals. The only difference that should exist between a sale to society
and one to an individual is that the former may acquire property that the latter could
not buy.
282. 4 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION
ASSEMBLED AT FRANKFoRT, ON THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1890, TO ADOPT, AMEND OR
CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 4745 (1890) (statement of Mr. Bullitt).

283. John Lewis, writing in his 1888 treatise on eminent domain, may have expressed this
idea most clearly:
If, for damage caused to my land by certain acts of my neighbor done upon his own land
for his own use, I may have compensation, and if, for the same damage caused by the
same acts done upon the same land by the public or its agents for public use I can have
no compensation, it is plain that the right upon which the former action was founded
has been taken from me, that so much has been substracted from my property in the
land.
1 LEWIS, supra note 35, § 56, at 59.
284. Eaton v. Boston, Concord & Montreal R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 511 (1872) (quoting
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433 (1856)).
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positivist analysis.285 Common law equivalence played a large part in
the rhetoric of the Eaton opinion.26 The first sentence, for example,
announces that "if the cut through the ridge had been made by a
private land-owner, who had acquired no rights from the plaintiff or
from the legislature, he would be liable for the damages sought to be
recovered in this action. 287 This sets the stage for the case's holding
that any material abridgement of the "rights of user and of exclusion"
are a taking of the plaintiffs property. 88 Those commentators who
lauded the positive-law analysis of property in Eaton, such as John
Lewis, argued that "taking or damage" amendments were intended to
89
prod courts into accepting that analysis.2
Third, common law equivalence does not require the slightest
change to the justification-stripping model of just compensation litigation. The justification-stripping model begins with a party's rights,
duties, immunities, and disabilities at common law; common law
285. See id. (citing 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 817, 818 (3d ed. 1869)).
A.W. Brian Simpson suggested in a recent book review that "[tihere is no reason to suppose that
Austin's views on the law of tort, or on any other branch of the law, ever had the least influence." Simpson, supra note 165, at 2028 (reviewing DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES:
His THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY (1995)); see also id at 2032 ("No doubt a few masochistic
individuals read [Austin's Lectures], but I gravely doubt if they included many judges or
practicing counsel. I know of no citation to them in legal argument in a tort case.") Simpson
may well be right that Austin was cited rarely, but Eaton was a tort case. Eaton did not cite
Austin for his views on negligence, which is Simpson's immediate concern, but Simpson's
broader point is that high theory had little or no influence on the actual development of the law.
John Lewis copiously cites and quotes Austin, as well as Jeremy Bentham, in support of his
argument that "property" is a bundle of rights. See 1 LEWIS, supra note 35, § 54, at 54.
286. The opinion hedges its rhetoric by suggesting that "the practical result is the same" if
"'theland itself be regarded as 'property.'" Eaton, 51 N.H. at 512. It also accommodates many
of the results of a more traditional takings clause interpretation by incorporating two qualifications. First, Eaton notes that the injury it is recognizing as a taking is 'a physical injury to the
land itself, a physical interference with the rights of property, an actual disturbance of the
plaintiffs possession." Id. at 513. Second, Eaton distinguishes cases involving "an entry on land
for a merely temporary purpose"; such a temporary entry does not amount to a "taking of
property'" because "[t]he beneficial possession of the owner is not substantially interfered
with.'" Id at 525 (citations omitted).
287. Id. at 506-07.
288. Id at 511.
289. 1 LEWIS, supra note 35, §§ 233-34, at 551. Lewis contended that, if the "property" of
just compensation provisions were properly defined to refer to an owner's entire bundle of legal
rights, a prohibition on "taking" property without just compensation would encompass all
interferences with legal rights. See id- The "taking or damage" amendments were only necessary because some courts had defined property too narrowly.
As John Forrest Dillon noted, however, if the real problem was that courts were defining
"property" too narrowly, the most straightforward solution would have been to frame an
amendment that clarified what "property" was supposed to mean. If that was supposed to be
the function of the "taking or damage" amendments, they did not serve that function well,
because they did not address the definition of "property," but continued to presuppose some
unspecified definition. See 2 DILLON, supra note 53, '§ 587c, at 687. Some courts may have seen
this weakness as supporting their decision not to interpret the "taking or damage" amendments
as mandating common law equivalence.
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equivalence begins and ends with the same set of rights, duties, immunities, and disabilities. To the extent that jurists saw this as
natural, common law equivalence preserved and reinforced that
view.290 One of the most striking features of the Eaton opinion is its
juxtaposition Of a supposedly novel, modern treatment of the substantive protection of a takings clause with one of the most detailed accounts anywhere of the strictly traditional justification-stripping
model of takings clause litigation. The plaintiff in Eaton brought a
common law tort action; the first sentence of the opinion, as I have
noted above, indicates that absent statutory justification the plaintiff
would prevail in that action; the defendants then claim "that they
cannot be made liable as tort-feasors for doing what the legislature
[implicitly] authorized them to do" in their special charter;91 and the
court, assuming that the legislature intended such an implicit
authorization, frames the question presented as one of whether the
legislature has the power to pass a statute so authorizing "without
making any provision for... compensation."292 The constitutional
provision operates to deny the defendant its authorization or justification, because, as the court held, the legislature did not have the
constitutional power to authorize the defendant's challenged activity
without compensation: "[T]heir enactment is not 'law,' and can afford
no justification." 293 Eaton also specifically mentions and leaves intact
the immunity of municipal corporations acting in a governmental
capacity, another part of the traditional common law structure. 294
In spite of the appeal of common law equivalence, however,
most courts ended up rejecting that model; while common law liability
remained a factor in shaping liability under "taking or damage"
clauses, courts began to conclude that liability under those clauses

290. An echo of the view that common law rights and remedies were natural appears in
Henry Mills's 1879 treatise on eminent domain: 'For an entry on land, or the taking or destruction of property, of another, the common law gave the injured party the remedies of trespass,
trespass on the case, or ejectment. These remedies gave the owner complete compensation for

the invasion of his rights of property." HENRY E. MILS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMiNENT
DoMAIN § 88, at 116 (1879). Mills assumes that an owner's rights of property are quite independent of the remedies recognized at common law, so that those remedies can be evaluated in

terms of whether they completely or incompletely vindicate the owner's rights. Mills concludes,
however, that the remedies are complete, and that therefore the common law perfectly reflects
an owner's pre-existing property rights, although the exact source of those rights remains
unclear.
291. Eaton, 51 N.H. at 510.
292. I&
293. Id. at 516 ("Ifthe enactment is opposed to the constitution, it is in fact 'no law at all.'")
(quoting COOLEY, supra note 236, at 3).
294. See id at 526-27.
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was both broader and narrower than the liability of private parties at
common law. For my purposes, the more important of the two directions is that towards broadening liability, because that is the direction
that could not be accommodated by the justification-stripping model.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the general rule in partial condemnation cases was that the owner could recover, not just the market value of the condemned portion of his land, but the diminution in
value of the portion retained by the owner caused by the severance
and the likely use of the condemned portion. 2 5 Although courts sometimes excluded evidence of potential causes of diminution in value of
the retained portion as too remote or otherwise inappropriate, 2 6 they
took into account many causes that clearly would not be actionable
against neighbors at common law.297

For example, diminution in

value caused by the mere unsightliness of a railroad constructed on
the condemned parcel was an accepted element of damages in partial
condemnation cases, as was diminution caused by the increased risk
of fire and loss of privacy occasioned by railroad operation. 298 Some
courts interpreting "takings or damage" clauses, notably those in
Nebraska, concluded that the clauses extended the protection granted
retained land in partial condemnation cases to land no part of which
was taken, but which was merely adversely affected by nearby public
works projects. 299 Not surprisingly, Nebraska courts took the position
295. See, e.g., 2 LEWIS, supra note 35, § 464, at 998 ("Upon this point there is entire unanimity of opinion.")
296. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Hall, 136 S.W. 905, 906 (Ky. 1911) (holding
that when a farm is partially taken for railroad tracks, the possible use of a barn on the remaining portion by tramps need not be considered as an element of damages); Petition of the Mount
Wash. Rd. Co., 35 N.H. 134, 146-47 (1857) (holding that 'just compensation" for a partial taking
for a tall road did not include competitive injury to a horse rental business conducted on the
remaining portion); 2 NICHOLS, supra note 34, § 239, at 736-37 (collecting cases).
297. For a general statement of the proposition that partial takings damages go beyond
what is actionable against neighbors, see In re Utica, Chenango & SusquehannaValley Railroad
Co., 56 Barb. 456, 460-61 (N.Y. App. Div. 1868). While applying, at least nominally, a common
law equivalence requirement for compensation for injury to land none of which was taken, the
English courts explicitly held that compensation for partial takings was broader. See In re
Stockport, Timperley & Altrinchim Ry. Co., 33 L.J.Q.B. 251 (1864).
298. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. White Villa Club, 159 S.W. 983, 984, 986
(Ky. 1913) (unsightliness); Webber v. Eastern R.R. Co., 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 147, 149 (1840)
(increased risk of fire); Utica, 56 Barb. at 464 (increased risk of fire); Idaho & W. Ry. Co. v.
Coey, 131 P. 810, 810-11 (Wash. 1913) (increased risk of fire, unsightliness, danger from
probable breeding of squirrels and gophers); Duke of Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Bd. of Works,
[1861-73] All E.R. Rep. 654, 659 (H.L. 1872) (annoyance and inconvenience from public use of
new highway); 2 NICHOLS, supra note 34, § 238, at 729-35; RANDOLPH, supra note 184, § 260, at
241.
299. On this view, the "taking or damage" clause was adopted to rectify a kind of injustice
ofunequal treatment, but not the unequal treatment between individual and corporate or public
defendants rectified by common law equivalence:
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that, although the Nebraska legislature had only provided a procedure for owners to sue for damages when their property was "taken,"
owners still had a cause of action, implied directly by the constitution,
for damages when property was "damaged." The justification-stripping model would no longer work when the constitution afforded
3
protection greater than that afforded by the common law. 00

The interpretation championed by the Nebraska courts was
never generally accepted; the liability it imposed was too broad. Far
more states rejected common law equivalence on other grounds.
Many courts viewed the rule that municipal corporations were not
liable for consequential damages from street grade changes as a
common law rule, and thus decided that any provision that exposed
municipalities to liablity for such damages must create a new cause of
action not known at common law.3o1 This may initially seem to involve a basic legal mistake. The English cases originating the doctrine that public entities were not liable for consequential damages
from street grading relied, not on the common law, but on statutory
Under [the Nebraska Constitution of 1867], if any portion of a person's real estate was
taken for public use, he could recover all the damages sustained by the taking, but, if
none of his real estate was taken for public use, he could recover nothing, although his
property had been greatly damaged by such use. The [taking or damage"] provision,
therefore, is remedial in its nature, and the well-known rule, that in the construction of
remedial statutes three points are to be considered, viz., the old law, the mischief, and
the remedy.., is to be applied.
City of Omaha v. Kramer, 41 N.W. 295, 296 (Neb. 1889) (citation omitted); see also Omaha
Horse Ry. Co. v. Cable Tram-Way Co., 32 F. 727, 734 (D. Neb. 1887) (applying Nebraska law,
but formulating a general rule for "taking or damage" clauses):
Whenever a proposed public use causes to property, no part of which is taken, an iijury
of such a character as, if it accrued when a portion of the property was taken, would
form a proper element of the damages to the part not taken, there is a damage within
the scope and protection of this constitutional provision, and entitling the owner to compensation.
See also 2 NICHOLS, supra note 34, § 312, at 846. In support of its broad view of the "taking or
damage" provision, the Kramer court cites cases, including previous Nebraska cases, that
clearly take a narrower view; it is not clear whether this represents disingenuity, misreading, or
hesitancy about the breadth of its own holding. See Kramer, 41 N.W. at 296 (citing, among
other cases, Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 11. 64 (1882) and Gottschalk v. Chicago Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co., 16 N.W. 475 (Neb. 1883)).
300. See Burlington & M. R.R. Co. v. Reinhackle, 18 N.W. 69,70 (Neb. 1883).
301. See City of Atlanta v. Green, 67 Ga. 386, 388 (1881) (noting that decisions holding
municipalities not liable "have rested upon the common-law doctrine that... private injury or
inconvenience that may arise to adjacent lot-holders, as a consequence of such raising or
lowering the grade of the street must be borne by the proprietor without compensation"); Swift
& Co. v. City of Newport News, 52 S.E. 821, 823 (Va. 1906) ("At common law, as has been
repeatedly held by this court, municipal corporations were not liable for consequential damages,
arising from the change of grade of a street...."); Johnson v. City of Parkersburg, 16 W. Va.
402, 415 (1880) ("[The sweeping current of beth English and American decisions... is, that at
common law a municipal corporation is not liable for consequential damages arising from a
change in the grade of a street....").
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authority that shielded the entities from common law liability. 02
American courts accepted this statutory justification framework, but
added the qualification that statutes in violation of just compensation
clauses could not justify otherwise tortious action.s03 Thus, expansion
of a just compensation clause to expose a municipality to greater
liability for street grading might restrict legislative power to alter the
common law without reaching beyond the common law itself.
The characterization of the no-liability-for-street-grading rule
as a common law rule, however, is not merely a mistake, but a more
complex and interesting phenomenon. Legal analysis of some of the
injury caused by street grading could draw on private law
cases-cases involving the rights and duties of two private parties.
Raising the grade of a street, for example, would often cause flooding
on abutting property;53 thus there was a developed body of law about
a private owner's liability for diverting surface water towards his
neighbor.30 5 Lowering the grade of a street often caused lateral support problems; °6 thus there was also developed law about private
lateral support. 3 7 Often, however, property owners were concerned
about neither flooding nor loss of lateral support, but loss or increased
difficulty of access to the street. Owners found it more difficult to
reach their property from the street, and the property lost value as a
result. Courts deciding the scope (if any) of a right of access to public
streets were hard-pressed to find a suitable body of private law from
which to draw. No customary relationship between private neighbors
seemed sufficiently analogous to the relationship between private
owner and municipality regarding public streets. Thus, when courts
were deciding issues of access to public streets-when, for example,
they decided that abutting owners had easements of accessSce-they
302. See supra text accompanying notes 127-35.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
304. See, e.g., Nevins v. City of Peoria, 41 111L 502, 507-08 (1866).
305. See, e.g., Proprietors of Locks and Canals v. Nashua & Lowell R.R. Corp., 64 Mass. (10
Cush.) 385, 388 (1852).
306. See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 418 (1823) (involving dwelling
house placed in danger of collapse when grade of adjacent street was lowered); O'Connor v.
Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187, 187-88 (1851) (involving cathedral that had to be moved when grade of
adjacent street was lowered by seventeen feet).
307. See, e.g., Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 220, 224-25 (1815).

308. See generally Transylvania Univ. v. City of Lexington, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 25 (1842);
Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289 (1838); Fletcher v. Auburn &
Syracuse R.R. Co., 25 Wend. 462 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841); In re Lewis Street, 2 Wend. 472 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1829); Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record
Straight, 1996 UTAH L. Rzv. 1211, 1250-53 (discussing Parker,Transylvania University, and
Fletcher); cf McCombs v. Town Council, 15 Ohio 474, 481-82 (1846) (Birchard, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority was wrong to recognize a municipal corporation's liability for a
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were developing an irreducibly public body of common law.3°o
Unsurprisingly, the development of this public common law was
intertwined with the development of the constitutional law of just
compensation. 310 Once one thought of an owner as having a reified
right of access to a public street, the effect of street grade changes on
access to abutting land seemed less like "consequential damage," and
more like a taking.31 ' And if, in deciding that injury to neighbors was
merely "consequential damage," a court was always implicitly
rejecting the claim that the neighbors had a more reified common law
right that was being "taken," then it was not a simple mistake to
characterize the earlier street-grade cases as common law cases, but
involved a subtler recasting of those cases. Once those cases were so
recast, the common law equivalence interpretation was rejected, not
just because making municipalities liable for consequential damages

change in street grade even though the landowner suffered no loss of lateral support, because a
private owner would not face liability in that situation). For a review of the development of the
constitutional law of access rights, see generally WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY
TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 21-71 (1977); William B. Stoebuck, The PropertyRight of Access
Versus the Powerof Eminent Domain, 47 TEx. L. REV. 733 (1969).
309. The rejection of the private-law analogy may be clearest in Crawford v. Village of
Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459, 469-70 (1857). The Crawfordcourt concedes that "if the owner of a lot
abutting on a street, stands in the same relation to the street, which adjacent proprietors of lots
stand in to each other, no right of a lot owner is invaded by cutting down or blocking up a
street...." Id. at 468-69. It then, however, "inquire[s] whether there is any analogy between
the rights of a lot owner in the adjacent lot of another person, and the rights of a lot owner in an
adjacent street," id, at 469, and decides that there is no such analogy. See id.
Public nuisance law is perhaps another (older) area of arguably irreducibly public common
law. In enforcing public nuisance law the state is not just acting for those members of the
public who own or possess land, but for the entire public; a public nuisance is not an aggregation
of private nuisances. Nor is it in any simple sense the aggregation of individual rights untied to
land ownership; it is doubtful, for example, that the state could permanently divest itself of its
authority to enforce nuisance law by distributing it to individuals in pro rata portions.
310. This point is particularly true in state courts, which had full control over both state
common law and state constitutional law. This statement itself, however, reflects in part
modem attitudes not shared by nineteenth-century judges who thought in terms of general
common law. See, e.g., Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1870):
The law which governs the case is the common law, on which this court has never acknowledged the right of the State courts to control our decisions, except, perhaps, in a
class of cases where the State courts have established, by repeated decisions, a rule of
property in regard to land titles peculiar to the State.
Id. at 506 (Miller, J.) (holding that the city of Milwaukee's regulation banning docks from
reaching past a particular line in a river took a riparian owner's common law rights without just
compensation)
311. Cf Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544,568-71 (1905) (holding that
construction of elevated railroad over a street deprived abutting landowner of easement of light
and air over that street); New Mexican R.R. Co. v. Hendricks, 30 P. 901, 901 (N.M. 1892)
(upholding an action to recover loss in land value caused by construction of railroad in street)
("[1The most the state can do is to surrender its own right to the public street or highway.., it
cannot impair or surrender the property represented by the easement of private owners of
abutting property in the right of way to and from their homes.").
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from street grading went beyond the common law, but because the
common law equivalence model assumed that common law was
essentially private law, and that all public law could be reduced to
Treatise writer Philip Nichols came closest to
private law.
articulating such a view in his rejection of common law equivalence:
Mo lay down the rule that damage in the [sense used in "taking or damage"
clauses] is such injury and such injury only as would be actionable if done by a
private individual neither clarifies the situation nor gives the clause a broad
enough meaning to include the specific form of injustice which it was chiefly
intended to remedy. Few public improvements which injuriously affect
adjoining land are of such a character that similar structures have been
erected without legislative authority frequently enough to have settled the
question whether they would constitute an actionable injury at common law,
so that the proposed test is in most cases useless, and furthermore many of the
injuries from public improvements which cause the greatest hardship to
individuals would not be actionable at common law. Thus the right of a
private owner to pile up a mound of earth on his own land close to his
neighbor's line, or to excavate on his own and so long as he did not deprive his
neighbor's soil of support, was unquestioned at common law; and yet the right
of a city or town to do this same thing in the course of grading a street without
liability to the adjoining owner was the chief cause of dissatisfaction with the
12
doctrine that unless there was a taking there was no right to compensation.

Finally, even though the case that became the leading
American case on "damage clause" interpretation, Rigney v. City of
Chicago, 13 wraps its holding in the mantle of common law equivalence, doubt that the rule in Rigney was really coextensive with the
common law both preceded and followed the case. Rigney held that:
[To warrant a recovery it must appear there has been some direct physical
disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the plaintiff enjoys in
connection with his property, and which gives to it an additional value, and
with
that by reason of such disturbance he has sustained a special damage3 14
respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public generally.

312. See 2 NICHOLS, supranote 34, § 312, at 849-50.

313. Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 fll 64 (1882).
314. Id. at 80-81; see also Metropolitan Bd. of Works v. McCarthy, 7 L.R.-E.&I. App. 243,
265 (H.L. 1874). In McCarthy, the plaintiff was the lessee of a building near a public dock on
the Thames River who successfully argued that the construction of the Thames Embankment,
which involved demolition of the dock and an end to easy unloading of ships at that location,
rendered his leasehold interest less valuable and was therefore an "injurious affection." The
McCarthy rule, crafted by McCarthy's lawyer Thesiger to allow McCarthy to recover while
assuring the court that ijurious affection! liability was not unlimited, is a truly outstanding
example of lawyering. See id. at 249 (summarizing Thesiger's argument); id. at 256 (Lord
Chelmsford) (adopting Thesiger's proposed rule); id. at 264 (Lord OHagan) (adopting Thesiger's
proposed rule).
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In the very next sentence, the Rigney court asserted that its rule was
merely a restatement of the common law:
In the absence of any statutory or constitutional provisions on the subject, the
common law afforded redress in all such cases, and we have no doubt it was
the intention of the framers of the present constitution to require
compensation to be made in all cases where, but for some legislative
315
enactment, an action would lie by the common law.

The Rigney rule, however, was copied almost verbatim from
Metropolitan Board of Works v. McCarthy,3 16 an English case interpreting the "injurious affection" requirement of the Lands Clauses
Consolidation Act. Although McCarthy formally followed the already
established English rule that actionability at common law was a prerequisite for recovery,3 17 two members of the McCarthy court openly
expressed doubt about the validity of that rule,318 as did members of
3 1 9 American courts
English courts in cases before and after McCarthy.
such as the Colorado Supreme Court in City of Denver v. Bayer were
skeptical that the English and Illinois courts actually applied common
law limitations on recovery:
The English courts ... have usually (not always) held that the words
"injuriously affected" only allow compensation where a right of action would
have existed at common law; yet, in their application of this construction, they

at 81.
315. Rieney, 102 IML
316. McCarthy, 7 L.R.-E.&I. App. at 243.
317. Heat 261 (Lord Penzance); see supra text accompanying notes 262, 279 (discussing the
English rule). There was some dissent from the common law equivalence model even among
English judges.
318. See McCarthy, 7 L.R.-E.&L App. at 252 (Lord Cairns) ("I do not pause to inquire
whether or not, if the question was now to be decided for the first time, [the test of actionability
at common law] is not a test somewhat narrow."); id&at 264 (Lord O'Hagan):
I confess, my Lords, that if the case were entirely new... I should have doubted
whether it was within the view of the framers of this Act of Parliament to make the
possibility of bringing an action, if the Act of Parliament had not existed, a condition of
compensation under the statute.
319. See Caledonian Ry. v. Walker's Trustees, 1881-85 All Eng. L.R. 592, 597 (H.L. 1882)
(Lord Selborne) (discussing common law actionability):
[A]n interpretation which it is too late to criticize now, though, if the point were open, I
should myself think it questionable if there were not a fallacy in such a test depending
upon the hypothesis of the same work being executed without authority, which, having
regard to the nature and operation of Acts for that class of public works, can hardly be
supposed to have been within the contemplation of Parliament.
See also Ricket v. Metropolitan Ry., 2 L.R. 175, 202 (H.L. 1867) (Lord Westbury, dissenting)
("There is nothing in the statutes to warrant the position that there shall be no compensation
where at common law there would be no right of action.").
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have been extremely liberal, sometimes declaring
that actionable at common
3 20
law which we generally do not so consider.

Although the Bayer court noted that other courts had taken conflict-

ing positions on the issue of whether. common law actionability was
required, it concluded that it need not decide the issue, because the
injury in the case before it (obstruction of access by construction of a
railroad in a public street) was actionable at common law.21

In a

later concurrence, however, the author of the Bayer opinion, Judge
Helm, revealed his own support for an interpretation that did not
require common law actionability, and argued that his position
"seem[ed] to be the construction given, though without discussion, by
the supreme courts of several states in the Union." 22 Under this
interpretation, the addition of the words "or damaged" to the state
constitution's just compensation provision indicated "the recognition
of a new right of action."323 In sum, whether because of the relatively
simple reasoning that private-law liability could not be accommodated
in the justification-stripping model, or because of the more complicated reasoning that any expansion of just compensation law changed
a portion of common law that was irreducibly public, the courts' attempts to interpret and apply the "taking or damage" amendments
were major factors in the transition to a remedial duty understanding
of just compensation provisions.
C. PermanentDamages and Injunctive Relief
Recall that the broad project of the Article is to describe the
transition from a justification-stripping/legislative disability model of
just compensation provisions to a remedial duty model, and to explore
the connections between that transition and changes in the operative
rules defining the just compensation rights of owners. Although the
changes set in motion by the "taking or damage" amendments are
probably the most important, another potentially fruitful set of rules
is that governing the ability of owners to obtain permanent damages
320. City ofDenver v. Bayer, 2 P. 6, 11 (Colo. 1883).
321. Id. at 12.
322. Denver Circle R.R. Co. v. Nestor, 15 P. 714, 725 (Colo. 1887). The Colorado Supreme
Court later embraced Justice Helm's position in Boardof County Commissioners v. Adler, 194 P.

621, 623 (Colo. 1920), noting that "damag[e]" in the "taken or damaged" clause meant:
[Sluch as would result from the making of an improvement in which the right of
eminent domain might be called into use .... The provision being thus limited, it may
be held.., that the right of recovery under such a constitutional provision is not limited
to actions maintainable at common law.
323. Nestor, 15 P. at 725 (emphasis in original).
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or injunctive relief. As detailed above, under the classic justificationstripping model, owners who successfully invoked a just compensation
provision to strip a defendant's justification could recover only retrospective damages, following the normal rule for trespass actions.324 In
the 1850s and 1860s, one can find a few isolated cases allowing owners to waive their right to an injunction or ejectment and sue for the
value of property appropriated, which the court would then award as
permanent damages .32

After 1870, however, more and more courts

allowed suits for permanent damages. This shift was aided by the
growing sense that an owner's action under a just compensation provision was distinct from a common law trespass action. The most
explicit recognition of this distinction and its effect on available damages appears in City of Denver v. Bayer,326 the first Colorado Supreme

Court case to interpret the 1876 Colorado Constitution's "taking or
damage" amendment. The Bayer court proclaimed that "[u]nlike
actions for trespass to realty, where the plaintiff can only recover for
the injury done up to the commencement of the suit; in suits of this
kind a single recovery may be had for the whole damage to result
from the act, the injury being continuing and permanent."27
At the same time that courts began to allow actions for permanent damages under "taking or damage" provisions, they also became
more reluctant to provide injunctive relief. In Stetson v. Chicago &
Evanston Railroad Co.,382 for example, the plaintiff, Stetson, owned
land abutting a street in which the defendant railroad, by permission
of the city of Chicago, had laid tracks. Stetson alleged that the operation of the railroad would "damage" his land within the meaning of
the 1870 Illinois Constitution's just compensation clause, and fied a
bill praying for an injunction against such operation until the railroad
paid him just compensation. The Illinois Constitution did not contain
a provision that required payment of just compensation before an
appropriation, 329 and the mere failure to pay compensation before
commencing operation would not be grounds for an injunction. On
the other hand, even absent such a timing provision, courts would
traditionally grant an injunction if a taking was about to occur and no
statute provided an adequate post-deprivation procedure for an aggrieved property owner to obtain the constitutionally guaranteed just
324. See supratext accompanying notes 184-85.

325. See, e.g., Mayor and Council of Rome v. Perkins, 30 Ga. 154, 155-56 (1860).
326. City ofDenver v. Bayer, 2 P. 6 (Colo. 1883).
327. 1& at 15.

328. Stetson v. Chicago & Evanston R.R. Co., 75 hE.74 (1874).
329. For an example of such a provision, see supra note 22.
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compensation; in such a case, the legislature would have purported to
authorize a taking without providing just compensation, an act outside of its competence. Yet the Stetson court denied Stetson's request
for an injunction without mentioning the existence of any statutory
post-deprivation procedure, and apparently there was none. Instead,
it relied on the existence of an ordinary action at law, in which, it
intimated, Stetson could recover permanent damages. ° The availability of a non-statutory action for permanent damages was becoming a substitute for a statutory post-deprivation procedure; if the
constitution itself provided an adequate post-deprivation remedy, the
lack of a statutory remedy would not be grounds for enjoining an act
amounting to a "taking or damaging" until compensation was paid.
The Stetson court, followed by the Georgia Supreme Court in
Moore v. City of Atlanta,33' concluded that this regime was appropriate when property was not taken, but merely damaged. First, it reasoned, the amount of damage could only be known after the improvement was constructed and in operation: "How can it be known before
the completion of the railroad what damages, if any, the complainant
will sustain, and how could the same be measured?"332 Second, and
more importantly, the Stetson court reasoned that construction of
public improvements would be greatly impeded if compensation, not
only for land actually taken, but for damage to all neighboring land,
had to be paid before the improvement was constructed and operated.333 The Moore court was even more emphatic on this point; after
ruling that an abutting landowner damaged by a change in street
grade could "recover damages for such injury to his
freehold.., measured by the decrease in the actual value of his
property[,]" 334 it denied his request for an injunction, and intoned:
Has [the abutting landowner] or any other citizen the right absolutely to stop
the entire system of grades of a whole street, or of two streets, because his
property will be damaged if the contemplated improvement, in the judgment of
the authorities, be carried into effect? Is it not better that one man's property
be incidentally damaged than that the city authorities be absolutely prohibited
330. Stetson complained that the construction of the track "had depreciated and decreased
the value and price of lots fronting on the avenue," Stetson, 75 IM.at 75, and that the railroad's
operation "would further diminish the price and value of lots .... " Id. The court concluded that
"[wihat injury, if any, [Stetson] has sustained, may be compensated by damages recoverable in
an action at law." Id. at 78.
331. Moore v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 611 (1883).
332. Stetson, 75 Ill. at 78.

333. Id. ("[If the] company [were] bound to stop and litigate the question of damages with
every one who may claim to be injured.., it would be found to be utterly impracticable to
construct any railroad or other public improvement within any reasonable time.").
334. Moore, 70 Ga. at 614.

19991

CONSTITUTIONAL TORT

from grading the streets? Is it not more in harmony with all law and reason
that this be so, especially when whatever damage the one man sustains the
municipality will be made to pay? It might damage the one man one thousand
dollars to make the contemplated grade; it might damage the march
of
335
improvement in a great and growing city millions of money not to make it.

Thus, here as well, one might trace a change in operative rule,

as well as the change toward understanding just compensation provisions as imposing remedial duties, to the courts' response to the
"taking or damage" amendments. When those amendments expanded
just compensation protection to cover the effects of public improvements on many neighboring landowners, courts concluded that allowing injunctive relief absent a statutory post-deprivation procedure
would unduly impede "the march of improvement"; thus, they invented an adequate non-statutory post-deprivation procedure for
recovering just compensation. With that procedure in place, they
denied injunctive relief.336 The invention of that non-statutory postdeprivation procedure, with a different measure of damages than
traditionally allowed in trespass or case actions, further supported
the perception that the Constitution itself imposed a remedial duty.
D. Immunities
A final group of operative rules to consider are those concerning sovereign, governmental, and official immunities. These rules
determine, in part, the parties against whom an owner has a just
compensation remedy. In advance of specific historical research, one
might hypothesize that the change from a justification-stripping
model to a constitutional tort model was precipitated by, or immediately followed by, changes in immunity doctrine. For example, one
335. Id at 614-15.
336. Philip Nichols, writing in 1917, explained this development along similar lines, without tying it specifically to the "taking or damage" amendments:
when... an expensive public improvement has been erected by authority of the legislature upon private land, or so near it as to "take" it in the constitutional sense, [but]
there have been no valid condemnation proceedings ... it will be a matter of conven-

ience to both parties, and to the public as well, if the owner can have his damages
assessed once and for all, and the corporation which erected the structure can be at the
same time confirmed in its right of occupancy without further interference.
The convenience of an action which will produce such a result, or rather the inconvenience of there being none, has led to the creation of the necessary remedy by one
means or another in almost every jurisdiction, the courts, as in so many other matters,
being unconsciously influenced by sociological considerations when the statutory authority was lacking and having thus been led to adapt the law to the conceptions of policy
and justice prevailing in the community of which they form a part.
2 NICHOLS, supranote 34, § 478, at 1278-79.
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might think that the expansion of immunity for individual public
officials had made it more difficult to recover against individual officers under justification-stripping, and therefore had led propertyrights-conscious courts to reshape just compensation clauses as encompassing a right to recover directly from the state. In fact, however, as detailed above, 337 the developing law of official immunity
never affected actions for violations of property rights: courts either
made an explicit exception for such actions or simply failed to recognize any immunity that would affect those actions. Nor did courts
that adopted a constitutional tort model of just compensation actions
immediately begin to entertain actions that previously would have
been barred by sovereign or governmental immunity.
To the contrary, the Illinois Constitution of 1870 contains
dramatic evidence that there was not generally thought to be a connection between the conception of the just compensation clause as
providing a private damages action and the abrogation of sovereign
immunity.

In debate, delegates to, the 1869-1870 constitutional

convention stated that the proposed "taking or damage" amendment
was inspired by the English Parliament's Lands Clauses
Consolidation Act; because the Lands Clauses Act did explicitly grant
a right of action for damages, it is reasonable to think that convention
delegates likely thought, though perhaps not in a conscious, articulated manner, that the "taking or damage" amendment did so as well.
Yet the same delegates adopted a provision that constitutionalized the
principle of sovereign immunity in the most extreme form, providing
that "[tihe State of Illinois shall never be made defendant in any court
of law or equity,"338thereby wresting from the legislature the power it
had had under the Illinois Constitution of 1848 to control actions
against the state. 39 Nor did the debate in the constitutional convention leave any doubt that the sovereign immunity provision was supposed to trump whatever rights owners might have had under the
1870 Constitution's "taking or damage" provision. That latter provision generally required that a jury ascertain just compensation, but
made an exception when just compensation was to be provided by the
state.34° The state's exemption from the jury requirement was contro-

337. See supra text accompanying notes 86-107.
338. ILL. CoNST. of 1870, art. IV, § 26.
339. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 34 (revised 1870) (The general assembly shall direct by
law in what manner suits may be brought against the state.").
340. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 13 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation. Such compensation, when not made by the State, shall be

ascertained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law.") (emphasis added).
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versial, but was explained and defended on the ground that, because
the state had absolute sovereign immunity, it alone should be the
judge of the sufficiency of the compensation it provided:
I conceive it to be very essential that, when compensation is made by the
State, the people of the State should not be restricted and regulated as to the
ascertainment of the compensation. The question of compensation, in such
case, should be left to the Legislature, instead of twelve men.

We have provided in the legislative article, upon full discussion, that the
State, in no event shall be made defendant in a suit at law. We reserve the
rights of the whole people when we provide that the State, the political
embodiment of the people, shall not be sued-shall not be the subject of jury
trials, or any trials whatever.
The effect of the clause is merely this: that when compensation is made
by the State directly, the State shall be the proper judge of the compensation,
upon the same principle that we provided that the State should never be
sued.4 1

Thus, adoption of a constitutional tort model was not initially thought
to have any connection to the abrogation of sovereign immunity.
That is not the end of the story, however. The United States
Supreme Court, while adopting the view that the Just Compensation
Clause is "'se lf -execu t i n g ... with respect to compensation[,]' " has

341. 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supranote 254, at 1580 (statement of Mr. Benjamin).
342. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (quoting Nichols). In the federal
courts, the transition from a justification-stripping model to a constitutional tort model has been
tightly linked to the history of the federal statutes creating jurisdiction over claims against the
United States and waiving federal sovereign immunity. In 1855, Congress passed the Court of
Claims Act, creating the Court of Claims and conferring on it jurisdiction over actions founded
"upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States...." Court of
Claims Act of 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, 612 (1855) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2525 (1994)).
The Court of Claims and the Supreme Court construed this statute to grant jurisdiction over
certain claims of owners for just compensation under the Takings Clause, by allowing owners to
bring a common law action of indebitatus assumpsit, alleging that the United States had
impliedly promised to pay for property it had taken, so long as the United States did not dispute
that the plaintiffowner's title. See United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884):
The law will imply a promise to make the required compensation, where property, to
which the government asserts no title, is taken, pursuant to an act of Congress, as private property to be applied for public uses. Such an implication [is] consistent with the
constitutional duty of the government, as well as with common justice ....
Id. at 656-57. Jurisdiction under the "implied promise" fiction, however, did not reach all
takings within the scope of the Just Compensation Clause; if the government did not
acknowledge the plaintiffs title to the property alleged to have been taken, then, the Court held,
no promise to pay the owner just compensation could be implied. See Langford v. United States,
101 U.S. 341 (1879) (holding that the Court of Claims did not have jurisdiction over an owner's
claim for just compensation when the United States disputed title). The Langford court noted
that "Mw]e are not prepared to deny that when the government of the United States... takes for
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never held that the Clause abrogates either federal or state sovereign
immunity,343 and the reference to sovereign immunity in FirstEnglish
that some have taken to be an oblique hint about abrogation may be
explicable on other grounds. 344 But beginning in the 1920s and 1930s,
many state courts began to hold that state just compensation provipublic use... land to which it asserts no claim of title, but admits the ownership to be private
or individual, there arises an implied obligation to pay the owner its just value." Id. at 343.
In 1887, Congress passed the Tucker Act, which enlarged the Court of Claims's jurisdiction
to include "[a]ll claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States .... " Tucker Act, ch.
359, 24 Stat. 505, 505 (1887). Several decades later, the Court decided that property owners'
actions claiming just compensation were not based on an implied promise, but were simply
"founded upon the Constitution" within the meaning of the Tucker Act. See Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933). Jacobs represents the Court's acceptance of the modem
"constitutional tort" model of just compensation provisions, as is demonstrated by the citations
to Jacobs in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971) and FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 315 (1987).
343. The classic cases holding that the Just Compensation Clause does not abrogate sovereign immunity, now somewhat dated, are Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 580-82
(1934) and Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 168 (1894). More recently, the Court
seems to have indirectly affirmed that the Just Compensation Clause does not of its own force
abrogate federal sovereign immunity. In UnitedStates v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983),
the Court held that the Tucker Act merely granted jurisdiction and waived sovereign immunity,
but did not itself create any substantive rights. Rather, the Court concluded, "[a] substantive
right must be found in some other source of law, such as 'the Constitution .... ' Id. at 216.
Moreover, "[n]ot every claim invoking the Constitution... is cognizable under the Tucker Act."
Id. The claimant must be seeking money damages against the United States and must
"demonstrate that the source of substantive law he relies upon 'can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.'" Id. at 216-17
(quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)). This analysis seems clearly to
contemplate that constitutional provisions "mandating compensation" create substantive rights
to damages that plaintiffs can seek to vindicate once Congress waives sovereign immunity, but
do not themselves waive sovereign immunity. Cf Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 613 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("No one would suggest that, if Congress had not passed the Tucker Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994), the courts would be able to order disbursements from the
Treasury to pay for property taken under lawful authority (and subsequently destroyed) without
just compensation.").
344. The reference is in a footnote that rejects the Solicitor General's argument "that the
prohibitory nature of the Fifth Amendment,... combined with principlesof sovereign immunity,
establishes that the Amendment... is... not a remedial provision." FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at
316 n.9 (emphasis added); see also supra note 12 (discussing this footnote). The Court concludes
that "the cases cited in the text... refute the argument of the United States," id.; none of those
cases addresses the issue of sovereign immunity, and one of them, Jacobs v. United States, 290
U.S. 13 (1933), was decided a year before the Court most recently decided that the Just
Compensation Clause did not abrogate federal sovereign immunity. The nature of the
governmental defendant in FirstEnglish-a county-suggests at least two paths of development
other than the abrogation of sovereign immunity. First, the Court might decide that the
Fourteenth Amendment abrogated state sovereign immunity with respect to the incorporated
Fifth Amendment, even though the Fifth Amendment did not abrogate federal sovereign
immunity. Second, the Court might decide that the Just Compensation Clause did not have any
effect on sovereign immunity, but did provide a damages action against public entities that do
not have sovereign immunity under federal law. Counties such as Los Angeles County cannot
claim sovereign immunity (that is, Eleventh Amendment immunity) against a federal law claim.
See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
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sions did abrogate state sovereign immunity, and when they did, they
relied heavily on the "constitutional tort" conception of just compensation provisions as imposing remedial duties. The first case to hold
that a governmental entity otherwise immune from tort liability was
liable for just compensation if it "took or damaged property" was
Board of Commissioners of Logan County v. Adler, a 1920 Colorado
case.4 5 The nub of its reasoning relies on the notion that the just

compensation clause itself mandates a damages remedy:
It being a prerogative of the state to be exempt from coercion by suit, a
provision of the fundamental law for compensation in case of damage, which is
applicable to injuries caused by instrumentalities of the state, or by its agents,
and to no other injuries, must be held to except such cases from the exemption.
If this be not so, the plain intent of the inhibition is limited, and made, to a
considerable extent, ineffective.m

Similar reasoning appears in a landmark 1931 South Carolina case
holding that not just a county, but the state itself, cannot assert sovereign immunity as a defense to a property owner's suit for just com-

pensation:
ITMhe state... can[not] itself or by any statute or through any agency
take property without paying compensation. "Immunity from suit" cannot
avail in this instance, and, if no statute exists, liability still exists, because as
to this provision the Constitutio[n] [is] self-executing.
To hold otherwise would be to say that the Constitution itself gives a
right which the Legislature may deny by failing or refusing to provide a
remedy. Such a construction would indeed make the constitutional provision a
hollow mockery instead of a safeguard for the rights of citizens.4 7

What conclusion should one draw from this history? One possibility is
that courts deciding that just compensation provisions abrogated
sovereign immunity did so for reasons quite unrelated to the acceptance of a constitutional tort model of such provisions; perhaps they
were influenced by contemporary scholarship arguing that sovereign
immunity was obsolete.3 Even if the courts' discussion of the "self345. Board of Comm'rs v. Adler, 194 P. 621 (Colo. 1920).
346. Id. at 622.
347. Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 157 S.E. 842, 850 (S.C. 1931).
348. See, for example, Edwin Borchard's influental article that appeared in installments in
the Yale Law Journalbetween 1924 and 1927. Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924); 34 YALE L.J. 229 (1925); Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); 36 YALE L.J. 757 (1927); 36 YALE L.J. 1039 (1927).

In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of state courts began to discard the notion of common law
governmental and sovereign immunity altogether. See supra note 343 (citing cases rejecting a
common law governmental immunity defense). Moreover, in recent years, many state courts

140

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:57

executing" nature of just compensation provisions is post hoc rationalization, however, the fact that the rationalization has some appeal,
some plausibility, suggests an affinity between the constitutional tort
model and the idea that the provision should provide a basis for recovery against the state.
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of the transition from the traditional conception of
just compensation provisions as limitations on legislative competence
to the modern conception of those provisions as direct bases for damage actions is a history of surprise and complexity. It is not the history of how property owners gained a damages remedy protected by
the constitution; the traditional conception always assumed a preexisting common law damages remedy which the legislature was not
competent to foreclose if such a foreclosure would leave an owner
whose property had been taken without just compensation. On the
other hand, neither is it a history of a purely theoretical shift in understanding with no links to changes in the operative rules that define property owners' rights. The shift has some relationship to
changes in rules regarding the injuries cognizable under just compensation provisions, the damages recoverable for cognizable injuries, the
circumstances under which injunctive relief is available, and the
availability of governmental and sovereign immunity defenses to
states and state subdivisions. Yet those relationships seem to consist
of something less than logical necessity. The ultimate lesson is, perhaps, a cautionary one, suggesting that the evolution of legal doctrine
is subtle and complex, and that to describe the influence of change in
have recognized private damages actions, not only under just compensation provisions, but
under other individual rights provisions, and not just against state officials (as Bivens was
against federal officials), but against the state itself. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 602 (Cal. 1979); Moresi v. Department of wildlife &
Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1092-93 (La. 1990); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d
921, 929-30 (Md. 1984); Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1132-33 (N.Y. 1996); Corum v.
University of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276, 289-90,292 (N.C. 1992); Hunter v. Port Auth., 419 A.2d 631,
635 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). Other state courts have declined to create such an action. See, e.g.,
Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198, 1205-06 (Haw. 1979); Hunter v. City of Eugene, 787 P.2d 881,
884 (Or. 1990). For commentary on the state law development of constitutional private
damages actions, see John M. Baker, The Minnesota Constitution as Sword: The Evolving
Private Right of Action, 20 WM. MITcHELL L. REV. 313 (1994); Jennifer Friesen, Recovering
Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TE L. REV. 1269, 1298 (1985); Jefferson, supra
note 5; Paul R. Owen, Reticent Revolution: Prospectsfor Damage Suits Under the New Mexico
Bill of Rights, 25 N.M. L. REV. 173 (1995); Eric J. Stockel, Brown v. State of New York: Judge
Simons Says New York State Can Be Held Liable for Money Damages, 13 TOURO L. REV. 653
(1997).
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one area on another, we must conceive of a logic that admits to degree
and of conceptual links that can be of varying strength.

